Section — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Section I. On the Notion and Division of Morality
(St. Thomas, I-II, q. 10, aa. 4 and 9; q. 21, a. 1; q. 71, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, bk. V, XXXIV-XXXV.)1
1 Cf. John of St. Thomas, In I-II, t. I; Suarez, In I-II, De bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum; the Salmanticenses, Cursus theologiae, tract II, De bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum; Lehu, La raison, regle de la moralite d'apres St. Thomas; Pegues, Commentaire francais litteral de la Somme theologique, tt. VI and VII; Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae, tract II, sect. III, De relatione actuum humanorum ad finem ultimum seu de moralitate actuum humanorum; Frins, De actibus humanis; Walter McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science; Potters, Compendium Ethicae Generalis; Sweens, Theologia moralis fundamentalis.
I. Notion. The morality of human acts consists in their relation, for example of agreement or disagreement, to the divine law. For morality is the property of acts by virtue of which they are called good or evil, or indifferent (n. 61), worthy of praise or blame. But they must be called such from their relation to the divine law, since by commanding, forbidding, and permitting, it is the supreme director of all acts toward the ultimate end and toward proper secondary ends. "The will of any creature whatever," says Aquinas, "does not have rectitude in its act except according as it is ruled by the divine will, to which the ultimate end belongs, just as any lower will ought to be ruled according to the will of a superior, as the will of a soldier according to the will of the commander of the army" (I-II, q. 19, a. 1).
But since right reason indicates what the law or ordinance of God, commanding, forbidding, and permitting, includes, morality can also be called: the relation of a human act to right reason and law. "Now," as St. Thomas says, "a human act has that it is evil from the fact that it lacks due commensuration. But the commensuration of any thing whatever is attended to by comparison with some rule; if it turns aside from this, it will be incommensurate. Now the rule of the human will is twofold: one is proximate and homogeneous, namely human reason itself; the other is the first rule, namely the eternal law, which is, as it were, the reason of God" (I-II, q. 71, a. 6). Likewise St. Alphonsus: "The moral goodness of a human act consists in a certain conformity and agreement of the free act with right reason and law, so that that act is called good which is conformed to law and reason. Hence St. Augustine says: 'In no way can that have been rightly done which does not proceed from right reason.' Conversely, the moral malice of a human act consists in discrepancy or deformity from right reason. That act is called evil which is not according to the dictate of right reason, whether uncreated, which is the eternal law, or created, which is the natural light of man, or a participation in the eternal law according to St. Thomas. Both of these reasons are the rule of human acts, from which the measure of the goodness or malice of a human act is taken" (V, XXXIV).
Furthermore, since the relation of a human act to the divine law, which directs all acts to the ultimate end, and its relation to the ultimate end itself correspond to each other, morality can also be called: the relation of a human act to the ultimate end. Hence elsewhere St. Thomas says: "The formal account of a moral act is taken by comparison to the end" (De malo, q. 4, a. 2, c.). "According to relation to the end all moral habits are distinguished, from which the first difference of good and evil was taken, because good imports an end... but evil a disordering from the end" (In III Sent., dist. 33). "On the ultimate end depends the whole goodness or malice of the will, because whatever good things someone wills in order to a good end, he wills well; but whatever things are in order to an evil end, he wills badly" (Contra Gentiles, bk. 4, c. 95).1
Corollary I. The morality of a human act does not consist in its liberty; nevertheless, liberty is the foundation of morality. "There the genus of morals begins, where the first dominion of the will is found" (St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 24, q. 3, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, V, XXXV). Nor is it situated, as Scheeben teaches,2 in advertence of reason to the morality of the object; this advertence is a condition of morality. Nor does it consist in the relation of the act to human nature, unless this is taken as subject to the divine law.
Corollary II. Morality properly so called belongs only to elicited acts; to commanded acts it belongs only extrinsically.
Hence a commanded act, especially an external one, "does not add intrinsic and per se moral goodness or malice over and above the interior act, but enjoys only extrinsic goodness or malice taken from the act of the will commanding it" (St. Alphonsus, V, XL; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 20, a. 4). Thus authors, with the exception of the Scotists, teach sufficiently commonly, relying on this reason: morality is founded in liberty, which is found intrinsically in the elicited act alone. Consonant with this doctrine is the fact that although Abraham wished to immolate his son, and could not, nevertheless God says to him: "Because you have done this thing and have not spared your son... I will bless you."3
Nevertheless, a commanded act, especially an external one, per accidens increases the formal morality of the internal act, namely insofar as it causes the internal act to become more intense, to be prolonged longer, and to be repeated more often (St. Thomas, l.c.; St. Alphonsus, l.c.).
Corollary III. Having considered the nature of morality, which imports a relation to divine law, one must truly say with St. Thomas: "Every sin is evil because prohibited" (I-II, q. 71, a. 6, ad 4); and with St. Alphonsus: "No moral good, no evil, can be understood without respect at least to the natural law. When it is commonly said that certain things are prohibited because they are evil, this is rightly to be understood thus: certain things are forbidden by positive law as things repugnant to natural law. For nothing is intrinsically evil if it is not compared at least with the right of nature" (V, XXXV).
1 Several definitions handed down by others likewise fall under the definitions handed down above, such as: morality is situated in the relation of the act to rational nature, insofar as it is subject to divine law; or: in the relation of the act to its object, insofar as it is subject to the rules of morals.
2 Handbuch der katholischen Dogmatik, I, 1.2, n. 594 sq.
II. Division. Morality is divided:
Into objective and subjective morality. Objective morality is that which belongs to the act considered in itself; subjective morality is that which inheres in the act according as it proceeds here and now from the will.
Into goodness and malice. It is disputed whether a third species of morality ought to be added, namely indifference. Concerning this, observe the following things. It is commonly admitted indeed that there are acts indifferent from the object or according to species, as, for example, to lift a straw, etc. But it is asked, and even in the Thomistic school it is disputed, whether indifference is a species of morality. Moreover, it seems it must be affirmed, because even an indifferent act has order to the divine law, insofar as by force of that law it can be ordered to the ultimate end, is permitted by that law, and from it there belongs to man a right, that is, a moral faculty of placing the said act. And this opinion seems conformed to the mind of St. Thomas, who says thus: "Therefore if we speak of a moral act according to its species, in this way not every moral act is good or evil, but some are indifferent" (De malo, q. 2, a. 5). And again: "There are three differences of human acts. For as was said above, certain acts are good from their genus, which are acts of virtues; and with respect to these there is posited the act of law to prescribe or command, for law prescribes all acts of virtues, as is said in book 5 of the Ethics. But certain acts are evil from their genus, as acts of vices; and with respect to these law has to prohibit. Certain acts, however, from their genus are indifferent; and with respect to these law has to permit" (I-II, q. 92, a. 2).
Into intrinsic and extrinsic morality, according as the act is subject to natural law or to positive law, whether divine or human.