§ IV. On Counsels

(St. Thomas, I-II, q. 108, a. 4.)

I. Notion. Counsel is here understood as an ordering by which something, according to itself, is advised before another, but is not commanded. The object is that which, according to itself, is better than another; of this sort is, for example, virginity.

II. Existence of counsels is clear first from Sacred Scripture: "Now concerning virgins," says St. Paul, "I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give counsel, as having obtained mercy of the Lord, that I may be faithful.... Therefore both he who joins his virgin in marriage does well, and he who does not join her does better."¹ Then it is clear to reason that there are acts which, according to themselves, are more perfect than others, and therefore, according to themselves, are advised before others, but are not commanded. Thus, for example, according to itself it is more perfect to give a richer alms than a less rich one.

¹ 1 Cor. 7:25-40; cf. Matt. 19:17 sq.

III. Obligation of following counsel. 1. There is not, as is clear, an obligation of doing what according to itself is more perfect, but here and now is less perfect. Thus, for example, often here and now it is better to study, although prayer according to itself is more perfect.

2. Another question is whether there is an obligation of preferring what here and now is more perfect (understand: what is held by the one about to act here and now as more perfect) to an action or omission which here and now is less perfect. This question today is sharply disputed. Now some¹ affirm the obligation of doing what here and now is held by the agent as more perfect. Others² deny it, and it seems one must agree with them. For first, the more perfect does not oblige from the object, since it is not prescribed; nor from the fact that its omission could not be made for an honorable end, for it can be omitted on account of the honorable end of a less good work. Then, if the obligation of doing what is more perfect were admitted, by the same reason there would have to be admitted an obligation of doing it in a more perfect manner, and therefore from actual charity. But no one will have affirmed an obligation of this sort.

Objection 1. Since man is wholly ordered to the end, the order of reason requires that he attain the end as much as he can attain it. But one who prefers the less perfect to the more perfect does not satisfy this obligation.

Response. From the fact that man is wholly ordered to the end, it does not follow that he must attain the end as much as he can attain it. For if this were admitted, man would not only have to choose always what is more perfect, but also to perform it in the more perfect manner, that is, from actual charity. But at least the latter, as we noted above, no one will have admitted. It suffices that man always and in all things behave rightly toward the end; it is not required that always and in all things he behave toward the end in the more perfect manner.

Objection 2. No honorable end can be assigned on account of which the less perfect is preferred to the more perfect. An end of this sort does not consist in the fact that the more perfect is omitted precisely and only because it is pleasing to omit it, since such a volition would be idle, lacking pious utility or just necessity (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 54, a. 3). Nor does it consist in the end on account of which the less perfect is placed; for that end indeed suffices for placing the less perfect considered separately, but not for placing it when the more perfect occurs. In a word: no honorable reason is given for choosing the less perfect before the more perfect.

Response. Someone cannot honorably prefer the lesser good to the greater good by judgment; but he can honorably prefer it in desiring and choosing, because on the one hand the more perfect does not oblige by reason of itself or from the object, and on the other hand the less perfect, by reason of its own moral goodness, can be desired and chosen (cf. St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 23, a. 8, ad 9).

Objection 3. In Matthew it is declared: "You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and with your whole soul, and with your whole mind";³ these words are difficult to explain in the opinion of the adversaries.

Response. These words are sufficiently explained concerning charity above all things, which is to be shown to God, the Supreme Good.

St. Thomas does not treat the question in a special article, but many texts are found which state our proposition clearly enough; wherefore it is pleasing to cite some of them. First he has these words: "The observance of each of them in some special case pertains to counsel in a qualified sense, namely, in that case; for instance, when a man gives some alms when he is not held to give, he follows the counsel of poverty as regards that deed; likewise when someone does not follow his own will in some deed which he could licitly do, he follows the counsel of obedience in that case" (I-II, q. 108, a. 4). From these things it is clear that St. Thomas supposes that also in particular, or in the concrete, there truly are better works to which a man is not held and which he can licitly omit. Then in the disputed question De veritate, q. 23, a. 8, ad 9, refuting the objection in which the choice of the lesser good is asserted to be perverse, he responds thus: if "someone by judgment prefers that which is less good to the greater good, there will be perversity of choice; but not if he prefers it in desiring; for man is not held to pursue better things always in acting." Finally, in II, dist. 39, q. 3, a. 3, ad 6, where he speaks of the obligation of conscience, which is the practical dictate of reason showing what must be done here and now, he says: "When conscience dictates to someone that it is good to do some work of counsel: if he does not do it, he does not sin, because he does not apprehend it as a due good and subject to precept."

St. Alphonsus does not explicitly treat the question, but he concedes that those who confess only some imperfections, about which it is doubted whether they reach venial sins, are absolved conditionally. Therefore he seems to deny that imperfections are necessarily venial sins.

Besides, note:

a) By the consent of all, one who neglects what here and now is more perfect can sin by reason of an inordinate motive, scandal, or contempt; furthermore he can expose himself to the danger that divine aids be diminished.

b) In practice it is often difficult to determine what here and now is more perfect, all the more because the reason that someone not be overwhelmed by excessive efforts, nor tortured by scruples, easily brings it about that what in itself is less perfect becomes here and now more perfect, or equally perfect.

c) "As regards the direction of souls, one must insist more closely on a pure and holy intention than on a longer examination of betterness. He who seeks God with a sincere will is led not so much by fear of sin as by the joy of love, and, arranging ascents in his heart, will freely fulfill all things which he perceives to be useful for greater holiness. In this sense is to be understood that very well-known saying of St. Augustine:⁴ 'Love, and do what you will.... Let the root of love be within; from that root nothing can exist except good.'"⁵

¹ Thus, for example, De Lugo, De poenit., disp. III, sect. 1, nn. 9-10; Garrigou-Lagrange, Perfection chrétienne et contemplation, t. III, p. 532.

² Thus, for example, Cajetan on II-II, q. 186, a. 2, ad 2; Prummer, Man. Theol. Mor., bk. I, n. 131, and bk. II, n. 324; Kruysbergs, in Collectanea Mechliniensia, 1929, p. 425.

³ Matt. 22:37.

⁴ VII In Ep. Jo., 8.

⁵ Cruysberghs, in Collectanea Mechliniensia, 1929, p. 429.