Question V: Whether an accused who unjustly denies a true crime, for which he was to be condemned to a fine, is bound to pay it, and is liable to restitution

The first opinion is affirmative: Molina, de iust. tomo 1. tract. 2. disp. 95.; Soto, l. 1. quaest. 6. art. 6.; Castridel., paen. l. 2. cap. 12.; Layman, l. 3. sect. 5. tract. 2. cap. 7. num. 4.

But the opposite opinion is that of Tanner, 2. 2. disp. 4. quaest. 6. dub. 2. num. 76.; Nauarr, cap. 18. ad num. 46.; Azor, t. 1. l. 5. cap. 8. quaestio 5.; Vazquez, prima secundae, disp. 175. cap. 12.; Less., l. 2. cap. 13. dub. 10.; Sanchez, Summ. tom. 1. l. 2. cap. 22. num. 22., and lib. 10. de matrim. disput. 8. num. 14.; Medina, lib. 1. Summae cap. 14. §. is; Angles, in flor. 2. p. de restit. legis paen. art. un. diff. un. concl. 3. fol. 248.; Aragon., 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 3. fol. 228., and there Salon, controu. 2.; Bannes, art. 3. disp. 2.; Lud. Lopez, p. 1. Instruct. cap. 159.; Rodriquez, T. 1. Sum. in secunda edit. cap. 186. num. 6.; Graff, p. 1. decis. l. 3. cap. 7. num. 25.; Azor, t. 1. l. 5. cap. 8. quaestio 5., and l. 8. cap. 12. quaest. 5.; Vasquez, prima 2. disp. 175. cap. 12. num. 13.; Fagundez, in octavum praeceptum decal. l. 8. cap. 30.; Palac., l. 4. de contract. cap. 5. resol. 52., and p. 4. Tract. 4. resol. 65., where he reports that one condemned to a pecuniary punishment appeals unjustly; Diana, p. 3. Tract. 5. resol. 52., and p. 4. Tract. 4. resol. 65., where he reports that the opinion of Layman is that he is bound to the punishment by force of the crime, as imposed upon him by that very fact, not at the discretion of the Judge to be inflicted. Bassaeus makes an exception, num. 17., namely that he would not be bound before the sentence.

Yet he is bound, they say, to the costs of the suit, says Diana, tract. 5. p. 3. resol. 52., with Sanchez, de matrimonio l. 10. d. 8. num. 14.

Hence also Tanner, num. 8., and others with Azor ad 4., pursue the point: Less., lib. 2. cap. 13. dub. 10. num. 7.; Granado, prima 2. controu. 7. tract. 3. p. 1. disput. 14. sect. 2.; Vasquez, p. 2. disp. 168. num. 30.; Sala, de leg. disp. 13. sect. 8. num. 105.; Sà, verbo restit. num. 46., and v. poena, num. 14.; Diana, p. 1. Tract. 10. resol. 23., and p. 3. Tract. 5. resol. 52.: that a Fiscal who does not accuse, or a Judge who does not condemn — who are the cause of injustice, so that the Accused is not condemned to a pecuniary punishment — is not bound to restitution. Say the same of the keeper of the woods who does not accuse the one cutting the wood. The reason is that these do not sin against commutative or distributive justice, but against public vindicative justice, and the treasury has no right to the punishment directly, but only indirectly, and by means of the sentence of the Judge. Therefore a Judge without a sentence is not bound by justice to exact that punishment.