Question IV

GRATIAN. PART III. That unlawful oaths ought not to be observed is read in the Eighth Council of Toledo, [c. 2], in which it was established thus:

If in public records of oaths—may God avert it—an unlawful or evil condition had been alleged by any persons, which would compel someone either to slaughter the life of his father or to violate a most consecrated virgin, would it not be more tolerable to reject the vows of a foolish promise than, through observance of useless promises, to fulfill a measure of crimes that ought to be abhorred?

Likewise Ambrose, On Duties, book I, [c. 50]. Sometimes it is even contrary to duty to discharge a promised oath, as Herod, who swore that he would give the daughter of Herodias whatever she asked, furnished the death of John lest he deny what he had promised. GRATIAN. Likewise in the sermon of Saint Augustine the Bishop on the beheading of Saint John the Baptist, which begins, “When the holy Gospel was read”:

That David did not fulfill his oath through the shedding of blood was greater piety. I see David, a pious and holy man, to have fallen into a rash oath and to have preferred not to do what he had sworn rather than to fulfill his oath by the shedding of a man’s blood.

David swore rashly, but through greater piety he did not fulfill the oath. § 1. Behold, although holy David was bound by an oath, he did not shed a man’s blood; but who will be able to deny that he swore falsely? Of two sins he chose the lesser, but it was less in comparison with the worse. For, weighed by itself, to swear falsely is a great evil.

Likewise Isidore in the Synonyms, book II. In evil promises, break your pledge. In a base vow, change your decree. Do not do what you vowed incautiously. A promise that is fulfilled by crime is impious.

Likewise Bede in homily 44, [on the feast of the beheading of Saint John]. If perhaps it should happen that we swear somewhat incautiously to something which, if observed, would incline toward a worse outcome, let us know that it is freely to be changed by more salutary counsel, and that under pressing necessity we are rather to commit perjury than, for the sake of avoiding perjury, to turn aside into another, graver crime. Finally, David swore by God to kill Nabal, a foolish and impious man, and to destroy everything that pertained to him. But immediately, at the first intercession of Abigail, a prudent woman, he remitted his threats, called the sword back into its sheath, and did not grieve that he had contracted any fault for such perjury.

Likewise, [in the same place]. Not only in swearing but in everything that we do, this moderation is to be observed with especial care: if perhaps through the snares of the cunning enemy we fall into such a lapse from which we cannot rise without some contagion of sin, we should seek that passage of escape in which we perceive that we will suffer less danger.

Likewise Ambrose, On Duties, [book III, c. 12]. Let each person bring forth simple speech; let him possess his vessel in sanctification and not ensnare his brother by a circumvention of words. Let him promise nothing dishonorable; or, if he has promised, it is more tolerable not to do what was promised than to do what is base. Frequently many bind themselves by the solemnity of an oath, and although they themselves have recognized that the promise ought not to have been made, nevertheless, out of regard for the oath, they do what they pledged, as we wrote above concerning Herod, who basely promised a reward to the dancing girl and cruelly discharged it. It is base that a kingdom is promised for dancing; it is cruel that the death of the Prophet is given for reverence of an oath. How much more tolerable would perjury have been than such an oath? If, nevertheless, that which he had sworn when drunk amid wine and promised under oath amid choruses of dancers could be called perjury. The Prophet’s head is brought in upon a platter, and that which was a matter of friendship was reckoned to be fidelity. And after a few things, discoursing concerning Jephthah: § 1. “A miserable necessity,” he says, “which is discharged by parricide. It is better not to vow that which the one to whom it is promised does not wish to be discharged to himself.” And a little afterward: § 2. “Therefore not all promises are always to be discharged. Finally, the Lord himself, as Scripture indicates, frequently changes his sentence.”

Likewise from the Council of Toledo, [VIII, c. 2]. The nature of the highest God, immutable and always existing as the same, is often read in the sacred writings to have changed its promises and to have tempered a sentence for the sake of mercy. Hence, although he is impassible and immutable, nevertheless both his oaths and his repentance, which stand covered in sacred mysteries, are frequently read of. For God to swear is in no way to overturn what has been ordained by himself; but to repent is to change those same ordinances when he wishes. For thus he says through Jeremiah: “Suddenly I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, that I may uproot, destroy, and ruin it. If that nation shall have done penance for its evil, I too will repent of the evil that I thought to do to it.”

Likewise Augustine. It is a matter of great wisdom for a man to retract what he has spoken badly.

Likewise from the Council of Lérida, [c. 8]. One who has bound himself by an oath so that, while litigating with anyone, he will in no way return to peace is, for perjury, to be separated for one year from communion in the body and blood of the Lord, and is to absolve his guilt by alms, tears, and as many fasts as he can. But let him hasten quickly to come to charity, which covers a multitude of sins.

Likewise. Not all promises are always to be discharged. Finally, the Lord himself frequently changes his sentence, as Scripture indicates.

Likewise Isidore, Sentences, book II, [c. 31]. An oath by which evil is incautiously promised is not to be observed, as if someone should promise an adulteress that he will preserve perpetual fidelity by remaining with her. For it is more tolerable not to fulfill the oath than to remain in the crime of fornication.

Likewise from the Council of Toledo, c. 9. It is necessary that one who swears badly do worthy penance because, contrary to the Lord’s command, he took his name in vain, since it is written in Exodus: “For the Lord will not hold guiltless the one who has taken the name of the Lord his God in vain.”

“You shall not swear falsely in my name, nor pollute the name of the Lord your God; I am the Lord.” Nevertheless, let him by no means do the evil that he vowed by an oath that he would do, because foolish vows are to be broken.

Likewise from the Decree of Pope Soter, c. 3. If perhaps it should happen that we have sworn somewhat incautiously to something which, if observed, would incline toward a worse outcome, let us know that it is to be changed by more salutary counsel, and that under pressing necessity we are rather to commit perjury than, on account of the oath that was made, to turn aside into another, greater crime.

Likewise from the Council of Elvira, c. 1. An incautious determination is laudably to be dissolved; this is not transgression but the correction of rashness.

Likewise, the fourth action of the Seventh Synod. John, the representative of the eastern sees, said: “The discourse of our father Sophronius signifies that it is better for one who swears to commit perjury than to observe an oath in the breaking of sacred images. But we say this because certain persons excuse themselves by an oath.” Patriarch Tarasius said: “Because Father Sophronius knew the goodness of God, for that reason he wished to transgress the impious oath.” Likewise: § 1. Patriarch Tarasius said: “Herod observed his oath and perished; but Peter denied with an oath, and, having been converted, he wept and was saved. For the good God forgives every sin if anyone repents with his whole heart.” The holy synod said: “Thus holy Scripture teaches.” Likewise Leontius, Bishop of Phocaea, said: “It is written: ‘Do not love a lying oath.’ For this reason let our lying oath be dissolved as having no force.”

Likewise Isidore. If anyone shall have been forestalled so that he determines to do any of those things that do not please God, let him do penance, and let what was established contrary to the command of the Lord be revoked as void. Likewise Jerome in the book On the Nature of Things: § 1. Indeed, oaths contracted in three ways are to be dissolved. First, when someone swears badly. Second, when someone swears incautiously, not thinking this to be a sin. Third, if boys or girls in their parents’ house shall have bound themselves by an oath and their fathers, after hearing of it, contradict them. PART II. GRATIAN. Behold, unlawful oaths are laudably dissolved and condemnably observed. This is to be understood when an unlawful oath is abandoned so that one may return to good. § 1. But if it is abandoned so that one may pass into another evil, the unlawful oath is condemnably observed, but is more condemnably contemned. Hence Augustine, On the Good of Marriage, [c. 4]:

If fidelity is employed for committing sin, it is remarkable if it is called fidelity. Nevertheless, of whatever kind it may be, if one also acts contrary to it, it is worse—unless it is abandoned for this reason, that one may return to true and lawful fidelity, that is, that the sin may be amended when the depravity of the will has been corrected. It is as if someone, when he cannot despoil a man alone, should find a partner in iniquity and make a pact with him that they will do this together and divide the spoil; and, when this crime has been committed, he alone should take away the whole. The other man indeed grieves and complains that fidelity was not preserved toward him; but in his very complaint he ought to consider that fidelity should instead have been preserved toward human society in a good life, so that unjust plunder would not be taken from a man, if he perceives how unjustly fidelity was not preserved toward him in the partnership of sin. For the former is faithless in both respects and certainly is to be judged more criminal.

Likewise. If a woman, after violating marital fidelity, preserves fidelity toward an adulterer, she is certainly evil; if she does not preserve it even toward the adulterer, she is worse. But if she repents of the crime and, returning to marital chastity, rescinds the adulterous agreements and promises, I wonder whether even the adulterer himself will think her a violator of fidelity. GRATIAN. From these things, therefore, it appears that if anyone, as we said, does not observe an unlawful oath so that he may incline toward another pernicious evil, he sins the more gravely, the more condemnably sins are accumulated upon sins. But if it is abandoned so that one may return to good, no fault is contracted for such perjury; rather, it is to be lamented if it has happened that we sinned in anything on the occasion of that oath. Hence Augustine writes to Severus, Bishop of Milevis, who consulted him concerning a certain Hubald. Hubald had been compelled by the relatives of a certain concubine to swear that he would take her as his wife and would no longer furnish necessities to his mother or brothers. Therefore, as we have said, blessed Augustine writes back to Severus, Bishop of Milevis, speaking thus:

Among other things, as you had asked, I inquired of our father Ambrose what you, dearest brother, are to do concerning Hubald, your parishioner, who, after being captured and driven by fear of death, confirmed by oath to his concubine that he would take her as his wife, expel his own mother from the house together with his brothers, and never furnish them anything for sustenance. But because it is not a sin to take as wife the woman whom he previously had, let the marriage be firm and stable in God. § 1. Furthermore, an oath is not found to have been instituted for this reason: that it should be a bond of iniquity, matricide, fratricide, or any crime whatsoever. Nor do I believe that an oath ought to be made for this purpose: that an unjust oath should be the stripping of their goods from those who swear unjustly and eternal condemnation to the one who receives it. For the penalty of perjury strikes, and he will be struck down as by hail like a murderer in the final examination by the just Judge, through whom the sacrosanct Gospel is brought forward for something unjust, unlawful, and in no way pleasing to God, as though it were testimony to a just and humane petition. § 2. Therefore let Hubald support his mother and brothers, and let him lament if, through compulsion and fear of the oath, anything was lacking to his mother. But let those who compelled him to swear what he ought not be held bound by the guilt of the perjury in which they were implicated. For an injury unjustly inflicted is the disgrace of the one who does it. Nor is that which an unlawful condition of necessity extorted in any way drawn to the reproach of a coerced will. PART III. GRATIAN. But although by all these authorities unlawful oaths are proved not to be observed, it is objected that Joshua did not destroy the Gibeonites contrary to the Lord’s command because the elders of Israel had confirmed peace with them by oath. But it is to be noted that the elders of Israel, although they knew that it had been commanded by the Lord that they destroy the nations of the promised land, nevertheless, having been deceived by the Gibeonites, did not know that they were inhabitants of the land promised to them. For they came, as the history relates, with worn-out shoes and dry loaves, saying: “We are peaceful men; we have come from a distant land. The shoes are worn out on our feet; the bread has failed in our sacks. We have heard that the Lord is with you, and we have come to make peace.” This speech pleased the elders of Israel, and they made peace with them. But after the third day, when the children of Israel approached the Gibeonites, those to whom the elders of Israel had sworn met them. Then, seeing that they had been deceived, they wished to destroy them; but Joshua spared them because of the oath of the elders of Israel. Hence Ambrose in the book On Duties, [III, c. 10]:

“The innocent believes every word.” His readiness is not to be blamed, but his goodness is to be praised. To be innocent is this: not to know what may harm, and, even if he is circumvented by someone, nevertheless to judge concerning all men that there is fidelity in all. Inclined, therefore, by this endowment of his mind to believe the Gibeonites, Joshua arranged a covenant, granted peace, and confirmed an alliance. But when they came into their lands and the fraud was discovered—that, although they were neighbors, they had pretended that they were foreigners—the people of the fathers began to be indignant that they had been circumvented. Joshua nevertheless did not judge that the peace he had granted should be revoked, because it had been confirmed by the religious obligation of an oath, lest, while reproving another’s faithlessness, he should break his own pledge. Nevertheless, he punished them with the more excellent service of ministry. The sentence was more merciful, but more lasting. GRATIAN. Therefore, the unlawful oath that is prohibited from being observed is to be understood as one that is known to be unlawful when it is sworn. But if it is not known to be unlawful, ignorance itself excuses if it is thought to be lawful—not from ignorance of law, but of fact. For it is one thing if union with someone is believed to be lawful because she is not known to be a blood relative, or because she is believed to be a widow; it is another if it is thought lawful because the union of blood relatives or union with women left by others is believed to be prohibited by no law. For here there is ignorance of law, which excuses no one except one who is permitted to be ignorant of law; but there there is ignorance of fact, by which anyone is truly excused. The elders of Israel were not ignorant that the nations of the promised land were to be destroyed by the Lord’s command; but they were ignorant that the Gibeonites were inhabitants of the promised land. They were indeed ignorant of the fact, but they were not ignorant of the law governing the fact, and therefore, although what they swore was unlawful, nevertheless what they confirmed by oath ought lawfully to have been observed. § 1. But the statement that an unlawful oath is prohibited from being observed is not to be understood generally. For an oath, as Jerome testifies upon Jeremiah, ought to have three companions: truth, judgment, and justice. But where these are lacking, it is not an oath but perjury. From this it is given to be understood that an oath in which any of these is lacking is unlawful; nevertheless, not everyone whose oath happens to lack one of them is prohibited from observing it. § 2. For sometimes justice is lacking from an oath, as when someone after a vow of chastity takes a wife, confirming by oath that he will never depart from her. Although this is unlawful because justice is proved to be lacking from it, nevertheless by Augustine’s authority he is commanded to observe it. But if anyone contends that this is to be observed by the prerogative of marriage, not because of the religious obligation of the oath, let him notice that the Gibeonites were preserved contrary to the Lord’s command solely because of that religious obligation. Therefore, since every command of the Lord is just, it is evident that justice is lacking from what is found contrary to his command. § 3. Judgment also is sometimes established to be lacking from an oath, as when someone, led by his own rashness, swears that he will eat and drink. Although this is proved unlawful through indiscreet levity, nevertheless it is not therefore commanded to be violated. § 4. Accordingly, an oath is understood to be unlawful in many ways. For it is unlawful sometimes from what is sworn, sometimes from the manner of swearing. An oath is unlawful from what is sworn when that which is sworn is vicious in its own nature, either taking away life, as adultery, homicide, and things similar to these; or not permitting life to be restored, as refusing to return to peace with an enemy or refusing mercifully to assist one in need. Because these have manifest injustice in themselves, although they are confirmed by oath, nevertheless they ought not to be observed. Accordingly, the statutes read above concerning the nonobservance of unlawful oaths are to be understood about such oaths. Therefore, whoever shall have confirmed by oath that he will do something by which either bodily or spiritual salvation is taken away, or without which either kind of salvation cannot be restored or preserved, is prohibited from preserving the pledge promised. The foregoing authorities supply examples of these when, by more salutary counsel, they do not permit unlawful vows to be observed by one who, by furnishing an oath, has promised to commit homicide, not to furnish food to his mother and brothers, to persevere in adultery, or not to return to peace with an adversary. § 5. That which is sworn is also sometimes vicious, not in its own nature but from causes coming from outside, as when someone after a vow of chastity swears to a woman that he will have her as wife. For to have a wife is not evil in itself; nevertheless, for this man it is pernicious because of his vow. Although this oath is unlawful, nevertheless he is not prohibited from observing it, but penance for the violation of his vow is commanded to be imposed upon him. § 6. An oath is unlawful from the manner of swearing when something is sworn inconsiderately and without circumspection by which neither bodily nor spiritual salvation is taken away, and without which either kind of salvation can be restored and life preserved—as when someone, compelled by his parents to receive the clerical tonsure or the habit of religious life, confirms by oath that he will do neither. Although this may seem blameworthy to some because he promised by oath that he would not perform a work of charity, nevertheless he is prohibited by no authority from observing it, because even if he never receives the clerical tonsure or the habit of religious life, he is nevertheless not for that reason any less able to merit salvation, since some persons in the lay habit are found to be most holy and chosen by God. By this example it is manifestly given to be understood that whenever someone swears that he will not do something by which a more expedient road to beatitude would be prepared for him, provided that he is able to find salvation without it, he is not prohibited from observing that oath. Hence, when we swear that we will not give someone something without which both kinds of his salvation can remain unharmed, even if some advantage would be furnished to him from it, nevertheless we are prohibited by no authority from observing the oath, provided that another way of assisting his necessities is open to us.