Section — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
IV. On Possession
Possession can be taken both for a right in a thing and for a fact. Possession taken in the former sense is a right in the very detention of some thing, with the intention of ownership; taken in the other sense, it is the very detention of the thing, with the intention of ownership. But since possession accepted in this latter sense can bring certain rights with it, it is useful to set forth certain things concerning it. Therefore let there be:
I. Notion of possession. Possession, as is drawn from what has been said, is understood here as detention of a thing, with the intention of ownership. It is said:
Of a thing; moreover, under the name of thing there is understood not only a thing properly so called, for example a field or house, but also the use of a thing, such as dwelling in a house or the exercise of authority.
Detention; by this word are comprehended physical detention, or its equivalent, if there is question of a corporeal thing; the very acts of using a thing, if there is question of the use of a thing.
With the intention of ownership, that is, with the intention of having the thing as one's own.
II. Division of possession. Possession, not indeed by reason of itself but by reason of the mind with which it is possessed, is divided into possession of good, bad, and doubtful faith.
Good faith is had when the possessor judges that he licitly retains the thing; in other words, it is had: 1. when the possessor is conscious that the thing is his own; 2. when the possessor, although he doubts whether the thing is his own, nevertheless detains it without fault or, if there is question of a grave thing, at least without grave fault. These things will be explained more fully later.
Bad faith is had when the possessor judges that he illicitly retains the thing; in other words, it is had: 1. when the possessor is conscious that the thing is another's; 2. when the possessor doubts whether the thing is his own and detains it with fault, if there is question of a light thing, or with grave fault, if there is question of a grave thing.
Doubtful faith, strictly speaking, is not had, because one who doubts whether the thing possessed is his own necessarily detains it either without fault or with fault; in that case he becomes of good or bad faith, as the case bears according to the things explained above. But what is lawful for one doubting whether the thing possessed is his own, we shall explain later. I said strictly speaking; but doubtful faith is customarily taken for the doubt of a possessor whether the thing possessed by him is his own. What is lawful for one thus doubting, however, we shall say at once.
III. Effects of possession. 1. Possession in good faith, and in some way also in doubtful faith, creates some presumption of an existing true right.
- Possession, if doubt about the right in the thing possessed persists after truth has been investigated, brings with it the right of continuing the use of the thing, or even, if there is question of a thing which can be consumed, of consuming it, if: 1. the possession was begun in good faith; 2. the possession is such as is required by a just law; 3. the judge has not justly determined otherwise. The reason is sought both from the fact that the common good requires this; and, as regards ecclesiastical matter, from rule 50 in Sexto: in doubt the condition of the possessor is better; and, as regards civil matter, from civil law. What the law is, if possession began in doubtful or bad faith, you should draw from what is to be said later about the possessor in doubtful or bad faith.