Question — Decretum of Gratian
Question III
GRATIAN. Part I. That periods of delay are not to be denied after summons to one coming to judgment is attested by the same Pope Felix II, [in the letter to the brothers of Egypt, c. 8], who says:
GRATIANUS. I. Pars. Quod uero post uocationem uenienti ad iudicium induciae negandae non sint, idem Felix Papa [II. in epistola ad fratres Egipti cap. 8.] testatur, dicens:
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C. I. Periods of delay shall not be denied to one coming to judgment.
When the accused has come to judgment, if he wishes, the periods of delay established by the Fathers shall be granted without impediment to him when he requests them, and judges chosen by him shall be assigned to him.
C. I. Venienti ad iudicium induciae non negentur.
Cum accusatus ad iudicium uenerit, si uoluerit, induciae ei petenti a Patribus constitutae absque inpedimento concedantur, et iudices a se electi sibi tribuantur.
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C. II. Periods of delay of how many months are to be furnished to bishops.
Likewise from the letter of Felix II to the brothers of Egypt, [c. 20]. Concerning periods of delay for bishops, about which you consulted us, we find diverse rules instituted by the Fathers. For certain Fathers commanded that a year and six months be granted for repelling the devices of assailants, preparing their responses, confirming witnesses, and seeking the counsel of bishops and friends. Others commanded a year, in which very many agree. But I have not found less than six months, because these have been granted even to laymen; how much more to the Lord's priests? And below: § 1. Periods of delay are to be granted not under a narrow time but over a long space, so that the accused may be able to prepare themselves, meet all communicants situated in the provinces, prepare witnesses, and arm themselves fully against ambushers.
C. II. Quot mensium induciae episcopis prestandae sint.
Item ex epistola Felicis II. fratribus Egiptiorum. [c. 20.] De induciis uero episcoporum, super quibus consuluistis, diuersas a Patribus regulas institutas inuenimus. Quidam enim ad repellenda machinamenta inpetitorum, et suas preparandas responsiones, et testes confirmandos, et consilia episcoporum atque amicorum querenda, annum et sex menses mandauerunt concedi. Quidam autem annum, in quo plurimi concordant. Minus uero quam sex menses non reperi, quia et laicis hec indulta sunt, quanto magis Domini sacerdotibus? Et infra: §. 1. Induciae non sub angusto tempore, sed sub longo spatio concedendae sunt, ut accusati se preparare, et uniuersos communicatores in prouinciis positos conuenire, et testes preparare, atque contra insidiatores se pleniter armare ualeant.
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C. III. Concerning periods of delay to be furnished.
Likewise Pope Eleutherius, [in the letter to the provinces of Gaul]. Periods of delay that are not small are to be given for making inquiry, lest anything appear to be done prematurely by either party, because many things happen through surreption.
[PALEA.
C. III. De induciis prestandis.
Item Eleuterius Papa. [in epist. ad Galliae prouincias] Induciae non modicae ad inquirendum dandae sunt, ne aliquid prepropere agi a quacumque parte uideatur, quia per subreptionem multa proueniunt.
[PALEA.
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C. IV. Concerning the same.
Likewise Pope Damasus, letter III to Archbishop Stephen. Periods of delay of six months, or longer if necessary, are to be granted to accused persons in criminal cases.]
GRATIAN. Part II. But the span of delays, as is found in book III of the Code under title 11, On Delays, is to be moderated on this basis: if either a person or instruments are requested from the same province in which the litigation is conducted, not more than three months shall be granted. But if they are requested from adjoining provinces, justice requires six months to be observed. In a transmarine delay, however, nine months will have to be computed. Judges, however, shall understand that by this rule there has not been granted to them a discretion for giving delay. Rather, they shall know that the same delay—if a most urgent basis in the matters has demanded it and the necessity of the desired instruction has required it—is not easily to be granted more than once, nor by any artifice for protraction.
§ 1. But a delay is to be entirely denied to one who has brought back a rescript to an extraordinary judge. It is to be given, however, to the person summoned to judgment for proving falsehoods in the petitions or producing some instruments or witnesses, because one who is drawn contrary to expectation before an alien judgment could not have been prepared. § 2. But when a rescript has been made by the prince concerning an appeal or consultation, whether a delay was requested in the first judgment and not granted or was not even requested, it will not be lawful to give it to anyone, on the same basis by which delay is not customarily granted in judgments of imperial cognizance. It is not proper to request a delay from a judge while he is proceeding, even if it be granted with both parties present, since it can be granted only after the cause has been heard, and the hearing of the cause is lawfully assembled not by a full formal challenge but rather while the judge is sitting, so that, if perhaps the petition for delay has been rejected, the question undertaken may be decided by the judge's sentence.
From the seventh Novel Constitution, in collation VIII. § 4. But the plaintiff shall direct the petition only after he first furnishes security, both to the person whom he says is bound and to the executor of the business, that he will either join issue within two months or restore every loss befalling the person who is brought to trial. In collation V: GRATIAN. Part III. § 5. Let the petition be offered to the person summoned to judgment, and thereafter, after the sportulae have been furnished and surety given, let him enjoy a delay of twenty days, in which he may deliberate whether to yield or contend, to request that another be joined to the judge, or to reject that judge, unless the latter is the judge whom he himself requested after already rejecting another. Finally, let him be asked in person whether this time has passed. This shall be made manifest not only by his own response but also by his subscription of the petition, which he ought to make at the beginning. Therefore, joinder of issue conducted contrary to this grant is held as nothing.
From Novel Constitution VI, in collation VI. § 6. This ought not to be done unless the plaintiff has given sufficient security, promising that he will give a fixed amount if he does not pursue the case, or, pursuing it, does not win the case. Therefore, if after the prescribed time he does not appear within ten days while the defendant is present, let the defendant be dismissed after exacting what was promised and whatever more he swears, subject to the judge's assessment, that he spent concerning the litigation. [§ 7. An exception concerning the forum is dilatory and therefore ought to be opposed and proved at the beginning of the litigation. But it is sufficient that peremptory exceptions, such as prescriptions of a long period, be pleaded at the beginning of the litigation.]
C. IV. De eodem.
Item Damasus Papa epistola III. ad Stephanum Archiepiscopum. Induciae accusatis in criminalibus causis sex mensium uel eo amplius, si necesse fuerit, concedendae sunt. ] II. Pars. Gratian. Spatium uero dilationum, sicut in III. libro Codicis titulo [11.] de dilationibus inuenitur, hac ratione moderandum est, ut, si ex ea prouincia, ubi lis agitur, uel persona, uel instrumenta poscentur, non amplius quam tres menses indulgeantur. Si uero ex continentibus prouinciis, sex menses custodiri iustitia est. In transmarina autem dilatione nouem menses conputari oportebit. Iudicantes autem hac ratione non sibi concessum intelligant dandae dilationis arbitrium, sed eandem dilationem (si rerum urgentissima ratio flagitauerit, et necessitas desideratae instructionis exegerit) non amplius facile quam semel, nec ulla trahendi arte sciant esse tribuendam. §. 1. Ei autem dilatio penitus est deneganda, qui rescriptum ad extraordinarium iudicem reportauerit. Illi uero, qui in iudicium uocatur, danda est ad probanda precum mendacia, uel proferenda aliqua instrumenta uel testes, quoniam instructus esse non potuit qui preter spem ad alienum iudicium trahitur. §. 2. Cum uero ad appellationem siue consultationem a principe rescriptum fuerit siue sit primo iudicio petita dilatio nec tributa, siue nec petita quidem, eam dare cuiquam non licebit eadem ratione, qua nec in iudiciis cognitionum inperialium dilatio tribui solet. A iudice procedente dilationem postulari non conuenit, etiam si utraque parte presente tribuatur, cum non alias, nisi causa cognita, indulgeri queat, et cognitio causae non interpellatione plenaria, sed considente magis iudice legitime colligatur, ut si forte dilationis peticio inprobata fuerit, suscepta questio per sententiam iudicis dirimatur. Constitutione nouella septima, in collatione VIII. §. 4. Libellum uero non alias actor dirigat, nisi prius et in ipsum, quem dicit obnoxium, et in negotii executorem exponat cautionem, se uel intra duos menses litem contestaturum, uel omne dampnum ei, qui conuenitur, contingens restituturum. In collatione V.: III. Pars. §. 5. Offeratur ei, qui uocatur in iudicium, libellus, et exinde prebitis sportulis, data fideiussione, XX. dierum gaudeat induciis, in quibus deliberet, an cedat, an contendat, atque alium iudici petat sociari, uel recuset eum, nisi sit ille, quem ipse iam alio recusato petiuit. Denique presens interrogetur, an hoc tempus transierit? Quod non modo ipsius responsione, sed etiam libelli manifestetur subscriptione, quam in initio facere debet. Litis ergo contestatio contra hoc indultum habita pro nichilo est. Constitutione nouella VI. in Collatione VI.: §. 6. Quod fieri non debet, nisi actor satisdederit, certam promittens quantitatem se daturum, si non exequatur, aut exequens non uincat causam. Si ergo post tempus prestitutum intra decem dies reo presente non occurrat, dimittatur reus exacto eo, quod promissum est, et si quid plus circa litem inpendisse cum taxatione iudicis iurauerit. [§. 7. Exceptio fori dilatoria est, atque ideo in initio litis debet opponi et probari. Peremptorias autem exceptiones, ut sunt prescriptiones longi temporis, sufficit in initio litis contestari. ]
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