Question II

GRATIAN. PART I. The second question follows, in which it is asked whether a girl betrothed to one person can renounce the prior agreement and transfer her vows to another. (Question I.) Here it must first be seen whether there is a marriage between them. (Question II.) Second, whether they can withdraw from one another. § 1. That these persons are spouses is easily proved both from the definition of marriage and from the authority of many persons. For nuptials or matrimony are a union of a man and a woman retaining an indivisible manner of life. But between these persons there was a union that required an indivisible manner of life. For there was consent between them, which is the efficient cause of matrimony, according to that statement of Isidore: “Consent makes matrimony.” Likewise John Chrysostom upon Matthew, [that is, the author of the Imperfect Work, homily 32 on Matthew]:

“Indeed, intercourse does not make matrimony, but the will; therefore separation of the body does not dissolve it, but separation of the will. Therefore, one who dismisses his spouse and does not take another is still a husband. For although he is now separated in body, he is nevertheless still joined in will. Therefore, when he takes another, he then dismisses her fully. Thus it is not the man who dismisses who commits adultery, but he who marries another.”

Likewise Pope Nicholas, [in the responses to the Bulgarians, c. 3]. “According to the laws, let the consent alone of those whose unions are at issue suffice. If this alone is absent, all other things, even when celebrated with intercourse itself, are frustrated.” [GRATIAN.] Therefore, since consent—which alone makes matrimony—occurred between these persons, it is apparent that they were spouses. But it is asked what consent makes matrimony: consent to cohabitation, consent to carnal union, or both? If consent to cohabitation makes matrimony, then a brother can contract matrimony with a sister; if consent to carnal union does so, there was no marriage between Mary and Joseph. For Mary had vowed that she would persevere as a virgin. Hence she said to the angel: “How shall this be, since I know not a man?”—that is, I resolved that I would not know one. For it was not necessary to ask how she could have a son merely because she did not then know a man, but because she had resolved that she would never know one. § 1. Therefore, if afterward she consented to carnal union contrary to her resolve, she became guilty in mind of violating her virginal vow, even if not in deed. It is impious to think this concerning her; but, as Augustine says:

“Blessed Mary resolved in her heart that she would preserve a vow of virginity, but she did not express that vow of virginity with her mouth. She subjected herself to the divine disposition when she resolved that she would persevere as a virgin unless God revealed otherwise to her. Therefore, committing her virginity to the divine disposition, she consented to carnal union, not by desiring it but by obeying divine inspiration in either event. But afterward, when she bore a son, what she had conceived in her heart she expressed with her lips together with her husband, and each remained in virginity. § 1. Therefore, intervening consent to cohabit and to retain an indivisible manner of life makes them spouses. An indivisible manner of life is for her to show herself to her husband in all things as she is to herself, and conversely. Thus it pertains to an indivisible manner of life that without the consent of her lawful husband she cannot sometimes devote herself to prayer or profess continence. Therefore, because this consent existed between these persons, it is apparent that they were spouses.”

John Chrysostom—that is, the author of the Imperfect Work, homily 32 on Matthew. Every thing is dissolved through the same causes through which it arises. For intercourse does not make matrimony, but the will; and therefore separation of the body does not dissolve it, but separation of the will. Therefore, one who dismisses his spouse and does not take another is still a husband. For although he is now separated in body, he is nevertheless still joined in will. Therefore, when he takes another, he then plainly dismisses her. Thus it is not the man who dismisses who commits adultery, but he who marries another.] GRATIAN. Likewise, they are proved to be spouses by authority. For Ambrose says in the book On Virgins, [c. 6]:

When marriage is initiated, the name of marriage is assumed. The deflowering of virginity does not make marriage, but a marital compact. Accordingly, marriage exists when she is joined to a man, not when she is known through union with the man.

Likewise Isidore, Etymologies, Book IX, c. 7. They are more truly called spouses from the first pledge of betrothal, although marital intercourse is still unknown between them.

That an interposed condition has no force is proved from the African Council.]

[PALEA.

Whoever shall have betrothed a woman under the name of a condition and afterward wished to leave her, we say that the condition is broken and the betrothal is to be held irrefragably.]

Likewise Augustine, On the Good of Marriage, [Book I, c. 11]. She is called a spouse from the first pledge of betrothal, though he had not known her by intercourse, nor was he going to know her; nor had the designation of spouse perished or remained false where there had not been, and was not going to be, any commingling of flesh. § 1. Therefore both parents of Christ merited to be called faithful spouses—not only she, his mother, but also he, his father, just as he was also the spouse of his mother—each in mind, not in flesh.

Likewise in the same work, [book and chapter]. Thus every good of nuptials was fulfilled in those parents of Christ: fidelity, sacrament, offspring. We recognize the Lord himself as the offspring; fidelity, because there was no adultery; sacrament, because there was no divorce—that is, no separation. There alone marital intercourse did not occur, because in the flesh of sin it could not occur without the shameful concupiscence of the flesh that came from sin, without which he who was to be without sin wished to be conceived. GRATIAN. Likewise in Leviticus the Lord commanded Moses, saying: “If anyone shall have violated another’s betrothed woman in the field, let him die by death, because he violated another’s wife.” § 1. Likewise, in the laws of rulers a betrothed woman is ordered to mourn the death of her betrothed as though he were her husband. Likewise, it is found in the Canons:

If anyone shall have betrothed a woman to himself and, with the moment of death intervening, was unable to know her, his brother cannot take her as a wife.

Likewise Gregory to Emperor Maurice, concerning a certain count who married the betrothed wife of his dead nephew. Let one who has taken in marriage the betrothed girl of his kinsman be anathema, both he and all who consent to him, because according to the law of God he is decreed to die. § 1. For it is the custom of divine law to call betrothed women wives, as in the Gospel: “Take Mary your wife,” and that statement in Deuteronomy: “If anyone shall have violated the betrothed girl of any man in a field or in any place, or brought her into his house, let him die, because he violated the wife of his neighbor”—not one who was already a wife, but one who was to become a wife through her parents. And below: § 2. Just as it is lawful for no Christian to take in marriage anyone from his own consanguinity or one whom his kinsman had, so also it is not lawful to take anyone from the consanguinity of his wife.

Likewise Jerome. Another, fourth kind of lawful marriage is added. When anyone’s wife has died, it is lawful for him to take another, but not one repudiated or betrothed to a man, but a free woman; a woman ought to do likewise. Hence Paul also says: “A woman who is under a husband is bound under the law of her husband for as long as her husband lives.” Therefore, while her husband is living, she will be called an adulteress if she is joined to another man. But if her husband has died, she is freed from the law of her husband, so that she is not an adulteress if she is joined to another man.

Likewise Gregory. If anyone shall have betrothed or pledged himself to a woman, although afterward, with the day of his death intervening, he was unable to take her as his wife, nevertheless it is lawful for no one of his consanguinity to take her in marriage; and if this is found to have been done, let them be separated altogether.

Likewise Pope Julius. If anyone shall have betrothed or pledged himself to a wife and, whether with the day of death intervening or with certain other causes arising, has not known her, neither his surviving brother nor anyone of his consanguinity may ever take that same woman as his wife. PART II. GRATIAN. By all these authorities these persons are proved to be spouses. But Augustine testifies to the contrary, saying:

There is no doubt that a woman with whom it is shown that there was no sexual commingling does not pertain to matrimony.

Likewise Pope Leo. Since the partnership of nuptials was instituted from the beginning in such a way that apart from the commingling of the sexes nuptials do not possess within themselves the sacrament of Christ and the church, there is no doubt that a woman in whom it is shown that there was no nuptial mystery does not pertain to matrimony.

Benedict, servant of the servants of God, to the patriarch of Grado, greeting, etc. The law of the divine constitution placed the apostolic see as teacher of the whole world, so that whatever is doubted anywhere, the rationale concerning it may be sought from that see. Now a certain John of your people addressed us, the occupant of that see, by his letters and asked concerning the marriage of his surviving daughter. Her deceased sister had been betrothed by simple words to a certain young man named Stephen and was overtaken by death before she came to the nuptials. He asked, namely, whether matrimony can be celebrated between that same young man and the surviving daughter or not. For he testified that the rationale of this matter is regarded as doubtful among you. With God teaching, we render it most certain in these words. That first-formed man, our root and origin, seeing the rib taken from him formed into a woman, brought forth among other things in a prophetic spirit: “For this reason a man shall leave father and mother and cleave to his wife, and the two shall be in one flesh.” By these words it became known that a man and woman can become one flesh in no other way unless they cleave to one another by carnal union. Therefore, one who was in no way commingled with a woman unrelated to him by the nuptial bond—by what compact can they become one flesh through bare words of betrothal? We are wholly unable to perceive it. For blood relationship is expressed by words, not effected by words. Nor does a kiss produce relationship, since it effects no commingling of blood. But because the matter of this John stands altogether thus—that he wishes to unite his second daughter in nuptials to the man to whom he had already determined to betroth the first—by the censure of apostolic authority we command that this can be done without the fault of any crime if it accords with the will of both parties. For why should that be prohibited which holy Scripture never declares is to be prohibited? Nor do secular laws say anything of this kind among the persons whom they enumerate as not contracting nuptials with one another. Therefore, do not deny what you teach is to be denied by no reason.] GRATIAN. Likewise, the Apostle commands that the wife render the debt to the husband and the husband to the wife, except perhaps by consent for a time so that they may devote themselves more readily to prayer. From this it is given to be understood that without the consent of the other it is not lawful for either to devote himself or herself to prayer. § 1. Likewise, a man cannot assume a resolve of a better life without his wife’s consent, and conversely. Hence Gregory writes to the patrician Theoctista, [Book IX, epistle 39]:

There are some who say that marriages ought to be dissolved for the sake of religion. But it is to be known that, although human law has permitted this, divine law has prohibited it. For Truth himself says: “What God has joined, let man not separate.” He also says: “It is not lawful to dismiss a wife except for the cause of fornication.” Who, therefore, would contradict this legislator? We know that it is written: “The two shall be in one flesh.” Therefore, if husband and wife are one flesh, and for the sake of religion the husband dismisses his wife, or the wife her husband, who remains in this world or perhaps passes over to unlawful acts, what sort of conversion is this, in which one and the same flesh in one part passes to continence and in another part remains in pollution? But if it pleases both to lead a continent life, who would dare accuse this, since it is certain that almighty God, who permitted lesser things, did not prohibit greater things? For in two ways holy persons are accustomed to abstain even from lawful things: sometimes so that they may increase their merits before almighty God, and sometimes so that they may wipe away the faults of their past life. § 1. Consequently, when good spouses desire either to increase merit or to erase the faults of their past life, it is lawful for them to bind themselves and seek a better life. For we know that many saints both first led a continent life with their spouses and afterward passed to the governance of the holy church. But if the woman does not follow the continence that the man seeks, or the man refuses what the wife seeks, the marriage cannot be divided, because it is written: “The woman does not have power over her own body, but the man; likewise the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman.”

The same to Leo, bishop of Catania, [Book III, epistle 34]. We have learned from the report of many persons that this was formerly the custom among you: subdeacons lawfully united with their wives. So that no one might presume to do this anew, it was prohibited by Servusdei, deacon of our see, on the authority of our predecessor, in this manner: at that time those who had already been joined to wives were to choose one of two things—that is, either they were in no way to presume to minister or they were to abstain from their wives. And, as is said, Speciosus, who was then a subdeacon, suspended himself from the office of administration for this reason; until the time of his death he indeed discharged the office of notary and ceased from the ministry that a subdeacon ought to perform. After his death, because his widow Honorata was joined to a husband, we have learned that she was assigned by Your Fraternity to a monastery. Therefore, if, as is reported, her husband suspended himself from administration, it ought not to harm the aforesaid woman that she passed to the second vows of marriage, especially if she was not joined to the subdeacon with such an intention that she would abstain from the pleasures of the flesh. Therefore, if you know the truth to stand as we have been informed, it is altogether fitting that you release the aforesaid woman from the monastery, so that she can return to her husband without any fear.

The same to Hadrian, notary of Palermo, [Book IX, epistle 44]. Agathosa, the bearer of the present writings, complained that her husband was converted in the monastery of Abbot Urbicus contrary to her will. Wherefore we command Your Experience to examine by diligent inquiry whether perhaps he was converted with her consent or whether she herself promised to change her state. If it finds this, let it both provide that he remain in the monastery and compel her to change her state as she promised. But if neither of these is the case, and you learn that the aforesaid woman did not formerly commit the crime of fornication—for which it is lawful to dismiss a wife—lest his conversion become an occasion of perdition to the wife left in the world, we wish you, every excuse ceasing, to restore her husband to her even if he has already been tonsured. For although secular law commands that for the sake of conversion a marriage can be dissolved when either party is unwilling, divine law nevertheless does not permit this to be done. For no reason permits a man to dismiss his wife except for the cause of fornication, because after one body is effected from a man and woman through the union of marriage, it cannot in one part be converted and in another part remain in the world.

Likewise from the Eighth Synod. If any married man wishes to be converted to a monastery, he is not to be received unless he has first been released by his spouse professing chastity. For if she marries another through incontinence while he is living, she will without doubt be an adulteress. Nor is the conversion of that man received before God when the prostitution of the marital covenant follows it. Therefore, such persons then follow Christ without fault after abandoning the world if they possess by equal will a mutual consent to chastity.

Likewise from the Synod of Pope Eugenius, [II, in the Roman Synod, c. 36]. If a husband and wife consent between themselves to separate solely for a religious life, let it by no means be done without the bishop’s knowledge, so that they may be established by him in individually designated places. For if the wife, or either of them, is unwilling, the matrimony is not dissolved even for such a reason.

Likewise Augustine, On Adulterous Marriages. If you abstain without your wife’s will, you grant her license to fornicate, and her sin will be imputed to your abstinence.

Likewise Gregory to Abbot Urbicus, [Book V, epistle 49]. Because Agatho, the bearer of the present writings, desires to be converted in the monastery of Your Charity, we exhort you to receive him with every gentleness and devotion. § 1. Know, nevertheless, that he is to be received in this way: if his wife likewise wishes to be converted. For since the one body of both has been made through the union of marriage, it is unfitting for one part to be converted and the other part to remain in the world.

Likewise Pope Nicholas, [to King Charles]. Queen Theutberga wrote to us that she wished to be divested of her dignity or marital union and desired to be content with a private life alone. We wrote to her that this could not be done otherwise unless her spouse Lothair chose the same life. § 1. For although it is written, “What God has joined let man not separate,” nevertheless God, and not man, separates when marriages are dissolved by the consent of both spouses in contemplation of divine love. But we prohibit your mutual separation from being effected otherwise. GRATIAN. Behold, married persons cannot profess continence without the other’s consent. But betrothed persons are proved by examples and authority to be able to observe continence even without consulting those whom they betrothed to themselves. For, as blessed Jerome relates, Macarius, foremost among Christ’s hermits, after the wedding banquet had been celebrated, when in the evening he was about to enter the bridal chamber, departed from the city, sought lands across the sea, and chose for himself the solitude of the desert. § 1. Likewise blessed Alexius, son of the most distinguished Epiphanius, similarly called from his nuptials by divine grace, abandoned his betrothed and began to serve Christ naked. From their example it is apparent that betrothed men can profess continence without seeking the consent of their betrothed women. The same is proved by the authority of Pope Eusebius, who says:

It is not lawful for parents to hand a betrothed girl over to another man; nevertheless, it is lawful for her to choose a monastery for herself.

Likewise Gregory in the Register, [Book VI, epistle 20, to Fortunatus]. Legal decrees have judged that if a betrothed woman wishes to be converted, she is to be punished by no penalty whatsoever. GRATIAN. Therefore, since the continence of married persons cannot be offered to God except by the consent of both; since the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman does; but betrothed women can choose a monastery, and betrothed men can assume a resolve of a better life without seeking the consent of their betrothed women: it is apparent that there is no marriage between a betrothed man and a betrothed woman. § 1. Likewise, since according to Augustine that woman with whom it is shown that there was no sexual commingling does not pertain to matrimony; likewise, according to Leo, that woman in whom it is shown that there was no nuptial mystery does not pertain to matrimony: it appears that there is no marriage between a betrothed man and a betrothed woman. § 2. Likewise Pope Nicholas commanded concerning those who are blinded by enemies or mutilated in their members that their marriages are not to be dissolved on account of this infirmity. § 3. But concerning those who, because of frigidity, cannot render the marital debt to their wives, Pope Gregory established that each of them, with seven kinsmen acting as oath-helpers and with the most sacred relics touched, is to declare under oath that they had never become one flesh joined through commingling of the flesh. Then the woman will be able to contract a second marriage; but the man who is of a frigid nature is to remain without hope of marriage. Hence the same Gregory writes to Venerius, bishop of Cagliari, speaking thus:

Concerning what you asked me about those who are joined in matrimony and cannot consummate it: whether he may take another woman or she another man. Concerning them it is written: If a man and woman have joined themselves, and afterward the woman shall say concerning the man that he cannot have intercourse with her, if she can prove by a true judgment that it is true, let her take another. GRATIAN. Behold, inability to have intercourse, if it is found in anyone after carnal union, does not dissolve the marriage. But if it is detected before carnal union, it makes the woman free to take another man. Hence it appears that those persons were not spouses; otherwise it would not be lawful for them to withdraw from one another except for the cause of fornication, and persons withdrawing in this way must remain unmarried or be reconciled to one another. § 1. Likewise, if a betrothed woman were a spouse, after the death of her betrothed she would remain a widow. But if she were a widow, her husband could not ascend to sacred orders. For the husband of a widow, just as much as a bigamist, is prohibited from becoming a priest. But no one is prohibited from sacred orders because of union with such a woman. For, as Pope Pelagius says: “There is nothing, so far as this point is concerned, that opposes him from the canonical institutes.” Therefore, it appears that these persons were not spouses. § 2. Likewise, if they were spouses, withdrawal from one another would be divorce—that is, marital separation. But Ambrose denies that their separation was divorce, saying concerning blessed Mary, whom Joseph had betrothed to himself and taken into his home: “Joseph never knew her. For if the just man had known her, he would never have permitted her to withdraw from him; nor would the Lord, who had commanded that a wife not withdraw from her husband except for the cause of fornication, have been an author of divorce by commending her to the disciple.” Behold, Mary’s commendation to John and her removal from Joseph is denied to have been divorce because Joseph had not known her. Hence it appears that they were not spouses. But if blessed Mary, whom Joseph had betrothed to himself and taken into his home, is denied to have been a spouse, much less is that woman who was simply betrothed to be called a spouse.

Likewise from the Council of Orléans. One who has slept with two sisters, one of whom had previously been his wife, is to have neither of them; nor are the adulterous persons themselves ever to be joined in marriage. GRATIAN. That is, it is not lawful for his own wife to render the marital debt to him, for he has made her unlawful to himself by knowing her sister. Nor, even after the wife’s death, is it lawful for him or for the adulteress to be joined to anyone in marriage. Concerning a betrothed woman, however, the contrary is read in the Council of Tribur:

A certain man betrothed and endowed a wife but was unable to have intercourse with her; his brother secretly corrupted her and made her pregnant. It was decreed that, although she could not be married to her lawful husband, the brother nevertheless cannot have the woman betrothed to his brother; but let the adulterer and adulteress sustain the punishment of fornication, while lawful marriages are not denied to them.

Likewise from the same. If anyone shall have violated his son’s betrothed and afterward his son shall have married her, let the father thereafter have no wife, nor the woman a husband. Let the son, who was ignorant of his father’s crime, take another.

GRATIAN. If the woman whom the husband of her sister has known is perpetually prohibited from being joined in marriage, but this man who corrupted his brother’s betrothed is permitted to contract matrimony after completing penance, it appears that she was not his brother’s spouse. § 1. Likewise, a woman dismissed by her husband for the cause of fornication will either be reconciled to him or remain unmarried while he lives. But concerning a betrothed woman the contrary is found in Book I of the Capitularies, [c. 105, and Book VII, c. 183], in which it is read thus:

Let the abductor be punished by public penance. But if the betrothed man is unwilling to receive the abducted woman, and she did not consent to the same crime, let permission to marry another not be denied her.

Likewise from the Council of Toledo. It was established by the sacred assembly that if anyone abducts another’s betrothed, let him be punished by public penance and remain without hope of marriage. And if she did not consent to the same crime, let permission to marry another not be denied her. But if after this they presume to join themselves, let both be anathematized until satisfaction. PART III. GRATIAN. Therefore, it appears that she was not a spouse, since while her betrothed lives she is not denied permission to marry another. How, then, are betrothed women called spouses according to Ambrose and the other Fathers, while by all these arguments they are proved not to be spouses? But it is to be known that marriage is initiated by betrothal and perfected by commingling. Hence between a betrothed man and woman there is a marriage, but one initiated; between those carnally united there is a ratified marriage. Hence Ambrose:

When marriage is initiated, the name of marriage is assumed, not when the girl is known through union with the man. GRATIAN. Behold, marriage is initiated in betrothal, not perfected.

Likewise Ambrose in the book [I] On the Patriarchs. In every matrimony a spiritual union is understood, which the bodily commingling of those joined confirms and perfects.

Likewise Jerome upon Obadiah. “Wherefore they will fornicate with your daughters, and your betrothed women will be adulteresses.” It is to be noted that he says there will be fornication among daughters and adulteries in marriages, which are initiated by a betrothal agreement and perfected by the commingling of bodies.

Likewise Ambrose to Paternus, [epistle 66]. If anyone has use of a woman betrothed and handed over to him, it is called marriage. GRATIAN. Augustine shows in Book IV of the Confessions, [c. 3], why women are not handed over immediately after nuptial compacts, saying:

It was established that women already pledged in betrothal are not handed over immediately, lest a husband regard as cheap what was given, for which as a betrothed man he sighed while it was delayed. GRATIAN. According to this distinction, that authority of Augustine is to be understood: “There is no doubt that a woman with whom it is shown that there was no sexual commingling does not pertain to matrimony.” It is to be understood: to perfected matrimony, namely, such as possesses within itself the sacrament of Christ and the church. That statement of Pope Leo is likewise to be understood. § 1. But that statement of Augustine is objected: “Between Mary and Joseph there was a perfect marriage.” But it is understood as perfect not from the office of marriage but from those things that accompany marriage, namely fidelity, offspring, and sacrament. All these things are proved by Augustine’s authority to have existed between the parents of Christ. Therefore, all the things adduced concerning a marriage not to be separated are understood of a perfected marriage, which was initiated by the union of betrothal and consummated by the office of bodily commingling. But those things by which a separable marriage is shown are understood of an initiated marriage, which has not yet been perfected by its office. § 2. It can also be distinguished otherwise. Betrothed women are called spouses by the custom of Scripture in hope of future things, not by the effect of present things. Hence Ambrose, when he had said, “When marriage is initiated,” did not add, “then the reality or effect,” but “then the name of marriage is assumed,” showing that such persons possess the name of marriage, not its reality or effect. Likewise Augustine, when he spoke concerning the parents of the Lord, said: “They were spouses in mind, not in flesh, just as they were parents.” From this it is given to be understood that just as Joseph was called the father of the Lord, not by the effect of generation but by the office and care of providing, so also he was called the spouse of his mother, not by the effect of marriage but by the provision of necessities and the affection of an indivisible mind. Hence Augustine says: “Do not fear to take Mary your wife”; he named her a wife because she was going to be one. Hence also Bede upon Leviticus: “If anyone shall have violated another’s betrothed, etc.” He called the betrothed woman a wife, not one who then was a wife but one who was going to be a wife. Hence also Jerome upon Matthew in the Gospel: “When she had been betrothed.”

“He begot Joseph, the husband of Mary.” When you hear “husband,” let no suspicion of nuptials enter you, but recall the custom of the Scriptures, that betrothed men are called husbands and betrothed women wives. And below: § 1. She was found by no one other than Joseph, who with nearly marital license knew all the affairs of his future wife. And below: § 2. “Joseph, son of David, etc.” As we have already said above, betrothed women are called wives, as the book Against Helvidius teaches more fully.

“Therefore Lot went out and spoke to his sons-in-law, who were going to receive his daughters.” In what follows, Lot’s daughters are said to have been virgins. And he himself said to the Sodomites: “Behold my two daughters, who have not known a man, etc.” Yet now he is said to have had sons-in-law. But some persons think that the daughters who had husbands perished in Sodom and those who were virgins departed with their father. But the Hebrew truth has: “Lot went out and spoke to his betrothed sons-in-law,” which appears more likely from what follows: “who were going to receive his daughters.” GRATIAN. Hence it is given to be understood that Scripture calls betrothed men sons-in-law.

Likewise John Chrysostom upon the same Gospel. “Before they came together.” He did not say, “before she was brought into the house of her betrothed.” For antiquity observed this custom, that betrothed women were kept in the houses of their betrothed men. Just as Lot’s sons-in-law are read to dwell with their father-in-law together with the women betrothed to them but not yet united to them by the law of marriage, so also Mary dwelt with her betrothed. And below: § 1. For he did not wish to expel her from the house, but to dismiss her. And below: § 2. “Do not fear to take Mary your wife.” By this expression he likewise indicated a betrothed woman, just as Scripture also customarily calls those who are still betrothed sons-in-law. But what does “to take” mean? Certainly, to retain her at home. For he had already dismissed her in his mind. And below: § 3. For just as Christ afterward commends her to the disciple himself, so also now the angel joins her to her betrothed, not in the solemn covenant of marriage but in the fellowship of a common dwelling.

The same in the same work, homily V, [on the same c. 1 of Matthew]. For if he had known her and held her in the place of a wife, how would the Lord commend her to the disciple as though she were without solace and had nothing at all, ordering him to receive her as his own?

Likewise Origen upon the same, [homily I on the Gospel]. “She was found having a child in the womb.” By blessed Joseph, who, although he did not touch her, nevertheless knew all the affairs of the woman who, as he thought, was to be his wife. And below: § 1. If she is named a wife to you, if she is said to be yours in betrothal, nevertheless she is not your wife, but is the eternal mother of God’s Only-begotten. And below: § 2. I call her a wife for this reason: that I may conceal her virginity from the devil and not destroy the institutes of the law. In what follows I will demonstrate that neither is she regarded as your wife according to the custom of marriage nor is he who is begotten believed to be your son.

Likewise Gregory in the exposition of the Gospel, “When it was evening on that day,” [homily 26]. For thus he permitted the disciple to doubt after his resurrection, yet did not abandon him in doubt, just as before his nativity he wished Mary to have a betrothed man who nevertheless did not come to nuptials with her. For the doubting and touching disciple was thus made a witness of the true resurrection, just as the mother’s betrothed had been guardian of her wholly intact virginity. GRATIAN. From all these things it appears that betrothed women are called spouses in hope of future things, not by the reality of present things. How, therefore, are spouses called such from the first pledge of betrothal if this woman, who is asserted to have been betrothed, is denied to have been a spouse? But she is said to be called a spouse from the first pledge of betrothal, not because she becomes a spouse in the betrothal itself, but because from the pledge that they owe to one another through betrothal they afterward become spouses, just as sins are said to be remitted through faith—not because they are remitted through faith before baptism, but because faith is the cause why we are cleansed from sins in baptism. § 1. Moreover, that statement of John Chrysostom, “Intercourse does not make matrimony, but the will,” and likewise that statement of Ambrose, “Not the deflowering of virginity but a marital compact makes matrimony,” are to be understood thus: intercourse without the will to contract matrimony and the deflowering of virginity without a marital compact do not make matrimony; rather, the preceding will to contract matrimony and the marital compact cause the woman, in the deflowering of her virginity or in intercourse, to be said to marry the man or to celebrate nuptials. § 2. Likewise Pope Siricius calls the departure of a betrothed woman from her betrothed a marital separation. But such a departure is called a violation not of a marriage already existing but of a future marriage, as it was hoped for from the betrothal itself. So also the devil is said to have fallen from blessedness, not only that which he then possessed but also that which he was created to possess. So one who by the merit of his life or learning is elected as a priest or bishop, if meanwhile he shall have deserved to have his election annulled, is said to lose sacerdotal or episcopal anointing—not one he had already received but one to receive which he had been elected. Therefore, by that authority a betrothed woman cannot be proved to be a spouse. § 3. But let it be conceded that a betrothed woman is not a spouse; nevertheless, it is asked whether it is lawful for her to renounce the prior agreement. This is prohibited by the authority of the Council of Ancyra, [c. 11], in which the statute is read thus:

It was resolved that girls who were betrothed and afterward abducted by others are to be rescued and restored to those to whom they had previously been betrothed, even if it is established that violence was inflicted upon them by their abductors.

Likewise John VIII to Archbishop Rostagnus. Atto, bearer of the present writings, complains that while he kept watch faithfully in our service, a certain man abducted the woman betrothed to him. Therefore, supported by our authority, let Your Fraternity summon its suffragan bishops to appear in person and thus, by a unanimous sentence, if the abductor does not restore the betrothed woman to him, let both that man and the abducted woman—if she is unwilling to return to her former betrothed—be deprived of all communion. PART IV. GRATIAN. But it is one thing to renounce the prior agreement and arrange nuptials with another; it is another to be abducted, that is, unlawfully violated. Hence Isidore says in Book V of the Etymologies, c. 24:

Raptus is unlawful intercourse, named from corruption; hence one who obtains another by raptus enjoys defilement. GRATIAN. This woman, however, is shown not to have been abducted by another but to have been betrothed to another. Pope Gelasius prohibits such a woman from being called abducted, speaking thus:

That law of former rulers said that raptus was committed where a girl concerning whose nuptials nothing had previously been arranged is seen to have been abducted. PART V. GRATIAN. What is appended at the end of the chapter—“even if it is established that violence was inflicted upon them by their abductors”—was added for this reason: some abducted women expose themselves to be abducted, while others are violently carried away. Therefore, in whatever manner they are abducted, they are to be restored to their former betrothed men. But this woman, as was said above, is numbered not among abducted women but among other betrothed women, and therefore she is not to be taken away from this man and restored to the former man. § 1. Other authorities follow, by which this woman is prohibited from marrying the second man and ordered to return to her former vows. For Pope Siricius says to Himerius, bishop of Tarragona, [epistle I, c. 4]:

You asked concerning a violation of marriage whether another man can take in matrimony a girl betrothed to someone else. Therefore, we anathematize such a union and prohibit by every means that it occur, because among the faithful that blessing which the priest imposes upon a woman about to marry is comparable to a certain sacrilege if it is violated by any transgression. GRATIAN. But by this authority of Siricius, the woman prohibited from passing to second vows is one who has been brought into her own household and has been veiled and blessed together with her betrothed. By the departure of such persons, the blessing that the priest imposes upon a woman about to marry is violated. But this betrothed man had not yet brought this woman into his home, nor had he received the blessing with her. Therefore, their union is not prohibited by this authority.

§ 1. Likewise, that statement of Pope Eusebius, “It is not lawful for parents to hand a betrothed girl over to another man,” is similarly understood of a betrothed woman of this kind—namely, one who has been veiled and blessed together with her betrothed. § 2. Likewise, that statement of Gregory is objected: “A woman who was separated from her husband because of frigidity and married to another, if her husband has known another woman, is to be taken from the second and restored to the first.” But it is resolved in the same way: namely, because this woman had received the blessing with that man.

[PALEA.

Augustine, On the Pledge of Compact and Consent. A pledge is spoken of in two ways: of compact and of consent. If anyone has given a woman a pledge of compact, he ought not to marry another. If he marries another, he ought to do penance for the falsified pledge; nevertheless, let him remain with the woman whom he married. For so great a sacrament ought not to be severed. But if he has given a pledge of consent, it is not lawful for him to marry another. If, however, he has married another, he is to dismiss her and cleave to the former woman. “A pledge of compact exists when someone promises a woman his pledge that he will marry her if she permits him to have intercourse with her, or even in place of consent. But a pledge of consent exists when, even if he does not clasp her hand, he nevertheless consents in heart and mouth to marry her, and they mutually grant themselves to one another and mutually receive one another.”]