§ II. On the Subjects of Law Generally

I. All human beings are subject to the natural law, even infants and the perpetually insane. The reason is that the natural law is founded in human nature itself (n. 81). Hence neither infants nor the perpetually insane may be induced to violate the natural law¹ (St. Alphonsus, I, 153).

¹ There are, nevertheless, acts which, when placed by infants or by the perpetually insane, or by those who lack reason only actually, for example by the drunk, lose their objective disorder, such as insulting words (St. Alphonsus, V, 78). Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine precisely which acts ought to be referred to this class.

II. To the law of nations, insofar as it is said to pertain to the law of nature (n. 92), the same persons are subject who are subject to the law of nature. Insofar as it is said to differ from the law of nature (n. 92), all are subject to it to whom the matter of that law, that is, of the law of nations, pertains, not only inferiors but also governors. The reason is that this law, as introduced by the consent of all nations, is superior to the governors of individual kingdoms.

III. In order that someone be subject to positive law, it is required that he be the subject of the respective legislator, and, if there is question of human law, that he habitually enjoy the use of reason. I said:

1. That he be the subject of the respective legislator, that is, that he be subject to his jurisdiction in such matter.

2. That, if there is question of human law, he habitually enjoy the use of reason. Namely:

a) The divine legislator can bind all, at least in first act, and, as authors commonly seem to teach, He has in fact bound all.

b) A legislator lower than God is not considered to have received the power of binding, not even in first act, those human beings who cannot know the law and be directed by it. Therefore infants and the perpetually insane are excluded; but not the half-witted or those who have lucid intervals, nor those who lack the use of reason only actually, such as the drunk or sleeping. One who induces these latter, for example a drunk man, to violate positive law does not of itself commit the sin of scandal, because the drunk man lacks formal fault, but he sins against the law to whose material transgression he incites him. Moreover, observe that a perpetually insane person, although he is not subject to the directive obligation of law, nevertheless participates in the rights and other effects of laws. Thus, for example, their acts, that is, acts placed in their name by a guardian, can be invalidated, etc.

Corollary I. All human beings are subject to universal divine positive law. Hence Christ declares: "Going, teach all nations... teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you."¹

Corollary II. All baptized persons habitually enjoying the use of reason are subject to universal ecclesiastical law (cf. can. 12). So, at least generally.

Therefore unbelievers are excluded, as those who are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Church. Hence the Apostle says: "What is it to me to judge those who are outside?"² Therefore it is licit, for example, to set meat before the aforesaid persons on days of abstinence.

I said: so, at least generally; for 1. concerning some, certain special things must be noted, which we shall do in § III; 2. concerning subjects of the Eastern Church, can. 1 is to be observed: although in the Code of Canon Law the discipline of the Eastern Church also is often referred to, nevertheless the Code regards only the Latin Church and does not oblige the Eastern Church, unless there is question of those things which from the very nature of the matter affect the Eastern Church also.

Corollary III. To a particular law, whether ecclesiastical or civil, there are subject those who habitually enjoy the use of reason and, if there is question of a law established for a territorial community,³ are both of the territory and in the territory, with the prescription of can. 14 remaining firm. I said:

1. They are of the territory; in other words, it is required that they have domicile or quasi-domicile in the territory of the community. This condition, if there is question of an inferior legislator, for example of a bishop, is necessary, because only through domicile or quasi-domicile is someone constituted a subject of an inferior legislator placed over a territorial community (can. 94). But if the Supreme Pontiff imposes a law on a community of this sort, he is presumed to bind only those who are subjects of the governor of that community, and therefore have domicile or quasi-domicile in his territory.

2. They are in the territory; in other words, it is required that they actually dwell in the territory of the community, namely, a territorial law does not affect subjects except by means of the territory. And this holds also as regards those who have gone out of the territory in fraud of the law, as it is said, that is, for the purpose of being exempted from the law.

3. With the prescription of can. 14 remaining firm, which canon concerns travelers and vagi; considering that canon, some are at times held by territorial law, although they are not in the territory or lack domicile or quasi-domicile in it (n. 131).

¹ Matt. 28:19-20.

² 1 Cor. 5:12.

³ For example, for a diocese.