Disputation I: On States, and on Perfection in General

SINCE in the sensible world the beauty and grace of it arise from the comeliness and variety of species, there is no reason to deny to the moral world, such as Religion is, a variety of states and degrees of perfection; and that with the more excellent right, because when many run in the same racecourse, striving toward the goal of perfection, or of attainment, they mutually spur one another on to ever better Charisms. Now this variety of states arises from the diversity of ends, not the ultimate, which is the same for all, but of proximate ends; For the end especially diversifies in morals: although in the strictness of speech, as far as the thing goes, that end is rather a medium, which is ordered to a further attainment; yet because other things are presupposed to the attaining of that medium, therefore the proximate end, that it may be distinguished from the ultimate, has obtained the name; whence it is clear that then there is an essential difference of states, when such a diversity obtains among the ends toward which they tend; and this happens the more frequently because, according to the measure of his powers and experience, one man embraces a pursuit different from another; for as St. Gregory teaches book 6 of the Morals, chap. 16, otherwise 17, there are some who, while they would easily make progress in praying, would suddenly sink in acting: The utility of states, therefore, having been shown, both proper and common, it remains that we see what they are and of how many kinds.