Question II

GRATIAN. PART I. That perjury is to swear falsely is easily proved. For Augustine says in the Book of Psalms upon “The earth is the Lord’s”:

One who will act otherwise than he promises swears deceitfully, since perjury is wickedly to deceive one who believes.

Likewise Jerome on Jeremiah, book II. It is to be observed that an oath is to have these companions: truth, judgment, and justice. If these are lacking, it will by no means be an oath, but perjury. GRATIAN. Likewise, one who swears falsely lies. But to swear while lying is nothing other than to commit perjury. § 1. Therefore, since all who speak a lie are to be destroyed, according to that statement of the Psalmist, “You will destroy all who speak a lie,” much more condemnable are those who are convicted of forswearing themselves by lying, because they take the name of their God in vain. § 2. But it is one thing to swear falsely, another to swear deceitfully. For not everyone who will act otherwise than he promises swears deceitfully. Although the Apostle was going to act otherwise than he promised the Corinthians in the first epistle, when he said, “I will come to you,” nevertheless he did not swear deceitfully or promise falsely. For one swears deceitfully or promises falsely when it is in his mind not to act as he promises; but one who promises what is false but thinks it true neither swears deceitfully nor promises falsely. Hence Augustine, On the Words of the Apostle, sermon 28, [otherwise 30]:

Men swear falsely either when they deceive or when they are deceived. A man thinks that what is false is true and swears rashly; or he knows or thinks that it is false and nevertheless swears to it as true, and no less swears with criminality. But these perjuries that I have mentioned are different. Suppose that one swears who thinks that the thing for which he swears is true: he thinks that it is true, and nevertheless it is false. This man does not commit perjury from his intention; he is deceived. He holds as true what is false; he does not knowingly interpose an oath for a false thing. Give me another. He knows that it is false, says it is true, and swears to it as though what he knows to be false were true. You see how detestable this beast is and how it is to be exterminated from human affairs. Who would wish to become such a person? All men detest such things. Suppose another. He thinks that it is false and swears that it is true. Perhaps it is true. For example, so that you may understand: it rained in that place. You question a man, and he says that it rained, and it suits his business to say, “It rained,” but he thinks that it did not rain: he is a perjurer. It matters how the word proceeds from the mind. Nothing except a guilty mind makes the tongue guilty. GRATIAN. Therefore, because this man’s mind was not guilty—he did not know that what he swore was true was false—and he seemed to himself to have ascertained with great diligence, not rashly or negligently, that what he swore falsely was true, he is by no means to be judged guilty of perjury. Likewise, when it is said that one who swears falsely lies, this ought not to be understood universally. For not everyone who says what is false lies, just as not everyone who lies says what is false. Hence Augustine in the Enchiridion, [c. 22]:

But one who lies speaks contrary to what he perceives in his mind, with the will to deceive. § 1. And words have certainly been instituted for this reason: not that men should deceive one another through them, but that by them each person should bring his thoughts to another’s knowledge. Therefore to use words for deceit, not for that for which they were instituted, is a sin. § 2. Nor for this reason is any lie to be thought not to be a sin because we can sometimes benefit someone by lying. For we can also do so by stealing, if a poor person to whom it is openly given experiences an advantage and the rich person from whom it is secretly taken experiences no disadvantage; nor for this reason would anyone say that such a theft is not a sin. And below, [c. 18]: § 3. No one is to be judged a liar who says what is false while thinking it true, because, insofar as it lies with him, he himself does not deceive but is deceived. Therefore one who too incautiously believes false things and holds them as true is to be accused not of lying but sometimes of rashness. Rather, on the contrary, insofar as it lies with him, one lies who says what is true while thinking it false. For insofar as his mind is concerned, because he does not say what he perceives, he does not say what is true, although what he says is found to be true. Nor is one in any way free from lying who unknowingly speaks truth with his mouth but knowingly lies by his will. Therefore, without considering the things themselves concerning which something is said, but only the intention of the speaker, one who unknowingly says what is false because he thinks it true is better than one who knowingly bears an intention to lie while not knowing that what he says is true.

Likewise Pope Gelasius. The blessed Apostle Paul is not for that reason to be believed—far be it—to have deceived or to have been contrary to himself because, although he had promised that he would go to Spain, being occupied by greater causes through divine ordering, he was unable to fulfill what he promised. So far as his own will was concerned, he declared what he truly would have wished to accomplish. So far as concerns the secrets of the divine counsel—which, as a man, although full of the Spirit of God, he was unable to recognize in their entirety—he omitted these because he was forestalled by heavenly ordering. § 1. Nor because the blessed Apostle Peter, from the disposition of divine reverence, answered the Lord himself, “You shall never wash my feet,” will he be thought—far be it—to have deceived or in no way to have stood by his judgment, because he soon yielded to that same divine will and, constrained by the reasons of human salvation, permitted with ready will to be done what he had said he would not do. PART II. GRATIAN. Therefore one who, by swearing to something false, lies is one who knows that what he swears is false. For a lie is, as Augustine says, “a false signification with the will to deceive.” § 1. But since deceiving is always a matter of the will, while being deceived is a matter either of weakness or rashness, and since what proceeds from the will is graver than what proceeds from rashness or weakness, it sometimes happens that to be deceived is either no sin or a minimal sin, and sometimes, from the diverse consideration of the matters themselves, it is less to deceive than to be deceived. Hence the same Augustine in the Enchiridion, [c. 21]:

In matters in which it makes no difference to attaining the kingdom of God whether they are believed or not, and whether they are thought true or false, to err in these—that is, to think one thing in place of another—is not to be judged a sin; or if it is, it is a minimal and most slight sin.

In the same, [c. 18]. In consideration of the things themselves that are said, there is so great a difference that, although, so far as a person’s will is concerned, it is in every case a lesser evil to be deceived than to lie, nevertheless it is far more tolerable to lie in matters separated from religion than to be deceived in those matters without faith in or knowledge of which God cannot be worshiped. PART III. GRATIAN. Likewise, what is said—“You will destroy all who speak a lie”—is not to be understood of every lie. For there are certain lies in which, even if there is some fault, they are nevertheless not condemnable; indeed, they are to be held as though they were not lies. There are also other lies that are of graver fault, of which “You will destroy all who speak a lie” is understood. § 1. But so that it may appear which lies are venial and which condemnable, it must be distinguished how many kinds of lies there are. Concerning these Augustine writes in the book On Lying, [c. 14]:

The first is a deadly lie, to be avoided by far, which is made in the teaching of religion; no one ought to be brought to this lie under any condition. The second is one that injures someone unjustly and is such that it benefits no one and harms someone. The third benefits one person in such a way that it harms another, although it does not harm him unto bodily defilement. The fourth is made solely from a lust for lying and deceiving, which is a monstrous lie. The fifth is made from a desire to please by pleasant speech. When all these have been entirely avoided and rejected, there follows the sixth kind, which harms no one and benefits someone—as if someone, knowing where another’s money that is to be unjustly taken away is located, were to lie that he does not know. The seventh harms no one and benefits someone—as if one were to lie because he is unwilling to betray a man sought for death. The eighth kind of lie harms no one and benefits someone in this respect: that it protects someone from bodily defilement. § 1. Therefore one must not lie in the teaching of piety; the first kind of detestable lie is a great crime. Therefore one must not lie by the second kind, because injury is to be done to no one. One must not lie by the third kind, because no one is to be aided with injury to another. One must not lie by the fourth kind, on account of the lust for lying, which is vicious through itself. One must not lie by the fifth kind, because not even truth itself is to be uttered to men for the sake of pleasing them; how much less a lie, which through itself, because it is a lie, is certainly base? One must not lie by the sixth kind, for the truth of testimony is not rightly corrupted for anyone’s temporal advantage and safety; but no one is to be led to eternal salvation with the assistance of a lie. Nor must one lie by the seventh kind, for anyone’s temporal advantage or safety is not to be preferred to the perfecting of faith, nor ought anyone to experience himself as being so badly moved by our deeds rightly done that he becomes even more dejected in spirit and more remote from piety. Nor must one lie by the eighth kind, because among goods the chastity of the mind is preferred to the chastity of the body, and among evils what we ourselves do is more condemnable for us than what we permit to be done. § 2. But among these eight kinds, the farther one withdraws from the first, the less he sins when he lies. But whoever shall think that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin will shamefully deceive himself when he judges himself an honorable deceiver of others.

Likewise Augustine, On the Words of the Apostle, [sermon 31, otherwise 29]. When you lie for the sake of humility, if you were not a sinner before you lied, by lying you become what you had avoided. Truth is not in you unless you call yourself a sinner in such a way that you also know yourself to be one. But truth itself is that you say what is. For how is there humility where falsity reigns?

Likewise Gregory, [book XXVI of the Moralia, c. 2]. Those who entangle themselves in a lie are incautiously humble.

Likewise Augustine on John, [tractate 43]. Let arrogance not be avoided in such a way that truth is abandoned.

Likewise in the Enchiridion, [c. 18]. But it does not seem absurd to me that every lie is indeed a sin, while it makes a great difference with what intention and concerning what matters each person lies. For one who lies with the will to aid does not sin in the same way as one who lies with the will to harm, nor does one who by lying sends a traveler upon a contrary road do as much harm as one who corrupts the way of life by a deceiving lie.

Likewise Augustine in the book On the Conflict of Vices and Virtues, [c. 19]. One ought to deceive no one either by an artful lie or by a simple word, because in whatever manner a person lies, he kills his soul.

Likewise Augustine on the Fifth Psalm, [at the verse “You will destroy all who speak”]. Let no one think that a perfect and spiritual man ought to lie for this temporal life, by the death of which neither his own soul nor another’s is killed. But because it is one thing to lie and another to conceal the truth—indeed, it is one thing to say what is false and another to keep silent about what is true—if perhaps someone is unwilling to betray a man to this visible death, he ought to be prepared to conceal the truth, not to say what is false, so that he neither betrays nor lies, nor kills his own soul for the body of another. § 1. But there are two kinds of lies in which there is no great fault, although they are nevertheless not without fault: when we either jest or lie while aiding our neighbor. The former, in jesting, is not pernicious for this reason: because it does not deceive. For the one to whom it is said knows that it was said for the sake of jesting. The latter is milder for this reason: because it retains some benevolence. § 2. But that which does not have a double heart is not even to be called a lie. For example, if a sword should be entrusted to someone and he should promise that he will return it when the person who entrusted it asks for it, and if perhaps the latter, raging, should demand his sword again, it is manifest that it is not to be returned, lest he kill either himself or others, until sanity is restored to him. Here the one to whom the sword was entrusted does not have a double heart for this reason: when he promised that he would return it to the one asking, he did not think that the man might demand it while raging. § 3. It is manifest that sometimes keeping silent about the truth is not to be blamed, but saying what is false is not found to have been conceded to the saints.

The same in the book On Lying, [c. 17]. Let a man do what he can even for the temporal safety of men. But when matters have come to such a point that he cannot provide for such safety except by sinning, let him then judge that he has nothing he can do, since he has perceived that the remaining course is what he will rightly do.

Likewise Isidore in the Synonyms, [c. 10]. Flee every kind of lie with the greatest care. Speak falsely neither by chance nor deliberately; do not strive to lie in order to render assistance, nor defend anyone’s life by any deceit. Beware of a lie in all things.

[PALEA.

Likewise Augustine in the book On Lying, c. 6. If anyone who could be freed from death by your lie should flee to you, you are not to lie. For the mouth that lies kills the soul. And below: § 1. Therefore, since eternal life is lost by lying, one must never lie for anyone’s temporal life. ]

Likewise Augustine in the book Questions on Genesis, c. 45, [question 145]. What Joseph says to his brothers—“Did you not know that there is no man like me in divination?”—and the fact that he also commanded this to be said to them through the man concerning this divination: what he means is commonly asked. Or, because it was said not seriously but in jest, as the outcome taught, is it not to be held a lie? For lies are performed seriously by liars, not in jest. But when things that are not are said as though in jest, they are not reckoned as lies. GRATIAN. But in the Old Testament many things were permitted whose examples it is not lawful to use today. Hence Gregory, [book XVIII of the Moralia, c. 3]:

If anyone wishes to defend his lie by the Old Testament because perhaps it harmed certain persons less there, he must say that the seizure of others’ property and the repayment of injury, which were conceded there to the weak, cannot harm him. It is clear to all with how great a severity Truth pursues all these things—Truth who, with the shadow of his signification now laid aside, is manifested to us in true flesh.

The same, [in the same book, c. 2]. If any fault is customarily purged by a subsequent pious work, how much more easily is this fault wiped away when piety itself, the mother of the good work, accompanies it? But certain persons strive to assert from the midwives’ deceit that this kind of lie is not a sin, especially because, when they lied, it is written “that the Lord built houses for them.” In that recompense it is more clearly known what the fault of lying merits. For the reward of their kindness, which could have been repaid to them in eternal life, was diverted to an earthly recompense by the preceding fault of lying. GRATIAN. Abraham also, speaking to his servants, said: “Sit here with the ass; I and the boy will pass over to that place, and when we have worshiped, we will return to you.” Although he had resolved that he would do something else, nevertheless he is excused from lying. Hence Ambrose in the book On the Patriarchs: “He prophesied what he did not know. He alone intended to return after his son had been sacrificed. But the Lord spoke through his mouth what he was preparing. Yet he spoke captiously with the servants lest, when the affair was known, either someone impede him or make an uproar with groaning or weeping.” PART V. § 1. Sometimes by commanding something we signify that we will it to be done, although we do not will it to be done, but seek a test of obedience, just as Abraham is read to have been tested by God when he was commanded to sacrifice his son, whom the Lord did not will to be killed by him. Hence in the same book the same Ambrose says: “For God did not will the son to be sacrificed by his father, nor did he who offered a ram to be sacrificed for the son will this offering to be completed, but he tested the father’s disposition, whether he would prefer God’s commands to his son.” And below: “‘Do not lay,’ he said, ‘your hand upon the boy, nor do anything to him. I investigated your disposition; I did not exact the deed. I tested your mind, whether you would not spare even your most beloved son because of me. I do not take away what I myself gave, nor do I begrudge the heir whom I bestowed upon one who had none.’”

Likewise Jerome, [in the letter to the Galatians, c. 2]. Let the example of Jehu, King of Israel, teach us that a useful simulation is to be assumed at the proper time. When he could not kill the priests of Baal unless he pretended that he wished to worship the idol, he said: “Gather to me all the priests of Baal. Ahab served him in few things; I will serve him in many.” And David, when he changed his countenance before Abimelech, who dismissed him, and he departed. Nor is it remarkable that even just men nevertheless simulate certain things for a time for their own and others’ safety, since our Lord himself, having neither sin nor the flesh of sin, assumed the simulation of sinful flesh so that, condemning sin in the flesh, he might make us the justice of God in himself. GRATIAN. Behold which lies are venial and which condemnable. § 1. But it is asked why Augustine says that one must not lie for someone’s temporal life, when Abraham, descending into Egypt, asked Sarah to lie that she was his sister, saying: “I know that you are a beautiful woman, and that, when the Egyptians see you, they will say, ‘She is his wife,’ and they will kill me and preserve you. Say, therefore, I beseech you, that you are my sister, so that it may be well with me because of you and my soul may live by your favor.” But Abraham wished not that a lie be said, but that the truth be kept silent. Hence the same Augustine says in Questions on Genesis, [question 26]:

It is asked why the Patriarch wished to lie by saying that Sarah was his sister, and did not rather entrust the matter to God, who, if he wished, could preserve her chastity before Pharaoh. But he wished the truth to be concealed, not a lie to be told. For she is called his sister because she was his brother’s daughter. And in this it is shown that no one ought to tempt his God when he has something that he may do by reasonable counsel. He did what he could; what he could not do he entrusted to God, in whom he hoped, and neither faith nor hope failed him. But if, when questioned, he had indicated that she was his wife, he would have entrusted two things to God: his own life and his wife’s chastity. GRATIAN. Likewise it is objected that Jacob by lying both benefited himself and harmed another, and nevertheless is not reproved but commended. But Jacob, by saying that he was Esau the firstborn, did not lie. For he did not say that he was firstborn by birth, but duly entered upon the right of primogeniture when the other sold it. Thus Christ also said that John was Elijah—not in person, but in imitation of virtue. Therefore Jacob was Esau, not by birth, as we have said, but by the purchase of the rights of the firstborn, passing from one not firstborn into the firstborn, just as Esau himself, by selling the rights of the firstborn, deserved to be made from the firstborn one not firstborn. Thus also the Jews, although they were children of Abraham by the flesh, because they were not his children by imitation, are not reckoned among the children of Abraham but are called children of the devil, whose children they are not by birth but by imitation. Hence they deserved to hear from the Lord: “If you are children of Abraham, do the works of Abraham. But now you seek to kill me, a man who has spoken the truth to you. Abraham did not do this. You are of your father the devil, and you will to do the desires of your father.” § 1. Conversely, although the gentiles according to carnal origin were strangers to Abraham, nevertheless by imitation of faith and justice they succeeded among the children of Abraham. Hence it is said to them by the Apostle: “But if you are Christ’s, then you are Abraham’s seed.” Therefore the same Apostle, writing to the Romans, says: “O Jew, if you are circumcised but do not observe his law, your circumcision has become foreskin; just as the foreskin, if it keeps the just requirements of the law, is reckoned as circumcision.” Therefore, as is gathered from the foregoing, imitation in deed is preferred to origin in the flesh. Thus Jacob truthfully, not falsely, said that he was Esau; and not by lying but by speaking truth did he benefit himself, while he did not harm the other, because he received the blessing owed to himself and did not surreptitiously take another’s. § 2. But this bishop concerning whom the case is being considered, although he swore falsely, nevertheless, because, as was said above, nothing but a guilty mind makes the tongue guilty, is by no means held guilty of perjury. This is also proved by the example of Saul. When he was in the camp about to fight against the Philistines, he swore that he would kill whoever ate before sunset. But his son Jonathan, not having heard the king’s oath, after he had made a great slaughter of the enemy by fighting and had wrought salvation in Israel, being afflicted by hunger saw a honeycomb, which he took with the royal staff that he carried in his hands and ate. Immediately his eyes, which hunger had almost closed, were opened, and his face was made cheerful. When this was discovered, Saul wished to deliver him to death; but, appeased by the prayers and pious supplication of the people, he revoked the sentence of death, so that the one through whom salvation had been given in Israel and by whose fighting that people had been freed from the hands of the enemy might not be killed. Behold, Saul swore falsely, because, provoked by the prayers of the people, he did not do what he had decreed by swearing that he would do. Nevertheless, he is not accused as guilty of perjury, because, insofar as it lay with him, he fulfilled what he swore when he gave a sentence of death against his son, which he revoked not from carnal affection but by the people’s supplication.