Question — Decretum of Gratian
Question V
GRATIAN. PART I. But that alms are not to be made from interest or usury, nor from anything acquired evilly, Augustine testifies in the book On the Words of the Lord, tractate XXXV:
GRATIANUS. I. Pars. Quod uero elemosinae non sint faciendae ex fenore uel usuris, nec ex quolibet male acquisito, Augustinus testatur in libro de uerbis Domini tractatu XXXV.:
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C. I. Alms cannot be made from usury.
Do not wish to make alms from interest and usury.
C. I. De usuris elemosinae fieri non possunt.
Nolite uelle elemosinas facere de fenore et usuris.
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C. II. One who offers from robbery is rejected by God.
Likewise Augustine. One who sacrifices from iniquity makes a stained offering. The Most High does not approve the gifts of the iniquitous, nor does He regard the offerings of the iniquitous, nor will He be propitiated for their sins by the multitude of their sacrifices. One who offers sacrifice from the substance of the poor is as one who sacrifices the son in the sight of his father. The bread of the needy is the life of the poor man. One who defrauds him is a man of blood. One who sheds blood and one who commits fraud against a person in need are brothers.
C. II. Oblatis de rapina reprobatur a Deo.
Item Augustinus. Inmolans ex iniquo oblatio est maculata. Dona iniquorum non probat altissimus, nec respicit in oblationibus iniquorum, nec in multitudine sacrificiorum eorum propitiabitur peccatis. Qui offert sacrificium ex substantia pauperum, quasi qui uictimat filium in conspectu patris sui. Panis egentium uita pauperis est. Qui defraudat illum homo sanguinis est. Qui effundit sanguinem, et qui fraudem facit necessario, fratres sunt.
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C. III. Nothing is to be seized from the rich so that it may be given to the needy.
Likewise Augustine in a homily. Perhaps someone thinks and says: “There are many rich Christians, avaricious and covetous; I have no sin if I take from them and give to the poor. For since they do nothing good, I shall be able to have a reward.” But a thought of this kind is suggested to him by the cunning of the devil. For if he should bestow the whole of what he took, he adds to sin rather than diminishes it.
[PALEA.
C. III. Non est aliquid rapiendum diuitibus, ut detur egenis.
Item Augustinus in Omelia. Forte aliquis cogitat et dicit: Multi sunt Christiani diuites, auari, cupidi; non habeo peccatum, si illis abstulero, et pauperibus dedero. Unde enim illi nil boni agunt, mercedem habere potero. Sed huiusmodi cogitatio ei Diaboli calliditate suggeritur. Nam si totum tribuat quod abstulerit, potius peccatum addit quam minuat.
[PALEA.
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C. IV. Concerning the same.
Likewise Jerome. No one who plunders is saved when dying if he has the means from which to make restitution. If he is unable to find those to whom it belonged, let him bestow it upon the church or the poor.]
[PALEA.
C. IV. De eodem.
Item Ieronimus. Nemo, qui rapit, moriens, si habet unde reddat, saluatur. Si eos, quorum fuit, inuenire non poterit, ecclesiae uel pauperibus tribuat. ]
[PALEA.
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C. V. Concerning the same.
Likewise Ambrose. It is not permitted to purchase plunder except with the intention that it be restored to the one from whom it was taken.]
C. V. De eodem.
Item Ambrosius. Rapinam emere non licet, nisi ea intentione, ut cui est ablata reddatur. ]
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C. VI. One who does not return what was found commits theft.
Likewise from the same. If you found something and did not return it, you plundered it; you did as much as you could, because you did not find more. One who denies another’s property would also take it if he could. § 1. God questions the heart, not the hand.
C. VI. Furtum conmittit qui inuentum non reddit.
Item eiusdem. Si quid inuenisti, et non reddidisti, rapuisti; quantum potuisti fecisti. Quia plus non inuenisti. Qui alienum negat, si posset et tolleret. §. 1. Deus cor interrogat, non manum.
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C. VII. When one expends alms from permitted and well-acquired goods, it pleases God.
Likewise Gregory, [book VII, letter 110, to Syagrius]. That alms pleases the eyes of our Redeemer which is not heaped up from illicit things and iniquity, but which is expended from permitted and well-acquired goods.
C. VII. Qui de rebus concessis et bene quesitis elemosinam inpendit, illa placet Deo.
Item Gregorius. [lib. VII. epist. 110. ad Syagrium.] Elemosina redemptoris nostri oculis illa placet, que non ex illicitis et iniquitate congeritur, sed que de rebus concessis et bene acquisitis inpenditur.
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C. VIII. One who does not return a thing found sins.
Likewise Jerome in the book on Leviticus. Many think that it is without sin if they retain another’s property which they have found, and they say, “God gave it to me; to whom have I to return it?” Let them learn that, if anyone does not return things found, this sin is similar to robbery.
C. VIII. Peccat qui rem inuentam non reddit.
Item Ieronimus in libro Leuitici. Multi sine peccato putant esse, si alienum, quod inuenerint, teneant, et dicunt, Deus michi dedit, cui habeo reddere? Discant hoc peccatum simile esse rapinae, si quis inuenta non reddat.
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C. IX. Good use does not justify things acquired unjustly.
Likewise Augustine, [book On the Good of Marriage, c. 14]. For neither, if anyone so uses fields unjustly and wrongly invaded that he makes generous alms from their fruits, does he thereby justify the robbery. § 1. Nor, if another avariciously broods over a paternal estate or one justly acquired, is the rule of civil law by which he became the lawful possessor therefore to be blamed. § 2. Nor will the perversity of a tyrannical faction be praiseworthy if it treats tyrants subjected to it with royal clemency. § 3. Nor is the order of royal power to be censured if a king rages with tyrannical cruelty. For it is one thing to wish to use an unjust power justly, and another to wish to use a just power unjustly.
C. IX. Bonus usus non iustificat iniuste quesita.
Item Augustinus. [lib. de bono coniugali, c. 14.] Neque enim si agris inique ac perperam inuasis ita quisque utatur, ut ex eorum fructibus elemosinas largas faciat, ideo rapinam iustificat. §. 1. Neque si alius ruri paterno, uel iuste quesito auarus incumbat, ideo culpanda est iuris ciuilis regula, qua possessor legitimus factus est. §. 2. Nec tirannicae factionis peruersitas laudabilis erit, si regia clementia tirannos subditos tractet. §. 3. Nec uituperetur ordo regiae potestatis, si rex tirannica crudelitate seuiat. Aliud namque est iniusta potestate iuste uelle uti, et aliud est iusta potestate iniuste uelle uti.
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C. X. It is not permitted to aid one person with loss to another.
Likewise Ambrose in book [III] On Duties, [c. 9]. Finally, if one cannot be aided unless another is harmed, it is more advantageous that neither be aided than that one be burdened. And therefore it is not priestly to intervene in pecuniary causes in which it cannot happen that frequently one who is defeated is not harmed, since he thinks himself defeated by the benefit of the intercessor. Therefore it belongs to a priest to harm no one and to wish to profit all; but to be able to do so belongs to God alone.
C. X. Cum alterius detrimento alteri subuenire non licet.
Item Ambrosius in libro [III.] de offitiis. [c. 9.] Denique, si non potest alteri subueniri, nisi alter ledatur, commodius est neutrum iuuari quam alterum grauari. Ideoque in causis pecuniariis interuenire non est sacerdotale in quibus non potest fieri, quin frequenter alter ledatur, qui uincitur, quoniam intercessoris beneficio se uictum arbitratur. Sacerdotis igitur est nulli nocere, prodesse uelle omnibus; posse autem solius Dei est.
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C. XI. Alms and sacrifices which are offered from crime do not please God.
Likewise Gregory in the Register, [book VII, indiction 2, letter 126, to King Reccared]. It is written: “The victims of the impious are abominable to God; the vows of the righteous are pleasing”; for in the judgment of almighty God, not what is given but by whom it is given is considered. Hence it is written: “God regarded Abel and his gifts, but He did not regard Cain and his gifts.” For when Scripture was about to say that the Lord regarded the gifts, it first carefully stated that He regarded Abel. From this matter it is plainly shown that it was not the offerer who pleased because of the gifts, but the gifts because of the offerer. “For the Most High does not approve the gifts of the iniquitous, nor does He regard their offerings, nor will He be propitiated for their sins by the multitude of their sacrifices.” Likewise: “The Lord is far from the impious, and He will hear the prayers of the righteous.” PART II. GRATIAN. To the contrary, it is read in Exodus that the children of Israel, when about to depart from Egypt, received golden and silver vessels as a loan from their neighbors, from which they afterward built the tabernacle for the Lord. Augustine replies to these matters in the book Questions on Exodus, [question 39]:
C. XI. Elemosinae et sacrificia non placent Deo, que offeruntur ex scelere.
Item Gregorius in Registro. [lib. VII. Indict. 2. epist. 126. Reccaredo Regi.] Scriptum est: "Victimae inpiorum abhominabiles sunt Deo: uota iustorum placabilia;" neque enim in omnipotentis Dei iudicio quid, sed a quo detur inspicitur. Hinc est enim quod scriptum est: "Respexit Deus ad Abel, et ad munera eius; ad Cain autem et ad munera eius non respexit." Dicturus quippe, quia Dominus respexit ad munera, premisit sollicite, quia respexit ad Abel. Ex qua re patenter ostenditur, quia non offerens a muneribus, sed munera ab offerente placuerunt. "Dona quippe iniquorum non probat altissimus, nec respicit in oblationibus eorum, nec in multitudine sacrificiorum propiciabitur peccatis eorum." Idem: "Longe est Dominus ab inpiis, et orationes iustorum exaudiet." II. Pars. Gratian. Contra in Exodo legitur, quod filii Israel, exituri de Egypto, a uicinis suis acceperunt mutuo uasa aurea et argentea, ex quibus postea edificauerunt tabernaculum Domino. His respondet Augustinus in libro questionum Exodi: [quest. 39.]
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C. XII. It is not permitted to seize another’s property by the example of the Israelites despoiling the Egyptians.
The Lord said to Moses: “Let a man ask from his male neighbor and a woman from her female neighbor vessels of gold and silver and clothing.” No one ought to think that an example is to be taken from this for despoiling a neighbor in this manner. For God commanded this, who knew what it was fitting for each person to suffer. Nor did the Israelites commit theft, but they furnished ministry to God who commanded it. PART III. GRATIAN. Likewise it is objected: To seize another’s property is not against a precept, since robbery appears to be prohibited by no command of God. But by the name of theft every illicit usurpation of another’s property is understood. Hence Augustine in the same book, [question 71]:
C. XII. Non licet aliena rapere exemplo Israelitarum spoliantium Egyptios.
Dixit Dominus ad Moysen: "Petat uir a proximo, et mulier a proxima, uasa aurea et argentea, et uestem." Non hinc quisque sumendum exemplum putare debet ad exspoliandum isto modo proximum. Hoc enim Deus iussit, qui nouerat quid quemque pati oporteat. Nec Israelitae furtum fecerunt, sed Deo iubenti ministerium prebuerunt. III. Pars. Gratian. Item obicitur: Aliena rapere non est contra preceptum: nullo siquidem Dei mandato rapina uidetur prohibita. Sed nomine furti omnis illicita usurpatio rei alienae intelligitur. Unde Augustinus in eodem libro: [quest. 71.]
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C. XIII. To seize something violently is of greater punishment than to steal.
To take away secretly is punishable; to seize openly is of much greater punishment. Therefore to take from an unwilling person, whether secretly or openly, has its own precept. For by the name of theft every illicit usurpation of another’s property is well understood. For He who prohibited theft did not permit robbery, but surely willed robbery also to be understood by the name of theft in the law of the Old Testament. For by the part He signified the whole: whatever of a neighbor’s property is taken illicitly. GRATIAN. By these authorities it is proved that no one can make alms either from things found or from things evilly acquired. PART IV. § 1. But Augustine testifies to the contrary, [sermon XXXV On the Words of the Lord], saying:
C. XIII. Maioris penae est uiolenter aliquid eripere, quam furari.
Penale est occulte auferre: multo maioris penae est uisibiliter eripere. Auferre ergo nolenti, siue occulte siue palam, habet preceptum suum. Furti enim nomine bene intelligitur omnis illicita usurpatio rei alienae. Non enim rapinam permisit qui furtum prohibuit, sed utique furti nomine in lege ueteris testamenti et rapinam intelligi uoluit. A parte enim totum significauit, quicquid illicite rerum proximi aufertur. Gratian. His auctoritatibus probatur, quod neque ex rebus inuentis, neque ex male conquisitis elemosinam quisquam facere potest. IV. Pars. §. 1. Sed Augustinus contra testatur [serm. XXXV. de uerbis Domini] dicens:
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C. XIV. Good can be made from things acquired evilly.
You who have something from evil, make good from it. You who have nothing from evil, do not acquire from evil. Be good, you who make good from evil; and when you have begun to do something good from evil, do not remain evil yourself. Your coins are converted into good, and do you remain evil? GRATIAN. But this is understood in many ways. For one who restores what he took illicitly makes good from evil. By the name of evil, the care and solicitude of mortals is also expressed. Therefore one makes good from evil who dispenses to the poor what he acquired with labor and solicitude, according to that saying of the Gospel: “Make friends for yourselves from the mammon of iniquity.” Or that is acquired from evil which is possessed from a shameful cause, as when an astrologer profits something from the art which he teaches or from the future things which he predicts. But things which are thus acquired from evil can be converted into good. Some things are also sometimes acquired from sin which are justly expended upon the poor.
Hence Augustine to Macedonius, [letter LIV]:
C. XIV. De male adquisitis bonum fieri potest.
Qui habetis aliquid de malo, facite inde bonum. Qui non habetis de malo, nolite acquirere de malo. Esto tu bonus, qui facis de malo bonum, et cum ceperis aliquid boni facere de malo, noli remanere tu malus. Nummi tui conuertuntur in bonum, et tu remanes malus? Gratian. Sed hoc multipliciter intelligitur. Facit enim de malo bonum qui reddit quod illicite abstulit. Nomine etiam mali cura et sollicitudo mortalium exprimitur. De malo ergo bonum facit qui pauperibus dispensat quod cum labore et sollicitudine acquisiuit, iuxta illud euangelii: "Facite uobis amicos de mammona iniquitatis." Vel ex malo acquiritur quod ex turpi causa possidetur, ueluti cum mathematicus ex arte, quam docet, uel ex futuris, que pronunciat, nonnulla lucratur. Que uero de malo sic acquiruntur in bonum possunt conuerti. De peccato etiam aliqua nonnumquam acquiruntur, que pauperibus iuste erogantur.
Unde Augustinus ad Macedonium: [epist. LIV.]
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C. XV. Things which are acquired evilly can sometimes be expended well.
Certainly not everything that is taken from an unwilling person is taken away injuriously. For many are unwilling to render either his honor to a physician or his wage to a workman; nevertheless, those who receive these things from an unwilling person do not receive them through injury, for they would rather not be given without injury. § 1. But a judge ought not therefore to sell a just judgment, or a witness true testimony, because an advocate sells just patronage and a jurist true counsel. For the former are employed for examination between both parties; the latter stand on one side. But when judgments and testimonies, which ought not to be sold even when just and true, are sold when iniquitous and false, money is certainly received much more wickedly, because it is also given wickedly, although by willing persons. Nevertheless, one who bought a just judgment is accustomed to reclaim money badly taken from him, because the judgment ought not to have been for sale. But one who gave money for an iniquitous judgment would indeed wish to reclaim it, unless he feared or was ashamed that he had bought it. § 2. There are other persons of inferior station who not improperly receive from both parties, such as the official who is removed and the one to whom an office is assigned. Things extorted by immoderate dishonesty are accustomed to be reclaimed from these persons; and we blame those who have reclaimed such things contrary to custom more than those who received them according to custom, because many persons necessary to human affairs are either invited by benefits of this kind or retained by them. § 3. If these persons have changed their way of life or ascended to a more excellent degree of holiness, they more readily bestow upon the poor as their own the things which they acquired in this manner than restore them as another’s property to those from whom they were received. § 4. But if anyone has taken anything contrary to the right of human society by thefts, robberies, calumnies, oppressions, or invasions, we judge that it is to be restored rather than donated, according to the example of Zacchaeus the publican.
C. XV. Que male acquiruntur aliquando bene possunt expendi.
Non sane quicquid ab inuito sumitur iniuriose aufertur. Nam plerique nec medico uolunt reddere honorem suum, nec operario mercedem; nec tamen hec qui ab inuito accipiunt, per iniuriam accipiunt, que potius per iniuriam non darentur. §. 1. Sed non ideo debet iudex uendere iustum iudicium, aut testis uerum testimonium, quia uendit aduocatus iustum patrocinium et iurisperitus uerum consilium. Illi enim inter utramque partem ad examen adhibentur: isti ex una parte consistunt. Cum autem iudicia et testimonia, que nec iusta et uera uendenda sunt, iniqua et falsa uenduntur, multo sceleratius utique pecunia sumitur, quia scelerate etiam, quamuis a uolentibus, datur. Ille tamen solet male sibi ablatam pecuniam repetere, qui iustum iudicium emit, quoniam uenale esse non debuit. Qui uero pro iniquo iudicio dedit, uellet quidem repetere, nisi timeret uel puderet emisse. §. 2. Sunt aliae personae inferioris loci, que ab utraque parte non insolenter accipiunt, sicut offitialis, et qui amouetur, et cui admouetur offitium. Ab his extorta per inmoderatam inprobitatem repeti solent; magisque reprehendimus qui talia inusitate repetiuerunt, quam qui ea de more sumpserunt, quoniam multae necessariae personae rebus humanis uel inuitantur huiusmodi commodis, uel tenentur. §. 3. Isti, si uiam uitae mutauerint, aut excellentioris conscenderint sanctitatis gradum, facilius ea, que hoc modo acquisierunt, tanquam sua pauperibus largiuntur, quam eis, a quibus accepta sunt, tamquam aliena restituant. §. 4. Qui uero contra ius societatis humanae furtis, rapinis, calumpniis, obpressionibus, inuasionibus aliqua abstulerit, reddenda potius quam donanda censemus, Zachei publicani exemplo.
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