Question I

GRATIAN. PART I. But that things done with an alienated mind are not to be imputed appears capable of being proved easily. For some sins appear to consist in the will of the mind, others in an infirmity of nature. But will, as Augustine says in book I of the Retractations, [c. 15], is a movement of the mind toward either not losing or attaining something. This was said so that by this definition one who wills might be distinguished from one who is unwilling. § 1. Therefore sins proceed from the will when they are committed by the free judgment of the mind and with the purpose of transgressing. § 2. Moreover, one infirmity is of the mind, another of the flesh. Infirmity of the mind is ignorance; infirmity of the flesh is concupiscence. But the things which proceed from either infirmity are imputed to punishment. Hence it was said of certain ignorant persons: “If anyone is ignorant, he shall be ignored.” Such were those concerning whom Christ said to the Apostles: “They will put you out of the synagogue, because they will think that they offer service to God.” Concerning the same persons the Apostle also writes in the Epistle to the Romans: “I bear them witness that they have zeal for God, but not according to knowledge.” Nevertheless, this ignorance excuses none of them who persists in his perfidy. Things which are done through the languor of nature proceed from infirmity of the flesh; and if they were not imputed to punishment, the Apostle, burdened by the law of the flesh, would by no means say: “Unhappy man that I am, who will deliver me from the body of this death? etc.” Therefore, whether sins consist in the will or in infirmity, they are always imputed to punishment. § 3. That statement of Augustine in On True Religion, [c. 14], appears contrary to this judgment: “To such an extent is sin a voluntary evil that, unless it is voluntary, it is in no way sin; and this is indeed so manifest that no scarcity of the learned and no multitude of the unlearned dissents from it.” Therefore either it is to be denied that sin is committed, or it must be confessed that it is committed with the will. § 4. But the same Augustine shows in book I of the Retractations, [c. 13], that this is not to be understood generally concerning all sins, saying: “To such an extent is sin a voluntary evil that it is in no way sin if it is not voluntary. § 5. This definition can appear false; but if it is examined diligently, it is found to be most true. For that sin which is only sin must be considered, not that which is also the punishment of sin. Although even those things which not without merit are called involuntary sins, because they are perpetrated either by those who do not know or by those who are compelled, cannot be said to be altogether involuntary.” The same in the same work, [book I, c. 15]: “The definition of sin which we stated—‘Sin is the will to retain or obtain what justice forbids, from which it is free to abstain’—is true for this reason: because that which is only sin has been defined, not that which is also the punishment of sin.”

The same in the book [IV] of Questions, [question 24, at c. 15 of Numbers]. It is deservedly asked: What are the sins of the unwilling? Are they those which are committed by persons who do not know, or can that which one is compelled to do also rightly be called the sin of an unwilling person? For this also is accustomed to be said to be against the will; but surely he wills that for the sake of which he does it. For example, if a person is unwilling to perjure himself, yet does so because he wishes to live when someone threatens him with death unless he does it. Therefore he wills to do it because he wills to live, and consequently he does not seek in itself to swear falsely, but to live by swearing falsely. But if this is so, I do not know whether these can be called sins of the unwilling, of the kind which here are said to be expiated. For if the matter is diligently examined, perhaps no one wills the sinning itself, but sins for the sake of something else which he wills. For all men who knowingly do what is not permitted would wish it to be permitted. To such a degree does no one seek the sinning itself for its own sake, but for that which follows from it. If these things are so, there are no sins of the unwilling except those of the ignorant, which are distinguished from sins of the willing.

From the title of the Digest concerning injuries, [law 3]. That which has been reported is equally true: those who can suffer an injury can also commit one. Certainly there are some who cannot commit one, such as a madman and a minor who is not capable of fraud. For these are accustomed to suffer injury, not to commit it. For since injury consists in the disposition of the one acting, it will follow that these persons, whether they strike someone or utter an insult, do not appear to have committed an injury. Therefore someone can suffer an injury even if he does not perceive it; but no one can commit one unless he knows that he is committing an injury, even if he does not know to whom he does it. Hence, if anyone strikes another in play or while competing, he is not held liable for injuries. If anyone has beaten a free man while he thinks him his own slave, he is in such a position that he is not held liable for injuries. GRATIAN. Therefore, as appears from the foregoing, whether sins proceed from the will or from infirmity, it is manifest that they are imputed. But infirmity of the flesh is understood in two ways. For there is a languor of nature which is called the concupiscence of the flesh, which can more truly be called an infirmity of the soul; but it is called an infirmity of the flesh for this reason, because it happens to the soul from the corruption of the flesh joined to it. Moreover, there is another infirmity which is properly called of the flesh, by which, when the harmony of the elements or humors has been disturbed, the flesh itself is afflicted and at last dissolved. § 1. Similarly infirmity of the mind is twofold: one which is called vice, by which the soul is separated from God, such as anger, hatred, and other things of this kind; another infirmity of the soul which, although it is not itself sin, is nevertheless a punishment and a cause of sin, such as forgetfulness and ignorance. But madness, although it is not sin, is nevertheless a punishment of sin, as are fever and the other passions which we properly say are of the flesh; the movements of these, that is, the things which are done while they disturb a person, are imputed to no one for punishment. § 2. But an objection is raised concerning Lamech, who, when he was blind, killed Cain, and the infirmity of blindness did not excuse him. Hence it was said: “Sevenfold vengeance shall be given for Cain; for Lamech, seventy-sevenfold.” But blindness is similar to ignorance. § 3. For from each certain things are done which are imputed, but certain others which are by no means imputed. For if a blind man, believing that he renders the debt to his own wife, defiles another woman, he is not guilty of adultery. But if, while throwing a javelin in play, in an exercise of strength, or in hunting, he kills someone, because this ought to be altogether foreign to him, he is held guilty of homicide. But a mind alienated by madness, since it is not in possession of itself, does not contract guilt for the things which it commits, because it did not have the capacity to deliberate. Hence aid is given to a ward and to a madman in cases of wrongdoing, so that things which did not proceed from mental deliberation are not imputed to them for punishment. This is known to be approved not only by human laws but also by divine laws. For Augustine says concerning little children, [in the book On Faith to Peter the Deacon, c. 30]:

“Hold most firmly and doubt in no way that, except for those who are baptized in their own blood for the name of Christ, no man will receive eternal life who has not here been converted from his evils through penance and faith and freed through the sacrament of faith and penance, that is, through baptism; and that for adults it is indeed necessary both to do penance for their evils, to hold the Catholic faith according to the rule of truth, and to receive the sacrament of baptism; but for little children, who are not yet able by their own will to believe or to do penance for the sin which they draw by origin, the sacrament of faith, which is holy baptism, suffices for salvation so long as their age cannot be capable of reason.” [GRATIAN.] But from what is said at the end of this authority—“so long, namely, as their age cannot be capable of reason”—it is evidently given to be understood that sins are imputed to no one after baptism, whether he is an adult or a minor, unless he is capable of reason. Hence concerning brute animals also the same reason is rendered by Augustine in the same book, [c. 3], why their deeds are not imputed to them: “For the animals,” he says, “complete the course or adornment of the present age according to the incomprehensible will of the Creator; they will render no account concerning their deeds, because they are not rational. For is God concerned about oxen? But men, because they were made rational, will render account to God both concerning themselves and concerning all the things which they received for the use of the present life, and according to the quality of their acts they will receive either punishment or glory.” Nevertheless, by the authority of sacred law animals are ordered to be killed, not because of a consciousness of sin, but because they renew the memory of the deed. Hence Augustine on Leviticus, [at c. 20, question 74]:

“A woman who approaches any beast to be mounted by it: you shall kill the woman and the beast; let them die by death. For they are guilty.” § 1. It is asked how the beast is guilty, since it is irrational and is in no way capable of law. Likewise: It is to be believed that beasts were ordered to be killed for this reason: because, contaminated by such a disgraceful act, they renew an unworthy memory of the deed. PART II. GRATIAN. But concerning madmen Augustine writes most clearly in the book Questions of the Old and New Testament, [question 2, at the end], saying thus:

We know that certain persons, suddenly made insane, have harmed many with iron, a club, stones, and bites, and have even killed some; but after being captured by contrivance and brought before judgments, they were by no means made guilty, because they did these things unknowingly, not by will but under the impulse of some force unknown to me. For how is one established as guilty who does not know what he has done?

Likewise Ambrose in the Hexaemeron, in the tractate on the first day. Those things are to be guarded against which proceed from our will: the offenses of youth and the irrational passions of the body. Therefore, of the things whose masters we are, let us not seek the beginnings outside ourselves or divert them onto others, but let us acknowledge the things that are properly ours. Because we can refrain from doing this if we wish, we ought to ascribe the choice of this evil to ourselves rather than to others. Therefore also in judgments of this kind, guilt binds the voluntarily guilty, not those compelled by necessity; punishment condemns them. For if anyone kills an innocent person through madness, he is not liable to death; indeed, by an oracle of the divine law itself, if anyone inflicts death through imprudence, he receives hope of impunity and the possibility of refuge, so that he may be able to escape. Let this, therefore, be said concerning that which appears properly evil. For those things are not evils which neither entangle the mind in crime nor bind the conscience. Hence no wise person would call poverty, ignobility, illness, or death evils, nor would he number them in the lot of evils.

The same in the book On the Patriarchs, [c. 6 of the book On Abraham]. Certainly we learn that drunkenness is to be avoided, through which we cannot beware of crimes. For the things which we beware of when sober we commit ignorantly through drunkenness. § 1. Those who indulge excessively in wine do not know what they say; they lie buried, and therefore, if they have transgressed in anything through wine, they are indeed granted pardon before wise judges, but as authors they are condemned for their levity.

Likewise Augustine in book I of The City of God, [c. 25]. If concupiscence or disobedience, which still dwells in mortal members, is moved as though by its own law contrary to the law of our will, if it is without guilt in the body of one sleeping, how much more is it without guilt in the body of one not consenting?

The same, Against Faustus, book II. His daughters made Lot drunk and mingled with him while he was unaware. Therefore he is indeed to be blamed, yet not so much as that incest but as much as that drunkenness merits.

Likewise Ambrose, On the Blessed Life. There is no reason for us to ascribe our distress to anyone except our will. None of us is held to guilt unless he has turned aside by his own will. Things inflicted upon those who resist have no crime. The odium of offenses, which we divert onto others, follows only voluntary acts. Christ chose for Himself a voluntary soldier; the devil claims for himself a voluntary servant. He possesses no one bound by the yoke of servitude unless the sinner has first sold himself to him for the bronze of sins.

The same in the book On Paradise. Nor is one who has unwillingly committed a homicide outside the ministry. For the law says concerning him: “Because God delivered him into his hands.” Therefore his hands, after the manner of an instrument, furnished ministry to divine vengeance. The Levite, therefore, is a minister of remission. But the striker who has committed homicide not by plan but contrary to his will is a minister of divine vengeance. § 1. Consider this also: when the impious man is killed, Christ is poured in, and where abomination is abolished, sanctification is consecrated, because the Lord said: “On that day on which I shall have killed all Israel.” This is referred not to one day of the affliction of Egypt but to all time. GRATIAN. Therefore, since one who has unwillingly killed a man is a minister of God, since one who kills an innocent person in madness is by no means liable to death, and since those suddenly made insane bear no guilt for the things they do, it is evident that this priest is not guilty of homicide, and therefore he ought not to be deprived of the priesthood. § 1. But that which is found in the penitential of Theodore is objected:

If anyone while insane has killed someone, if he has returned to a sound mind, a lighter penance is to be imposed upon him. GRATIAN. But perhaps this is understood concerning one whom his own fault brought to madness. § 1. Likewise it is objected: There are certain things which, even if they are not imputed to punishment, nevertheless impede the seal of the sacrament. For the ambition of parents is not imputed to the son for punishment, yet it hinders him from receiving an office of the church. Thus things done with an alienated mind, even if they are not imputed to punishment, nevertheless impede the exercise of a sacred office. Hence Jerome says:

If anyone, not in anger but for the sake of discipline, gives someone a blow with the palm and kills him by accident, as is accustomed to happen, in respect of grace he is innocent, because it considers the will, not the deed. But in respect of the law he is guilty, because it considers deeds. § 1. Likewise, if a virgin has been oppressed during persecution, she is rejected by the law because it looks at the deed, not the will; but in grace she is received as a virgin, because it considers not deeds but the will. GRATIAN. Therefore, just as one who commits homicide by accident for the sake of discipline is guilty in respect of the law but innocent in respect of grace, so this priest who committed homicide in madness is innocent in respect of guilt but is proved guilty in respect of the exercise of the office received. § 1. To these matters reply is thus made: Not all things which impede one who is to be ordained cast down one who has been ordained; for one who was at some time insane cannot be advanced to the priesthood. Nevertheless, if he begins to be mad after the priesthood, he will not for that reason lack the priesthood, unless perhaps it should happen that he never returns to the function of a sound mind. As Gregory writes concerning a certain bishop in the Register to Bishop Eleutherius: “Although it is sad for us, etc.,” as above: “A bishop burdened by prolonged illness.”