distinction — Decretum of Gratian
Distinction VIII
GRATIAN. Part I. Natural law also differs from custom and positive law. For by natural law all things are common to all, which is believed to have been observed not only among those concerning whom it is read, “The multitude of believers had one heart and one soul,” etc., but is also found to have been handed down by philosophers from an earlier time. Hence in Plato that city is presented as most justly ordered in which no one knows his own private attachments. By the law of custom or positive law, however, this is mine and that belongs to another. Hence Augustine says upon John [Tractate VI on John 1, §25]:
GRATIANUS. I. Pars. Differt etiam ius naturae a consuetudine et constitutione. Nam iure naturae sunt omnia communia omnibus, quod non solum inter eos seruatum creditur, de quibus legitur: "Multitudinis autem credentium erat cor unum et anima una, etc." uerum etiam ex precedenti tempore a philosophis traditum inuenitur. Unde apud Platonem illa ciuitas iustissime ordinata traditur, in quia quisque proprios nescit affectus. Iure uero consuetudinis uel constitutionis hoc meum est, illud uero alterius. Unde Augustinus ait supra Iohannem: [tract. VI. ad c. 1. §. 25. Ioannis]
Friedberg, col. 11/12
C. I. By divine law all things are common to all; by positive law, however, this is mine and that belongs to another.
By what law do you defend the estates of the Church, divine or human? We have divine law in the divine Scriptures, human law in the laws of kings. Whence does each person possess what he possesses? Is it not by human law? For by divine law, “The earth is the Lord’s and its fullness.” God made the poor and the rich from one clay, and one earth supports the poor and the rich. Therefore, by human law it is said: “This estate is mine, this house is mine, this servant is mine.” Human laws, moreover, are the laws of emperors. Why? Because God distributed those very human laws to the human race through the emperors and kings of the world.
Likewise. §1. Take away the laws of the emperor, and who dares to say: “This estate is mine, this servant is mine, this house is mine”? But if these things are held by men, the laws of kings made it so. Do you wish us to keep silent about the laws, so that you may rejoice? etc. Likewise. §2. Let the laws be read in which the emperors manifestly commanded that those who, apart from the communion of the Catholic Church, usurp for themselves the Christian name and are unwilling peacefully to worship the author of peace should dare to possess nothing in the name of a church. §3. But you say: “What have we to do with the emperor?” Yet, as I have already said, human law is at issue. The Apostle wished kings to be served, wished kings to be honored, and said: “Revere the king.” Do not say, “What have I to do with the king?” What, then, have you to do with a possession? Possessions are possessed through the laws of kings. You have said, “What have I to do with the king?” Do not call the possessions yours, because you have renounced those very human laws by which possessions are possessed.
Part II. GRATIAN. In dignity, however, natural law simply prevails over custom and positive law. For whatever things have either been received by customs or comprehended in writings, if they are opposed to natural law, are to be held vain and void. Hence Augustine says in Book II [Book III of the Confessions, c. 8]:
C. I. Iure diuino omnia sunt communia omnibus: iure uero constitutionis hoc meum, illud alterius est.
Quo iure defendis uillas ecclesiae, diuino, an humano?
Diuinum ius in scripturis diuinis habemus, humanum in legibus regum. Unde quisque possidet, quod possidet? Nonne iure humano? Nam iure diuino "Domini est terra et plenitudo eius." Pauperes et diuites Deus de uno limo fecit, et pauperes et diuites una terra supportat. Iure ergo humano dicitur: hec uilla mea est, hec domus mea est, hic seruus meus est. Iura autem humana iura imperatorum sunt: quare? Quia ipsa iura humana per imperatores et reges seculi Deus distribuit generi humano. Item. §. 1. Tolle iura imperatoris, et quis audet dicere: hec uilla mea est, meus est iste seruus, hec domus mea est? Si autem, teneantur ista ab hominibus, regum iura fecerunt, uultis reticeamus leges, ut gaudeatis? etc. Item. §. 2. Relegantur leges, ubi manifeste preceperunt imperatores, eos, qui preter ecclesiae catholicae communionem usurpant sibi nomen Christianum, nec uolunt in pace colere pacis auctorem, nihil nomine ecclesiae audeant possidere. §. 3. Sed dicitis quid nobis et imperatori? Sed ut iam dixi, de iure humano agitur. Apostolus uoluit seruiri regibus, uoluit honorari reges, et dixit: "Regem reueremini." Noli dicere, quid mihi et regi? Quid tibi ergo et possessioni? Per iura regum possidentur possessiones. Dixisti, quid mihi et regi? Noli dicere possessiones tuas, quia ipsa iura renuntiasti humana, quibus possidentur possessiones. II. Pars. Gratianus. Dignitate uero ius naturale simpliciter preualet consuetudini et constitutioni. Quecunque enim uel moribus recepta sunt, uel scriptis comprehensa, si naturali iuri fuerint aduersa, uana et irrita sunt habenda. Unde Augustinus ait, libro II.: [lib. III. Confessionum c.8]
Friedberg, col. 11/12
C. II. No one is permitted to act against natural law.
Disgraceful acts that are contrary to human customs are to be avoided according to the diversity of customs, so that the compact of a nation among itself, confirmed either by a city’s custom or by law, may not be violated by the lust of any citizen or foreigner. For every part that does not accord with its whole is shameful. §1. But when God commands something contrary to the custom or compact of any people, even if it was never done there, it is to be done; if it was omitted, it is to be restored; and if it was not established, it is to be established. §2. For if a king is permitted in the city over which he reigns to command something that neither anyone before him nor he himself had ever commanded, and obedience is not contrary to the society of his city—indeed, disobedience is contrary to that society, for it is a general compact of human society to obey its kings—how much more must God, ruler of all his creation, be served without hesitation in those things that he commands? For just as among the powers of human society a greater power is placed above a lesser for obedience, so God is placed above all.
C. II. Aduersus naturale ius nulli quicquam agere licet.
Que contra mores hominum sunt flagitia, pro morum diuersitate sunt uitanda, ut pactum gentis inter se aut consuetudine ciuitatis, uel lege firmatum, nulla ciuis aut peregrini libidine uioletur. Turpis est enim omnis pars suo uniuerso non congruens. §. 1. Cum autem Deus aliquid contra morem aut pactum quorumlibet iubet, etsi numquam ibi factum est, faciendum est; et si omissum, instaurandum; et si statutum non erat, instituendum est. §. 2. Si enim regi licet in ciuitate, cui regnat, iubere aliquid, quod neque ante ipsum quisquam, nec ipse umquam iusserat, et non contra societatem ciuitatis eius obtemperatur, immo contra societatem si non obtemperatur: (generale quippe pactum est societatis humanae, obtemperare regibus suis,) quanto magis Deo regnatori uniuersae creaturae suae, ad ea, que iusserit, sine dubitatione seruiendum est? Sicut enim in potestatibus societatis humanae maior potestas minori ad obediendum preponitur, ita Deus omnibus.
Friedberg, col. 13/14
C. III. An evil custom is to be uprooted entirely.
Likewise Pope Nicholas to Hincmar, archbishop of Rheims. An evil custom, no less than a pernicious corruption, is to be avoided. Unless it is very quickly uprooted entirely, it is assumed by the impious as having the force of privileges, and transgressions and various presumptions, if not most swiftly suppressed, begin to be venerated as laws and perpetually observed in the manner of privileges.
C. III. Mala consuetudo radicitus est euellenda.
Item Nicolaus Papa Hincmaro Remensi Archiepiscopo. Mala consuetudo, non minus quam pernitiosa corruptela uitanda est, que nisi citius radicitus euellatur, in priuilegiorum ius ab impiis assumitur, et incipiunt preuaricationes et uariae presumtiones, celerrime non compressae, pro legibus uenerari et priuilegiorum more perpetuo celebrari.
Friedberg, col. 13/14
C. IV. Custom is to be placed after truth and reason.
Likewise Augustine, Book II On the One Baptism [Book III On Baptism, against the Donatists, c. 6]. “When truth has been made manifest, let custom yield to truth”: plainly, who would doubt that custom should yield to manifest truth? Likewise: “Let no one place custom before reason and truth, because reason and truth always exclude custom.”
C. IV. Veritati et rationi consuetudo est postponenda.
Item Augustinus de unico baptismo libro II. [lib. III. de Baptismo, contra Donatistas, c. 6.] "Veritate manifestata cedat consuetudo ueritati": plane quis dubitet ueritati manifestatae consuetudinem cedere? Item: "Nemo consuetudinem rationi et ueritati preponat, quia consuetudinem ratio et ueritas semper excludit".
Friedberg, col. 13/14
C. V. Every custom is to be placed after truth.
Likewise Gregory VII to Wimund, bishop of Aversa. If perhaps you oppose custom, it must be observed that the Lord says: “I am the truth.” He did not say, “I am custom,” but “the truth.” §1. And certainly—to use the judgment of blessed Cyprian—every custom, however ancient, however widespread, is altogether to be placed after truth, and a usage that is contrary to truth is to be abolished.
C. V. Quelibet consuetudo ueritati est postponenda.
Item Gregorius VII. Wimundo Auersano Episcopo. Si consuetudinem fortassis opponas, aduertendum est, quod Dominus dicit: "Ego sum ueritas." Non dixit: ego sum consuetudo, sed "ueritas." §. 1. Et certe (ut B. Cipriani utamur sententia) quelibet consuetudo, quantumuis uetusta, quantumuis uulgata, ueritati est omnino postponenda, et usus, qui ueritati est contrarius, abolendus est.
Friedberg, col. 13/14
C. VI. When truth has been revealed, custom ought to yield to it.
Likewise Augustine, in the book On the Baptism of Infants [Book III On Baptism, against the Donatists, c. 5]. He who, having despised truth, presumes to follow custom is either envious and malignant toward the brothers to whom truth is revealed, or ungrateful toward God, by whose inspiration his Church is instructed. For the Lord says in the Gospel: “I am,” he says, “the truth”; he did not say, “I am custom.” Therefore, when truth has been made manifest, let custom yield to truth. Thus, when revelation of truth has been made, let custom yield to truth, because Peter also, who was circumcising, yielded to Paul preaching the truth. Therefore, since Christ is the truth, we ought to follow truth rather than custom, because reason and truth always exclude custom.
C. VI. Veritate reuelata, consuetudinem sibi cedere oportet.
Item Augustinus in libro de baptismo paruulorum. [lib. III. de Baptismo, contra Donatistas, cap. 5.] Qui contempta ueritate presumit consuetudinem sequi, aut circa fratres inuidus est et malignus, quibus ueritas reuelatur, aut circa Deum ingratus est, inspiratione cuius ecclesia eius instruitur. Nam Dominus in euangelio: "Ego sum," inquit, "ueritas": non dixit: ego sum consuetudo. Itaque ueritate manifestata ueritati cedat, consuetudo. Reuelatione ergo facta ueritatis cedat consuetudo ueritati, quia et Petrus, qui circumcidebat cessit Paulo ueritatem predicanti. Igitur cum Christus ueritas sit, magis ueritatem quam consuetudinem sequi debemus, quia consuetudinem ratio et ueritas semper excludit.
Friedberg, col. 13/14
C. VII. Custom is opposed to reason in vain.
The same, in Book IV On Baptism [against the Donatists, c. 5]. “In vain,” he says, “do certain persons who are overcome by reason object custom to us, as though custom were greater than truth, or as though that which has been revealed as better by the Holy Spirit ought not to be followed in spiritual matters.” This is plainly true, because reason and truth are to be placed before custom. But if truth supports custom, nothing ought to be retained more firmly.
C. VII. Consuetudo rationi frustra opponitur.
Idem in libro IV. de Baptismo. [contra Donatistas, cap. 5.] "Frustra", inquit, "quidam, qui ratione uincuntur, consuetudinem nobis obiiciunt, quasi consuetudo maior sit ueritate, aut non sit in spiritualibus sequendum, quod melius est a Spiritu sancto reuelatum." Hoc plane uerum est, quia ratio et ueritas consuetudini preponenda est. Sed si consuetudini ueritas suffragatur, nihil oportet firmius retineri.
Friedberg, col. 15/16
C. VIII. Custom ought not to impede reason.
Likewise Cyprian [in the epistle to Pompeius against the epistle of Stephen]. A custom that had crept in among certain persons ought not to prevent truth from prevailing and conquering. For custom without truth is the antiquity of error; therefore, leaving error behind, let us follow truth, knowing that even in Esdras truth conquered, as it is written: “Truth is strong and grows strong forever, and lives and prevails for ages of ages.”
The same [in the epistle to Jubaianus, around the middle]. One who errs in simplicity can be pardoned, as blessed Paul the Apostle says concerning himself: “I who formerly was a blasphemer and persecutor and injurious; but I obtained mercy because I acted ignorantly.” But after inspiration and revelation have been given, he who perseveres in that in which he had erred no longer sins knowingly and prudently under the pardon of ignorance; for he relies upon a certain presumption and obstinacy when he is overcome by reason.
C. VIII. Rationem consuetudo impedire non debet.
Item Ciprianus. [in epistola ad Pompeium, contra epistolam Stephani.] Consuetudo, que apud quosdam irrepserat, impedire non debet, quo minus ueritas preualeat et uincat. Nam consuetudo sine ueritate uetustas erroris est: propter quod relicto errore sequamur ueritatem, scientes, quia et apud Esdram ueritas uicit, ut scriptum est: "Veritas ualet et inualescit in eternum, et uiuit et obtinet in secula seculorum." Idem. [in epistola ad Iubaianum, circa med.] Ignosci potest simpliciter erranti, sicut de seipso dicit beatus apostolus Paulus: "Qui primo fui blasphemus, et persecutor et iniuriosus; sed misericordiam merui, quia ignorans feci." Post inspirationem uero et reuelationem factam, qui in eo, quod errauerat, perseuerat, prudens et sciens iam non in uenia ignorantiae peccat: presumtione enim atque obstinatione quadam nititur, cum ratione superetur.
Friedberg, col. 15/16
C. IX. God’s truth, not human custom, ought to be followed.
The same [Book II, epistle 3, to Caecilius]. If Christ alone is to be heard, we ought not to attend to what someone before us thought ought to be done, but to what Christ, who is before all, first did. For human custom ought not to be followed, but God’s truth, since God speaks through the prophet Isaiah and says: “In vain do they worship me, teaching the commandments and doctrines of men.”
GRATIAN. It is therefore clearly apparent that custom is placed after natural law.
C. IX. Dei ueritatem, non hominum consuetudinem sequi oportet.
Idem. [lib. II. ep. 3. ad Caecilium] Si solus Christus audiendus est, non debemus attendere, quid aliquis ante nos faciendum putauerit, sed quid, qui ante omnes est, Christus prior fecerit. Neque enim hominis consuetudinem sequi oportet, sed Dei ueritatem, cum per Ysaiam prophetam loquatur Deus et dicat: "Sine causa colunt me, mandata et doctrinas hominum docentes." Gratianus. Liquido igitur apparet, quod consuetudo naturali iuri postponitur.
Friedberg, col. 15/16