Question IX: Whether hope precedes charity

From what has been said the question is now almost settled.

I suppose that Faith is first; for it belongs to the intellect, illuminating it, so that from it the appetite—which cannot be carried toward the unknown—may rise, by an elicited act, to hoping and loving: for just as the things we see and hold we do not hope for, so we do not hope for the things we do not understand, but only for things that are to come; whence a certain difference also arises between hope and faith; for faith is concerned with past evils and goods, whereas hope is concerned only with future goods, as D. Augustine teaches in Enchir. cap. 8, from which it is clear that the Sectarians wrongly confuse Faith with Hope.

Therefore Faith is prior by nature to Hope; for we hope because we believe. The same is held by the Holy Doctor lib. 5. Compendium Theologiae, cap. 22.

As for Charity, I say that it is posterior to Hope.

It is proved by St. Bonaventure, first from the Gloss, which adduces this.

Secondly, because the foundation is prior to the building and to its perfection: but faith is the foundation of the spiritual building; for it is the substance of things to be hoped for: therefore first is Faith, second Hope, which rises like a wall; and finally Charity, which is the bond of perfection.

Third. Because according to the order of nature, the imperfect precedes the more perfect; but Charity is more perfect than Faith and Hope, ex prima Cor. 13. Ergo.

Fourth: No one can love a good recognized as impossible to him: therefore he must first hope.

The Holy Doctor notes, however, in the body of the text, that the Habits of Hope and Charity are indeed infused together, but in respect of act Hope operates first, which prepares for the act of charity; for that which we would not hope to obtain would not be loved.

You will object first. Hope is the expectation of beatitude from merits; but merits are from grace: therefore grace is presupposed to Hope itself.

The Holy Doctor answers that there Hope is taken for the state, or for the thing hoped for, as I explained quaest. 8.

You will object secondly. Every affection arises from love, as D. Augustine says 14. de civitate, cap. 6. et 15. Therefore also Hope.

The Holy Doctor answers that imperfect love is the root moving all the affections; yet perfect love is the term of all of them, whence all the affections are ordered so that God may be loved perfectly: but Charity does not name just any love, but perfect love.

You will object thirdly. No one hopes for what he does not love; for what is not a good loved by me, I do not hope for; therefore the rectitude of love precedes the rectitude of expectation. But charity directs in loving; hope in expecting: therefore Charity is before Hope.

The Holy Doctor answers that nothing is loved except what is hoped for; thus, by the love of concupiscence, charity does not love God as a good for itself unless it hopes to obtain Him; likewise not by the love of friendship, unless it trusts in Him; even though no one hopes except what he loves imperfectly.

You will object fourthly. Fear and Hope are two affections running together; therefore they are called two millstones by the Gloss ad 24. Deuter. But every fear proceeds from love: therefore also every Hope: therefore gratuitous hope arises from gratuitous love.

The Holy Doctor answers that love of self is the origin of fear of punishments, but not so the love of God. Therefore it does not follow that the act of Charity precedes the act of Fear; rather from filial Fear arises Love, as the Council of Trent teaches.

You will object fifthly. That which is more common is prior, of which the converse does not hold; but loving is more common than hoping: therefore that is prior. The minor is proved; for everything to be hoped for is to be loved, not the reverse.

He answers that the Major is true of those things which essentially follow one another mutually; not of those which accompany one another; and thus it follows: If there is snow: therefore something white; not conversely; and yet the whiteness of snow does not precede the substance of snow. Therefore, since hoping and loving accompany one another, although the act of loving extends to more lovable things, it need not be prior in the order of nature.

Moreover, although Charity is more general on the side of the object, yet Hope is more universal on the side of the subject. For every wayfarer who has Charity has Hope; but not conversely; and therefore the act of hope precedes in origin the act of Charity with respect to the subject, from which both acts take their origin.

You will object sixthly. The order of virtue to virtue is the same as the order of dowry to dowry; but perfect tension, which is the dowry corresponding to Hope, follows perfect dilection, which is the dowry corresponding to Charity: therefore also in the wayfare Charity precedes Hope.

The Holy Doctor answers by denying the parity; because the dowries in the fatherland will be of equal perfection; but in the wayfare Charity, in the respect of virtue, is greater than Hope, and therefore it does not follow that if in the wayfare expectation precedes some dilection, also in the fatherland tension should precede perfect dilection. For although the virtues are equal with respect to the reason of tending, yet the act of dilection is more perfect than that of Hope; but in glory it will be equally perfect to hold and to love; whence although in the wayfare the act of the Irascible precedes the act of the Concupiscible, it need not be so also in the fatherland, where there is perfect reformation.