Section — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Section III. On the Accuser and Denunciator
(St. Thomas, II-II, q. 68; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book IV, nn. 234-254; Homo Apostolicus, tract 13, nn. 73-78.)
I. Judicial Accusation. 1. Judicial accusation is the denunciation of someone's crime to a competent judge, for the sake of public vindication, with the burden of proving the crime. It is said:
a) The denunciation of a crime; and thus the accuser is distinguished from the actor or petitioner, who moves a lawsuit against another in a civil matter. The one who is accused, or against whom a lawsuit is moved in a civil matter, is called the defendant.
b) With the burden of proving the crime; and thus the accuser is distinguished from the denunciator, and accusation from denunciation; for the latter does not carry with it the burden of proving (St. Alphonsus IV, 235).
- Judicial accusation for the most part belongs to those officials to whom this has been committed by law; primarily indeed to those who are customarily called the public ministry (St. Alphonsus IV, 236). To whom besides them it has been committed, see in the law of one's country.
II. Denunciation. 1. Denunciation is the denunciation of a crime to officials deputed for this, without the burden of proving it.
- The following are bound to denunciation:
a) By office, those who have been expressly deputed to this by law, and generally all who, while carrying out a public office, detect some delict in the exercise of their office.
b) By precept of law, in many kingdoms even private persons who perhaps have been witnesses of certain graver crimes are obliged.
c) By natural law, everyone is obliged who knows some crime whose denunciation is necessary for the common good or for averting grave harm from a private person (St. Alphonsus IV, 236).
From the obligation of denouncing, if indeed there is question of the common good, a private cause does not excuse; otherwise, a proportionately grave cause excuses. A graver cause is required for those who are bound by office than for those who are bound only by law or by natural right. The principal causes are notable harm to be feared for oneself or one's own from the denunciation, and connection with the delinquent himself. Finally, an entrusted secret not only excuses from the obligation, but even prohibits one from denouncing someone. Except if, from omitted denunciation, grave harm threatens either the common good - in which case there is an obligation not to preserve the secret - or the one accepting the secret (St. Alphonsus IV, 236); if from omitted denunciation grave harm threatens a third person, the things said on p. 720 hold.
One who has falsely denounced (or accused) is bound, if he was gravely culpable, to restitution of the damages that followed. Besides, he is obliged to retraction, even with equal harm to himself, but not with much greater harm. If he was not gravely culpable, he is not bound to restore damages; nevertheless he ought to retract the testimony, if this can be done conveniently enough (n. 994).