point — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Point I. On Dispensation Considered in Itself
I. Notion. Dispensation is an act, or quasi-act, by which a law is relaxed in a special case (cf. can. 80). It is said:
Act, namely of the power of jurisdiction. For it belongs to the same power to relax a law as to make a law. But to make a law pertains to the power of jurisdiction.
Or quasi-act, because dispensation can also be granted tacitly or implicitly, suppose through legitimate custom or through an act which implicitly contains a dispensation.
In a special case, that is, with respect to a particular person or persons, or with respect to a community, but only for an act or at least for a time.
Dispensation differs: first, from epikeia, which is not a relaxation of law, but regards a case which, considering the benign mind of the legislator, is considered not to be included in the law; second, from excuse, which likewise is not a relaxation of law, or does not suppose an act of a superior, but regards a case in which someone, on account of extrinsic inconvenience, is not held to the observance of the law; third, from license, which also does not relax the law, but places a condition, and once it is placed, the law itself permits the act. If, for example, a law declares: "No one is to go out without license," once license is posited, going out is not opposed to the law; fourth, from abrogation or derogation of law, by which a law is removed totally or partially for the whole community and in perpetuity; fifth, from privilege, which of itself is perpetual and is not necessarily opposed to the law, whereas dispensation of itself is only for a time and is always contrary to the law.
II. Laws capable of dispensation. It is disputed whether the law of nature admits dispensation properly so called (n. 86); but in every positive law dispensation can have place.
III. Utility and necessity of dispensation. Dispensation is sometimes useful, indeed in some way necessary. This is clear both from the Council of Trent (sess. 25, ch. 18, De reformatione) and from the bull Auctorem fidei of Pius VI; likewise from the practice of the Church and from reason: namely, "since human law cannot provide for all cases, it is expedient that rulers provide in particulars; otherwise sufficient provision would not be made for the common good" (St. Alphonsus, I, 194).