Section — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Scholion. On Juridical Delay of Payment, on Voluntary Cession of Goods, and on Cession in Court
I. Juridical delay of payment consists in this: once it has been pronounced and while it endures, the debtor cannot be forced to pay debts; yet some of these are usually excepted by law. Now juridical delay of payment, as is clear from the nature of the matter, does not excuse from payment to be made afterward, if it can be made; nor from the obligation of applying means, if there are any, by which the debtor may be made capable of paying the debts. For the rest, one must stand by the dispositions of the law and of the judge.
II. Voluntary cession of goods consists in this: that the debtor, with the creditors consenting, cedes his goods so that the debts may be paid from them. It does not transfer ownership of the goods to the creditors, but gives them the right of selling them. For the rest, note:
The obligations of him who has made cession of goods are usually determined by the agreement itself.
To judge whether or not cession of goods frees from payment of the residue, the agreement should be inspected, and that agreement as ordered by law, and usage. If, after these have been inspected, it is sufficiently evident that the debtor is not freed, neither can condonation be presumed. If law, agreement, or usage does not settle the matter, let it be seen whether condonation by all or some of the creditors can be presumed. If doubt persists, the obligation of paying persists, because in doubt the condition of the creditor is better.
III. Cession in court consists in this: that the goods of the debtor are juridically seized, so that they may finally come to the creditors. For the rest, note:
The obligations of him who has made cession in court are determined by the judge in conformity with law.
To judge whether or not one who has made cession in court is freed from the residual debt, again the agreement should be inspected, if any has been entered into, and that agreement as it has been ordered by law, and usage. If, after these have been considered, it is sufficiently clear that the debtor is not freed, neither can condonation be presumed. If law, agreement, or usage does not settle the cause, again let it be seen whether condonation by all or by some can be presumed. If doubt persists, the obligation of paying persists.
Corollary I. He who foresees that he will be unable to satisfy his creditors sins against justice by squandering goods, by neglecting means of improving the state of his fortune, and by contracting new debts without necessity.
Corollary II. Likewise he injures justice who by fraud or by other unjust means induces creditors to a composition, or to one more favorable than just.
Corollary III. He who has made cession in court is held to stand by the dispositions of the law and of those who apply the law; and this from commutative justice, because the law justly determines the rights of creditors. Hence, for example, he sins who reserves for himself part of his goods besides those which are granted by the judge. If, however, he justly judges that the law does not sufficiently provide for him, namely so that he and his own may be able to live sparingly, he can secretly retain something for himself, and to the judge interrogating him he can respond that he has concealed nothing, understanding: nothing which it is illicit to conceal; indeed it is also lawful to confirm the assertion with an oath. But here one must proceed cautiously, because those who make cession of goods or cession in court easily exaggerate their necessities; for this reason others should not easily concur with them in concealing goods. Finally note canon 122, which establishes concerning clerics: for clerics who are forced to satisfy creditors, those things necessary for their honorable support, according to the prudent judgment of the ecclesiastical judge, are to be preserved, while nevertheless their obligation of satisfying creditors as soon as possible remains firm.