Question — Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V · from Schola Thomistica
Question XVII: Whether a husband can annul the vows of his wife, made without his permission, to be fulfilled when the marriage has been dissolved
UNIVERSALLY concerning all who have dominative power this is disputed by Sanchez lib. 9. de matrimonio, cap. 19. num. 24. Hence we too will define all things on this matter.
Utrum possit Vir irritare Vota Uxoris, sine sua licentia emissa, implenda tempore soluti matrimonii.
UNIVERSALITER de omnibus habentibus potestatem dominatiuam disputatur a Sanchez lib. 9. de matrimonio, cap. 19. num. 24. Idco et nos omnia hac de re definiemus.
The FIRST opinion is, that neither the husband of the spouse, nor anyone else endowed with dominative power, can nullify those vows. So Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 8. dub. penultimo Angel. votum 2. Nauar. summa, cap. 12. num. 66. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 8. fol. 1021. Angles flor. 2. part. quaest. de voto, art. 7. diffic. 8. concl. 2. Lopez p. p. Instruct. cap. 48. Manuel 1. tomo summae, cap. 79. num. 8. et 90. num. 10.
PRIMA sententia est, neque virum coniugis, neque ullum alium dominatiua potestate praeditum posse ea vota irritare. Ita Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 8. dub. penultimo Angel. votum 2. Nauar. summa, cap. 12. num. 66. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 8. fol. 1021. Angles flor. 2. part. quaest. de voto, art. 7. diffic. 8. concl. 2. Lopez p. p. Instruct. cap. 48. Manuel 1. tomo summae, cap. 79. num. 8. et 90. num. 10.
The SECOND opinion is, that he can nullify the vows of those only who are subject, not only with respect to the matter of the vow, but also with respect to the will, so that they have neither to will, nor to will not. So Syluest. verb. votum 4. quaest. 2 dicto 5. Sà verbo votum. Valentia 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 6. puncto 6. quaest. 5.
SECUNDA sententia est, posse irritare vota eorum tantum, qui subditi sunt, non solum quod ad materiam voti, sed etiam quod ad voluntatem, ita ut non habeant velle, aut nolle. Ita Syluest. verb. votum 4. quaest. 2 dicto 5. Sà verbo votum. Valentia 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 6. puncto 6. quaest. 5.
The THIRD opinion asserts, that all superiors can nullify those vows. So Sotus lib. 7. de Iust. quaest. 3. art. 1. Alcozier summa, cap. 16. concl. 9. Lopez p. p. Instruct. cap. 50. Vega Tom. 1. cap. 119. casu 20. and concerning the vows of the wife Stunica holds de voto, quaest. 3. num. 76. Sanchez lib. 9. de matrim. disp. 39. num. 16. adducing these, and others.
TERTIA sententia asserit, posse omnes superiores ea vota irritare. Ita Sotus lib. 7. de Iust. quaest. 3. art. 1. Alcozier summa, cap. 16. concl. 9. Lopez p. p. Instruct. cap. 50. Vega Tom. 1. cap. 119. casu 20. et de votis uxoris tenet Stunica de voto, quaest. 3. num. 76. Sanchez lib. 9. de matrim. disp. 39. num. 16. adducens hos, et alios.
Sanchez, however, and others EXCEPT the vow of a servant, adducing Lopez in the place cited, and Tostatum q. 91. ad cap. 30. Numer.
EXCIPIUNT tamen Sanchez, et alii votum servi, adducentes Lopez loco cit. et Tostatum q. 91. ad cap. 30. Numer.
Ludovicus Lopez also EXCEPTS the vow of chastity, made by the wife for the time when she will be her own mistress, to be fulfilled, and says it cannot be nullified by the husband; but Sanchez, Sotus and Stunica above think the contrary.
EXCIPIT etiam Ludovicus Lopez votum castitatis, factum ab uxore pro tempore, quo sui iuris erit implendum, aitque, non posse a viro irritari; at contra sentiunt Sanchez, Sotus et Stunica supra.
CONCERNING the vow of religion, Sanchez answers num. 19. If this vow was emitted by the wife after the marriage was entered, before its consummation, then to be fulfilled, he says, it cannot be nullified, because it is a vow by which the wife is to be exempted from the power of the husband, and the marriage to be dissolved. And it stands in the manner of a vow made by a religious of passing to a stricter religion. But if it was emitted in the time of a dissolved marriage, whether the marriage be consummated or not consummated, the husband could nullify it. He adds num. 20. other vows made by the wife before the consummation of the marriage, while she has also the vow of exempting herself from the power of the husband, and of passing to religion, can be nullified, because the wife is not yet freed from the power of the husband. See also Fagundez in secundum praeceptum, Decal. lib. 2. cap. 38. num. 9.
QUOAD votum religionis, respondet Sanchez num. 19. Si hoc votum emissum est ab uxore post initum matrimonium ante illius consummationem, tunc implendum, ait, non posse irritari, quia est votum per quod eximenda est uxor a viri potestate, et solvendum matrimonium. Atque se habet ad instar voti facti a religioso transeundi ad arctiorem religionem. Si vero emissum est in tempore soluti matrimonii, sive matrimonio consummato, sive non consummato, posset vir illud irritare. Addit num. 20. alia vota facta ab uxore ante consummationem matrimonii, dum habet votum etiam eximendi se a potestate viri, et transeundi ad religionem, posse irritari, quia nondum uxor liberata est a potestate viri. Vide etiam Fagundez in secundum praeceptum, Decal. lib. 2. cap. 38. num. 9.
What D. Bonaventure thought is not so clear; I judge, however, that he stands with the first opinion, because in 4. dist. 39. quaest. 3. where in the body, and ad 1. he requires two things, that a stable vow be emitted. The one is liberty of the will for emitting the vow, and this, he says, is had even in the time of subjection: The other is for executing it; and this is had in the time for which the vow was emitted.
QUID senserit D. Bonavent. non adeo clarum est; arbitror tamen, eum cum prima sententia stare, quia in 4. dist. 39. quaest. 3. ubi in corpore, et ad 1. duo requirit, ut stabile votum edatur. Alterum est libertas voluntatis ad votum edendum, et hanc haberi ait etiam tempore subiectionis: Alterum est ad exequendum; et hoc habetur tempore, pro quo editum est votum.
I ASSERT with this opinion, that vows to be executed in the time of liberty cannot be nullified in the time of subjection.
ASSERO eum hac sententia, vota tempore libertatis exequenda, irritari non posse tempore subiectionis.
IT IS PROVED by the argument of D. Bonavent. in the place cited, because a superior can nullify vows; for the reason that he is lord of the matter, and of the will, at most insofar as it falls upon the promised matter, which is therefore held to be in the power of the Lord; but there is no such dominion over a vow emitted for the time of liberty: Therefore. The minor is proved, because if the vow be considered in relation to the will, that is free independently of any creature, a sign of which is, that no legitimate dominion takes away liberty; but if it be considered in relation to the matter, since it is not in the power of the Lord, but is for the time in which he can freely execute it, for he has it in his own power; it cannot be usurped by the dominion of a superior.
PROBATUR argumento D. Bonavent. loco cit. quia superior potest irritare vota; eo quod sit dominus materiae, et voluntatis, ad summum pro ut cadit super materiam promissam, quae ideo censetur in potestate Domini; sed dominium tale non est super votum editum pro tempore libertatis: Ergo. Minor probatur, quia si consideretur votum in ordine ad voluntatem, ea libera est independenter a creatura, cuius signum est, quod nullum dominium legitimum aufert libertatem; si vero consideretur in ordine ad materiam, cum non sit in potestate Domini, sed sit pro tempore, quo potest libere eam exequi, quippe eam habet in sui potestate; non potest a dominio usurpari superioris.
Sanchez answers num. 21. that it suffices, if the person be subject, and the matter of the vow in the time in which the vow was emitted; although the obligation of execution be deferred to the time of liberty.
RESPONDET Sanchez num. 21. sufficere si persona sit subiecta, et materia voti tempore, quo emissum est votum; licet obligatio executionis dilata sit ad tempus libertatis.
Yet this answer is not solid, because formal subjection comes from subjection at most of the will, insofar as the will vows: and consequently over that matter. Therefore by this reasoning the will is not subject, since it is not borne toward a subject matter, as Sanchez thinks; for that matter for that time can be non-existing, and contingent, as, if the wife vow for the time of widowhood to assume that state which will be urged upon her by her Bishop for her spiritual profit, I do not see what right the husband has over this.
HAEC tamen responsio non est solida, quia subiectio formalis venit a subiectione ad summum voluntatis, pro ut voluntas vovet: atque adeo super illam materiam. Cum igitur hac ratione voluntas non sit subdita, cum non feratur in materiam subiectam, ut putat Sanchez; nam illa materia pro eo tempore potest esse non existens, et contingens, ut, si uxor voveat pro tempore viduitatis, eum statum assumere, qui pro suo profectu spirituali a suo Episcopo sibi suadebitur, non video quid iuris habeat vir circa hoc.
I URGE; if she vow to enter religion, over which vow I do not see how the husband has dominion; for in the same way it is exempted from his power, as the religious, vowing passage to a stricter religion, is exempted from the power of his present superior. Diana parte 4. Tract. 4. resol. 19. says, that he once thought some hold probably, that a father can nullify the vow of religion emitted by a son, to be executed after the years of puberty, because the minor is in the full power of the father.
URGEO; si voveat religionem ingredi, cui voto non video quomodo dominetur maritus; eodem enim modo ab eius potestate eximitur, sicuti religiosus, vovens transitum ad strictiorem religionem, eximitur a potestate superioris praesentis. Diana parte 4. Tract. 4. resol. 19. ait, se olim putasse, aliquos probabiliter censere, patrem posse irritare votum religionis emissum a filio, post annos pubertatis exequendum, quia impubet est in plena patris potestate.
SANCHEZ confesses that he is hard pressed by this argument; he answers, however; if the vow was emitted while a ratified marriage stands, not consummated, and to be fulfilled then, it cannot be nullified, because in that case the wife is to be exempted from the power of the husband, and the marriage dissolved, as is evident, and the Theologians prove, especially D. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 2. ex cap. Praeterea de conversione coniugatorum, but if it was emitted before, or after a consummated marriage, but to be fulfilled in the time of a dissolved marriage, the husband can nullify it. The reason of the disparity of this from the vow of a religious vowing passage to a stricter one is, that by this vow the Religious is exempted entirely by right from the power of that superior; not so the wife for that vow.
SANCHEZ hoc argumento valide se premi fatetur; respondet tamen; si votum sit emissum constante matrimonio rato, non consummato, et pro tunc implendum, non posse irritari, quia eo casu uxor eximenda est a viri potestate, ac matrimonium solvendum, ut patet, et probant Theologi praecipue D. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 2. ex cap. Praeterea de conversione coniugatorum, si vero emissum sit ante, vel post consummatum matrimonium, sed implendum tempore soluti matrimonii, posse virum id irritare. Ratio disparitatis huius cum voto religiosi voventis transitum ad strictiorem, est, quia per hoc votum Religiosus eximitur omnino a potestate superioris illius ex iure; non sic uxor pro eo voto.
BUT this escape is closed off, because, as that religious vows stably, because by that vow he is exempted by right, that he may pass to a more perfect state, so the woman is already exempted, when she vows that which does not, as to its fulfillment, lie under the husband himself, who after the deed cannot have the care of her governance.
AT effugium hoc praecluditur, quia, sicut religiosus ille stabiliter vovet, quia voto illo a iure eximitur, ut ad statum perfectiorem transeat, ita mulier iam exempta est, cum voveat id, quod non subiacet, quod ad impletionem, ipsi viro, qui de eius regimine post facta curam non potest habere.