Section — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
I. On Taxes
I. Notion. Taxes are goods which the competent Authority imposes as to be contributed for assisting the common necessity or utility. That an authority of this sort has this right is clear from what was said in n. 764. Moreover, it is said:
Goods; by which are understood real burdens, whether in kind or, as commonly obtains, in money.
Competent Authority, whether ecclesiastical or civil; wherefore canons 1504-1506 and the Civil Code of the country should be consulted.
For assisting, etc.; these matters may be seen explained in n. 1053.
II. Division. Taxes are especially distinguished into direct and indirect. Direct taxes are those which are founded on stable possession or use of goods, and are demanded at stated times; by authors they are said directly or immediately to affect persons.1 Indirect taxes are those which, when some fact occurs, must be paid; they are said directly to affect things,2 and are called indirect because sellers, on account of the taxes imposed, increase the price, so that they fall indirectly upon buyers.
1 Such are, for example, taxes on persons, lands, buildings, capital. Succession tax is counted by some among direct taxes, by others among indirect taxes.
2 Such as customs and tolls.
III. Requisites for the justice of a tax law. The following are required: 1° a just cause, namely of common necessity or utility (764); 2° the proportion of the tax to the cause or to the causes, so that a greater burden not be imposed than the causes require. I have said or to the causes, because today it is not so strictly determined which taxes precisely serve for such an object; 3° a just distribution, namely such that each person must pay according to his economic strength (St. Alphonsus, III, 615).
Corollary. Taxes should not too easily be regarded as unjust, as, for example, taxes imposed for maintaining armies (n. 1059), or for constructing certain luxurious buildings, since these bring some social good with them. Yet other taxes, for example those to be spent on bad schools, must be condemned; and taxes to be spent on useless or dangerous things, such as theaters, etc., are even less pleasing.
IV. The obligation of a tax law is explained in different ways by different authors. Some hold all tax laws to be merely penal; others judge that tax laws which impose direct taxes are mixed, and that those which prescribe indirect taxes are merely penal. Then it is disputed whether mixed penal laws oblige from commutative justice or from another virtue.1
Now, first, the natural law dictates that taxes must be paid so that the common necessity may be assisted (St. Alphonsus, III, 616). Positive and just laws determine this natural law further. But with respect to these laws it seems this must be said:
- The law of paying a tax, after the amount to be paid has been legally defined, seems mixed, or to oblige to the act. And first, indeed, Sacred Scripture seems to favor this opinion: "Render therefore the things that are Caesar's to Caesar, and the things that are God's to God."2 And: "Wherefore be subject of necessity, not only for wrath, but also for conscience' sake. For therefore also you pay tribute: for they are the ministers of God, serving unto this purpose. Render therefore to all men their dues: tribute, to whom tribute; custom, to whom custom."3 These, in their obvious sense, impose the act of paying, not only the penalties to be undergone after neglected payment. Then, the legislator is judged to make laws in the manner which is especially suited to the matter of the laws. But to the matter of tax laws it is especially suited that the very act of paying the tax be prescribed. For tax laws further determine the natural law itself of paying tax; and it is fitting that, through laws which further determine the natural law, the act itself also be prescribed, just as that is done through the law itself which is further determined.
Objection 1. Modern legislators do not intend to oblige or truly command; indeed, they neither acknowledge nor care for obligation, or the power of obliging, or any morality.
For the response, see n. 162.
Objection 2. Common estimation holds tax laws to be merely penal.
Response. I deny that, from common estimation, the just law of paying tax, after the amount has been legally defined, is merely penal. The estimation involves at most: 1° that the taxes imposed are greater than just, and therefore that there is no obligation of paying all; 2° that the law of declaring things subject to indirect tax is merely penal.
- The law of declaring things subject to tax, if perhaps such a law exists:4
a) It seems mixed, if there is question of direct taxes. The reason is that the legislator is presumed to make in the same way the law which concerns the means by which the amount to be paid can be defined, as the law of paying the defined amount; and this presumption is not overthrown by contrary arguments. Yet he does not sin who follows the received custom of somewhat diminishing the value of things to be declared; nor is he to be rebuked who, in a personal tax, does not declare everything to the exact measure.
b) Practically it can be held as merely penal, if there is question of indirect taxes. The reason is that, what cannot be said about the law of declaring things subject to direct tax, a fairly common estimation holds this law as merely penal. There is added that an exorbitant penalty threatens those who defraud, i.e. one which, considering only the gravity of the act, is graver than is fitting; now, to many it seems less suitable to oblige both under fault and under the threat of an exorbitant penalty (cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 616). Therefore he does not sin who, by declaring nothing or even by hiding things, defrauds indirect taxes.
To what extent foreigners are held by laws, including tax laws, see n. 133.
- Tax laws which we have said are mixed, sufficiently probably do not oblige from commutative justice, but from legal justice or another virtue distinct from commutative justice. The reason is taken from the fact that an obligation of commutative justice is not proved, as will be clear from discussing the arguments of the contrary opinion. Therefore, when the law has not been fulfilled, there is no obligation of restitution. Yet note that the obligation of paying the tax persists until that time for demanding it has passed.
Objection 1. The legislator, by imposing taxes, disposes of part of the goods of his citizens, and assigns a strict right in it to the treasury; this he can do by virtue of eminent domain.
Response. That the legislator, by a direct disposition, establishes a strict right is not clear. With equal right it is admitted that the legislator, by imposing a tax, disposes of part of the goods only in this sense, that he imposes on the citizens an obligation, for example of legal justice, to yield part of their goods to the treasury.
Objection 2. Legal justice can indeed regard all honorable acts, but those very acts are imposed from the motive of honesty proper to them, not from the motive of legal justice.
Response. Nothing prevents us from saying that in many acts there is the honesty of legal justice, and that they are imposed from the motive of that virtue. Besides, from the fact that an honorable act is not imposed from the motive of legal justice, it does not plainly follow that it is imposed from the motive of commutative justice.
Objection 3. From the fundamental pact of many kingdoms, the people themselves or the citizens, who are all declared equal before the law, elect deputies as mandataries, who each year decide what public expenses are to be made and how the money for this is to be procured. Therefore the mandating citizens are judged immediately to oblige themselves to furnishing the things which the mandataries have decreed necessary.
Response. The deputies are not mandataries strictly so called, or in no way act in the name of the citizens, but in their own name. Moreover, the deputies concede to the Government the right of procuring the necessary moneys, without establishing that these are to be demanded from the motive of commutative justice.
Objection 4. Taxes must be paid according to equality of thing, i.e. of the tax established, to thing, i.e. the tax to be paid. But equality of thing to thing is regarded by commutative justice.
Response. Taxes must be paid according to a proportionately established equality of thing to thing, I concede; according to equality taken simply, I deny. But proportionately established equality of thing to thing is not regarded by commutative justice (n. 379).
1 The opinion of some, who assert an obligation of obedience, seems altogether to be rejected (n. 148).
4 Namely, here and there some laws prescribe that citizens declare things subject to tax, others commit this to officials to be investigated, others leave citizens the faculty of choosing either one.
Corollary I. A tax law about whose justice there is meritorious and serious doubt per se does not oblige, because there is question of damage to the subject; in which case, in doubt, per se there is no obligation of observing the precept (n. 146; St. Alphonsus, III, 617). But since in doubt it is commonly to be presumed in favor of the justice of the law, the case will not occur so easily with respect to a determinate law. Yet with greater right it is admitted that, in so great a multitude of taxes, certain ones are less just, especially insofar as they are applied to harmful rather than useful things, for example to supporting harmful universities and schools; hence anyone who prudently judges that he has sufficiently contributed to the common good can defraud the other taxes; indeed, practically, it can be said that payment of a third part can be evaded. Yet those are to be disapproved who make a profession of defrauding duties, because they expose their soul and their goods and those of their family to danger.
Corollary II. Those who corrupt tax guards cooperate toward an unjust act, and therefore are held to restore the value of the taxes defrauded; but they are not held to restore the fine which, if caught, they would have had to pay (p. 657). Nor are they held to restitution or do they sin who, by words or little gifts, etc., strive to win the guards over to themselves, so that they abstain from unjust vexation, or so that they act kindly, though not unjustly, especially by carrying these laws into execution in a human way, as is fitting.
Corollary III. Those who deceive the guards, for example by seriously declaring that nothing subject to tax is present, are held to restitution if the law prescribes declaration, or if the citizen, according to what was said in n. 1054, has chosen declaration. The reason is that the treasury is impeded by an unjust means from obtaining a good (n. 996). But if the Government commits the matter to officials to be investigated, the deceiver sufficiently probably is not held to restore, because in the case the Government seems not to care for the declaration of the citizen, of whatever kind it may be, and therefore not to urge the right which per se belongs to anyone, namely, not to be impeded from obtaining a good by an unjust means. Besides, true deception will not easily be present; indeed, even a lie can be prevented by the use of restriction.
Corollary IV. Finally, observe that those are not taxes which must be paid to the State on account of services which it furnishes in favor of private persons, for example in transporting persons, letters, or goods. Here rather there is a contract. Yet very many things which are established by administrators can sufficiently probably be held as merely penal dispositions, for example, that money not be inserted in ordinary letters, or letters inserted in other things to be transported; that one person not set out with the same ticket and another return with it, etc.