Section IV. On Injury of a Secret

I. Notion. A secret is a hidden matter which cannot be manifested.

II. Division. A secret is distinguished into natural, promised, and entrusted. A natural secret is one which, from the nature of the matter, must be kept, namely because it cannot be revealed without damage or grief to one's neighbor; as if you know where someone has hidden his money, and you reveal this to a thief. A promised secret is one which someone, after receiving knowledge of it, has freely promised to keep; it can at the same time be natural. An entrusted secret is one which has been communicated to someone who did not know it, and who expressly or tacitly promised that he would keep it. By force of a tacit pact, for example, physicians, advocates, theologians, religious superiors, and others to whom recourse is had because of the office which they discharge, for the sake of seeking counsel, are bound to an entrusted secret (St. Alphonsus, III, 970). I said by force of a tacit pact; for by undertaking the office they undertake an obligation without which, if it had not been undertaken, subjects and clients would not approach them with sufficient security for the sake of seeking counsel or imploring help.

III. Obligation of keeping a secret. 1. A natural secret obliges from charity if the revelation merely creates sorrow; from justice if it creates damage for one's neighbor. Hence the said obligation is grave from its kind.

A proportionate cause excuses from the obligation, as was said concerning manifestation of a hidden crime or defect (n. 1070). Yet it is clear that a secret cannot be revealed if common damage would be imminent from the revelation (St. Alphonsus, III, 970).

2. A promised secret obliges from fidelity or from justice, according as was said concerning a promise in general (n. 864).

The obligation of a promised secret ceases or does not subsist: 1° by the consent, even presumed, of the promisee; 2° if from another source there was, or there arises, an obligation of revealing the secret, as if you are legitimately questioned by a judge or by a superior (St. Alphonsus, III, 970; IV, 268); 3° if it cannot be kept without such inconvenience that the one promising cannot be judged to have wished to bind himself with so great a burden. Moreover, these statements hold even if the promise was confirmed by oath.

Sometimes a promise is added to a natural secret; in that case the added promise is judged to be merely confirmatory of the obligation already existing, so that it stands or falls with the latter. Yet it is not repugnant that an obligation independent of the existing obligation be intended and assumed. Apply the same to an oath, if perhaps it is added to a natural secret.

Question. To what extent is he obliged who expressly promised that he would keep a secret of very great importance even with the loss of life? I said of very great importance, because otherwise the promise would certainly be prodigal and therefore invalid.

Response. Some say that he is not obliged, because from the precept of charity each person is bound to prefer his own life to another's good, however very grave. Others maintain the obligation, because every promise of an honorable object obliges. But the promise about which we are speaking regards an honorable object; since it is permitted "for an honorable end to omit the preservation of one's own life in order to save another's life... because this is not directly to bring death upon oneself, but not to protect life, which is permitted for a just cause: therefore very probably the doctors... say that in the proposed case you are sufficiently obliged to keep the secret even with danger of life, if you promised it" (St. Alphonsus, III, 971). Yet note that the words even with danger of life must more often be taken less strictly according to the mind of the one promising.

3. An entrusted secret obliges from justice, and therefore by an obligation grave from its kind (n. 978). Moreover, the said obligation is stricter by reason of the onerous contract intervening. With respect to the promise at least tacitly made by the adviser, there is added the fact that it is of the greatest interest to the common good that the secret entrusted to him bind most strictly, namely so that men may be able to seek counsel without fear of revelation. Yet it is sufficiently probable that it is not a grave sin to reveal an entrusted secret to one or another person who will certainly keep it and will not even reveal it to one or another person. Moreover, this is sufficiently probable because in that case the secret remains safe as to its substance. Except, however, if the secret is revealed to him from whom the one entrusting it wishes it to be hidden before all others; in that case it would be a grave sin (St. Alphonsus, III, 971). I said sufficiently probably, because a contract is involved, and it is doubtful whether that more benign interpretation is valid; with respect to a natural secret, the matter is certain.

The obligation of an entrusted secret ceases: 1° by the consent, even reasonably presumed, of the one entrusting the secret; 2° if, from the secret being kept, grave damage is imminent either to the common good, or to the one entrusting the secret himself, or - provided he accepted the secret without force or fraud - to the one accepting the secret. The first two are sufficiently clear; the latter is drawn from this, that "no one is presumed to have obliged himself to such a burden, unless this certainly appears from the circumstances" (St. Alphonsus, III, 971). The obligation of an entrusted secret does not cease from the questioning of a judge or superior; and "you can respond that you know nothing, namely nothing to be revealed" (St. Alphonsus, III, 970). Except if the obligation of the secret has already ceased from another heading (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 70, a. 1, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 970, 971; IV, 49, 248, 268).

What if grave damage is imminent to a third party from an entrusted secret being kept?

Response 1. If the damage is neither created nor culpably permitted by the one entrusting the secret, it is not lawful to reveal the secret; suppose that an advocate knows that an innocent man will be condemned, but the guilty man will be freed. If, because of special circumstances, the guilty man can permit the damage of the innocent man, the advocate also is bound to keep the secret entrusted to him.

Response 2. Outside the aforesaid case, I distinguish between those who are not bound by force of office and those who are bound by force of office to keep the secret. Now:

1. One who is not bound by force of office to keep the secret can certainly reveal it: 1° if the damage to the third party is created by the one entrusting the secret himself; as if a syphilitic, who pretends that he is healthy, intends to marry a bride ignorant of the bridegroom's disease; 2° if the damage to the third party is not indeed created by the one entrusting the secret, but nevertheless is culpably permitted by him; as if the guilty man mentioned above would culpably permit the damage of the innocent man. The reason for both is that charity demands that the secret be disclosed in order to avert damage to one's neighbor, unless the common good stands in the way. But the common good does not require that one who is not bound by force of office to be silent should be obliged to be silent, if a grave cause for speaking, i.e. for revealing the secret, exists (St. Alphonsus, III, 971).

2. The same, with St. Alphonsus and others against many, seems to be admitted if there is question of those who are bound by force of office to keep a secret; as if a physician knows that the bridegroom is afflicted with a contagious disease, and nevertheless does not wish to abstain from marriage. For on the one hand the reason just given is valid; on the other hand, the common good in this case does not demand that secrets of this sort be kept even with grave damage to a third party. For it is more in the interest of the common good that provision be made for the innocent person than for the harmful one, i.e. for him who wishes to inflict unjust damage on an innocent person, or who does not wish himself, by manifestation of the secret, to avert the damage to be inflicted on the innocent person (St. Alphonsus, III, 971). Yet the physician, etc., would be excused if grave damage to himself, for example hatred of citizens, a penalty to be imposed, etc., would be imminent from the revelation.

Objection 1. The common good demands that each person be able, without fear of revelation, to entrust a secret to those who furnish counsel by reason of office.

Response. On account of the reason just given, I deny the assertion with respect to those about whom the discussion is here. Nor, for that reason, will others to whom these things cannot be applied reasonably seek counsel with fear.

Objection 2. One who knows an impediment of marriage under an entrusted secret is not bound to reveal it, although there is question of averting damage.

Response. I deny the assertion taken generally; namely, one is bound to reveal an impediment, however known under an entrusted secret, if it is supposed and known that the impediment is known to one of the persons about to marry and unknown to the other, and therefore that formal injustice will be committed by one of the persons about to marry. And a case of this kind is especially intended by us.

Note 1. To an entrusted secret also belongs what is called a quasi-sacramental secret, namely one which arises from the manifestation of conscience to a superior or spiritual director, for the sake of seeking counsel or obtaining spiritual direction. Before this secret can be revealed, or even merely used, to avert some damage, even common damage, generally the one seeking counsel should first be warned concerning his obligation of preventing that damage by spontaneous manifestation or use of the secret; if he refuses, it should be well weighed whether in the case the gravity of the damage in question is not to be postponed to the gravity of that common damage which arises from the fact that, at least apparently, faith is broken in this matter.¹

Note 2. In some kingdoms a promissory oath concerning keeping a secret must be made by physicians; this oath, as is clear, is not valid insofar as you suppose that in some respect it is opposed to the law of nature.

¹ Aertnys-Damen, Theologia Moralis, I, n. 1004.

IV. Investigation of a secret. 1. Per se it is illicit and unjust to seek out another's secret against his will, for example by questioning deceitfully, reading letters, spying on the things which someone purposely does secretly, or by extorting a secret by a certain force. The reason is that one acting thus deprives another of his own thing; since a secret or hidden matter is most proper to a man. Moreover, it is a grave or light sin according as there is question of a grave or light matter. Except, with respect to a grave matter, if someone fishes out another's secret with the intention of keeping it to himself; this is sufficiently probably only light (n. 1069).

2. It is lawful to seek out a secret if there is at least presumed permission of the owner, or a proportionate cause, of which sort is damage to be averted, whether common damage, or grave damage to oneself or one's own. The reason is that there is no injury if the other consents or is bound to consent to the investigation itself of the secret.

Corollary I. It is lawful to read another's letters (i.e. whether written by subjects or sent to subjects): 1° as was said, from consent, even presumed, either of the writer or of the recipient; 2° if from the secret of the letters common damage, or damage to oneself or a third party, is feared; 3° if the rule of a religious institute prescribes or permits this, namely for the common good. Besides, parents, guardians, and superiors of institutes generally can read the letters of subjects, namely lest some evil befall them. A husband, however, per se cannot inspect letters given to his wife, since she is not plainly a subject but a companion. Often there will be consent at least presumed. For the rest, what a religious superior can do should be drawn from the rule and from custom (St. Alphonsus, III, 969; V, 70).

Corollary II. It seems illicit to join and read fragments of letters that have been torn very small and thrown away, because the owner, by tearing the letters, sufficiently signifies that he does not wish them to be read. The contrary must be said if the owner tore them into larger parts and voluntarily threw them into a place accessible to all (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

V. Use of a secret. 1. Use of a secret communicated as such, which takes place without revelation of the secret - suppose if someone uses knowledge of a secret to direct others in the way of perfection - is lawful if it is done without damage to him whose secret it was; for what does not harm you is, with the required suppositions in place, lawful for me. If it is done with damage, it is illicit, unless there is added the consent, at least presumed, of the one communicating the secret, or a proportionate cause for allowing the damage; for a secret is judged to have been communicated with the burden of not harming the one communicating the secret.

2. Use of a secret not communicated, but investigated by just industry - suppose an invention publicly displayed and attentively inspected by an expert - is lawful; since the one investigating by his own industry made the secret his own, and therefore he can use it; except if a monopoly of using it had already been granted to another by the State.

3. Use (whether revelation, or use without revelation) of a secret unjustly extorted, with damage to him whose secret it was, is lawful for averting damage to oneself or to others only when the matter has been brought to that state in which it would be lawful to seek out the secret; otherwise it is illicit, because it would be a continuation of the injustice (St. Alphonsus, III, 969).