Question V: Whether the Pontiff can dispense in solemn vows

With these things supposed, which I defined in disput. 1. quaest. 28., this question is easily solved, by admitting a juridical declaration.

The chief controversy is over the solemn vow of chastity.

The first, and celebrated, opinion is that the Pontiff can dispense in the solemn vow of chastity, and they assert the same concerning the other solemn vows. Thus a hundred and ten Doctors, related by Sanchez book 8. on marriage, disput. 8. The only one among them whom I have seen except the vow of poverty is Nauar. commentary 2. on regulars, num. 17. Others too are cited by Tannerus disput. 5. quaest. 4. num. 122. Platus on the good state of Religion book 2. chapter 16. and 27. Vasquez prima secundae, disput. 165. Add Bassaeus V. Votum 7. num. 28. who says it is common among the Canonists and almost all the Theologians.

The second opinion denies that the Pontiff has power to dispense in solemn vows. Thus D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 11. together with twenty-two others, whom Sanchez relates in the place cited, num. 5. where for this opinion he brings forward D. Bonaventure, who, as we said in the first question, does not dare to condemn this opinion: yet he does not presume to prefer it to the opposite, but says he does not know which is better.

I ASSERT first that this second opinion is probable. Thus Sanchez admits, with almost innumerable Doctors cited for the opposite opinion.

It is PROVED first from the chapter cum ad monasterium, where it is said: The custody of chastity is so closely bound to the monastic rule, that against it not even the supreme Pontiff can grant a dispensation.

SEE the responses cited in the first question. This decree is that of Innocent III. The Thomists press this text strongly, above all Peter Labata Tom. 7. tract. 3. disp. 6. dub. 8.

Mastrius answers, speaking for all, in 4. dist. 7. num. 512. that the sense is that the Pontiff cannot dispense in the composite sense, so that one exempted from the vows should still remain a Religious; for the vows are of the essence of Religion. Thus also answer the twin eminent writers on the sacrament of matrimony, Sanchez and Pontius.

Labata INSISTS, for there the Pontiff infers that an Abbot cannot dispense his subjects in the vow of chastity, because not even the supreme Pontiff himself has that power: but if, according to the aforesaid response, the supreme Pontiff could dispense by extracting a monk from the Religious state, he would not satisfy the question.

Mastrius ANSWERS that this author infers with no foundation that, if the Pontiff had power to call a Monk away from the Religious state, anyone could deduce that an Abbot also has the same power.

Yet Mastrius does not seem to answer him rightly; for this is not the point on which Labata presses, nor does he pretend to infer that, but he argues thus: Far be it that an Abbot think he can dispense with his Religious in solemn vows, because the vows are so intrinsic to Religion that against them not even the Supreme Pontiff can grant a dispensation. Now to answer that the Pontiff can dispense by calling one away from Religion seems ridiculous, because the Pontiff supposes the contrary in his reasoning; namely that one cannot dispense in the vows of Religion, because they are intrinsic to Religion irrevocably; or because one cannot go back on promises made in Religion and on Religion itself, and the vows are intrinsic to Religion. And so I marvel that this response has been embraced by so many men: Soto, Richard, Durand, Paludanus, Cajetan, Palacio, Azor, and Valencia, as in Sanchez lib. 8. disp. 8. num. 7. and 12.

I PRESS further on the side of Labata; for the reasoning of the Pontiff seems to suppose that Divine law, Luke 9. No one putting his hand to the plough and looking back is fit for the kingdom of God, as S. P. Francis indicates chapter 2. of the Rule, and there D. Bonaventure, and likewise Levit. last chapter. The animal that has been vowed to God shall be holy, and cannot be changed. These inferences rest on that foundation. Since one legitimately professed in the Religious state is irrevocable, and Religion essentially includes these vows, it follows not only that dispensation by an Abbot is impossible, but that to say it is absurd; since not even the Pope can do it.

To ME the obvious sense seems to be that of one upbraiding the Abbot for thinking that it is within his power to give leave, or a lawful concession, for retaining something of property, when very many deny this even of the Pontiff himself with probability; although for the gravest cause it has sometimes been granted, the Pontiff ought to employ that supreme authority and fullness of power which he exercises in the whole world for a change of state for the sake of the universal good, a power and superior understanding which an Abbot does not enjoy. Thus indeed the Divine law permitted in those cases. That such a case has often occurred, Cajetan relates tract. 1. opus. tit. 27. and others in Sanchez. Thus Alexander III dispensed with Nicholas Justinian, a Monk, at the urgent plea of the Most Serene Doge, lest the most illustrious offspring of the Justiniani perish: he took Anna as wife, by whom he had six sons and three daughters, and both entered religion and became famous for miracles. So it is related by Sutio in the life of B. Laurence Justinian, and in Azor lib. 11. Instit. cap. 7.

RAMIRUS, King of the Aragonese, having become a Monk, since his father had died without issue, was dispensed by the Pontiff; and he took a wife and begat a daughter.

CASIMIR, the first of that name, King of Poland and a Monk, being dispensed, begat sons. Constance, daughter of Roger, released from monastic profession, married Henry VI. Others too are related.

Azorius however OBSERVES that these men had been professed. Which he rightly shows from the histories, and thereby refutes the responses of Soto and Sylvester.

But to condemn this practice would be impious, as Peter a S. Ioseph Fuliensis warns lib. 4. de Relig. cap. 4.

It is PROVED secondly by D. Bonavent., because for a dispensation to be valid a preponderant cause is necessary; but no such cause can exist for dispensing in the vow of chastity, because No weighing is worthy of the soul of the continent, as is said Ecclesiasticus 26. Therefore.

Sanchez ANSWERS num. 7. and almost all the others, that there can be a preponderant good, for instance the peace of a whole kingdom, the life of a King, which is most necessary for preserving the kingdom, and other things of this weight, which indeed outweigh when weighed against the spiritual good of one monk. This response is taken from D. Bonav. in the place cited. who yet warns that they not be deceived by positing such causes unless they are morally certain to obtain their effect; then indeed the holy Doctor gives his hand.

Sanchez ADDS that that argument of the incomparable goodness of continence can apply even to the simple vow, and yet it is certain that the Pontiff can dispense in this.

BUT D. Bonaventure, with others, cites that passage for the solemn vow, which teaches that it perfectly subjects the soul together with the body to the Divine dominion, and therefore, I judge, the Holy Spirit said: there is no weighing of the soul of the continent, in the place cited above.

HENCE another argument is taken from D. Bonaventure. What has been wholly given over to God cannot be taken from Him by any inferior: But by solemn vows there is made an entire giving over of man to God, and so by Divine law he remains wholly devoted to God, as I showed in quaest. 1. Therefore.

Sanchez ANSWERS num. 120. from D. Bonavent. in the place cited. that for the sake of the common good something given over to God can be taken away, because God, since He always wills what is better, considers Himself sufficiently compensated. On this quaest. 1. disp. 1.

It is PROVED fourthly by D. Bonavent. in the cited dist. art. 2. quaest. 1. What is of natural Divine law is indispensable by the Church: But the solemn vow of chastity is of natural Divine law, in this respect, that it renders marriage invalid: Therefore. The major is the axiom of all, as I said in quaest. 1. The minor was proved there as to the first part. That it renders marriage invalid by natural Divine law is proved from Pope Siricius epistola 1. cap. 6. and is related in cap. si quis sacro, §. si quis sacra, §. velatae, 27. quaest. 1. where he says: those contracting after a solemn vow are to be separated by the word of the Lord, and by Canonical authority. Therefore that marriage is invalid not by ecclesiastical law alone, but by Divine law also.

It is CONFIRMED by D. Bonavent. quaest. 3. A thing given over to one is invalidly given over to another by the law of nature.

For no one can transfer to another what he does not have, by the rule of the chapter Quod autem de iure patron. But by the solemn vow of Religion the dominion of the person is transferred to God, so that he no longer has the use of his body for the acts of matrimony: Therefore. It is confirmed, for on this account a spouse cannot marry another, and although the Church may assist as accepting the consent, yet not by ecclesiastical law alone is a spouse bound to one spouse and not to marry another, but by the law of nature.

Sanchez responds in the place cited, from what was said in disput. 6. num. 2. that dispensation is possible over natural Divine law, which he acknowledges to arise from human will, such as vows and oaths, although not always in absolute natural Divine law; although some, among whom is D. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 38. art. 2. quaest. 3. deny that a relaxation is made, but only a declaration in that prior law, in the mode explained in disput. 1. quaest. 1.

These things therefore are not so firm that they do not lie overthrown by the preceding disputation, quaest. 1. and here quaest. 1.: that if in every law depending on our will dispensation is possible, it will be lawful to dispense also in polygamy; for such is the obligation of spouses.

Finally it is proved, because, as Abdias relates, S. Matthew refused to dispense so that Iphigenia, a monastic virgin, might marry the King, who offered himself and his whole kingdom to be baptized.

Sanchez responds from Cajetan, that it was done because it did not befit the beginning of the nascent Church that religion be propagated with those things relaxed which pertain greatly to it, and with so eager a contempt of religion.

But (with all respect to them) who does not know that at the beginning some things were tolerated, lest scandal be laid upon the increase of religion? So also D. Gregory the Pope wrote to S. Augustine in England. So the Ecclesiastical Annals testify that many things were tolerated at that time, which afterwards were restricted when the forces of the Church were strengthened.

I assert secondly; It is also probable that it is within the Pontiff's power to dispense in solemn vows; I suppose in Tract. de matrim. disput. 7. quaest. 6. that it is probable that the solemnity of Vows is from Ecclesiastical Law.

It is proved first by D. Bonaventure. Nothing is to be denied to Pontifical authority which conduces to the governance of the Church, unless some implication or inconvenience follows: but a dispensation in solemn vows is profitable to the Church, as, for instance, if it were for the peace of some kingdom, or the life of a King, things profitable to the Church, it would be fitting; nor does any implication follow: Therefore.

But the extreme part of the Minor is proved. Either it is repugnant, because it is done of Divine law; and not so, because with all doubt removed dispensation is granted in the simple vow, which is of Divine Law. Or it is repugnant from the matter of continence, to which no good can be equal; nor so; as we saw, because the good of a whole kingdom preponderates: Or it is repugnant from the solemnity; nor so; for in solemnity is not placed the reason of the vow. Or finally it is repugnant on the part of the giving over; nor this, because for the public good what has been given over can justly be recalled.

Yet this argument can be weakened from what has been said, by denying the Minor on the reasons brought forward in quaest. 1. and in the preceding disputation, question 1. with D. Bonaventure. Yet very many acclaim it, as in Mastrius num. 510.

It is proved secondly by the argument brought by D. Bonaventure at the beginning of his corpus. The will of man, insofar as he is political and ordered to the common good of the Republic, is subordinated to the head in those things which pertain to the political common good: Therefore in the will of a religious, binding himself by the bond of a vow, there is included the condition, unless the Head of the community, that is, the Pontiff, for the sake of the common good, relax these bonds. And it is confirmed, for if for the sake of the household it is conceded to a father to invalidate the vows of his sons, and to a husband those of his wife, why should it be denied to the supreme Father and Prince of all, for the public utility of the whole Church?

Yet this argument, which Sanchez trumpets as principal, is not very Seraphically proved, because since these vows are most pleasing to God, and His counsels, it does not seem probable that they should be made under a condition, while it does not remain fully proved that some good prevails.

The last argument of D. Bonavent. which is found in the cited dist. art. 2. quaest. 1. and which I value greatly, and on which Sanchez relies, is this. In doubt, one must presume in favor of the acts of the Pontiff, since he is directed by the Holy Spirit in a special manner in the governance of the Church; but it is established from the histories related by Cajetan Tom. 1. opusc. Tit. 27. on the dispensation of matrimony, in the western Church, a single question, and by others. This argument indeed prevails over the others, and by it the Seraphic Doctor was deterred from the opposite opinion. Add that Pontiffs have very often truly dispensed, as Sanchez relates: but the unworthy response of Sylvester, V. Votum, Peter Mastrius rejects, and justly.

Hence it follows that the same must be said also of the other vows: for the reason is parallel, as Sanchez indicates lib. 5. Decal. cap. 2. num. 9. the more so, because one who has married cannot keep religious poverty. Thus Rebaden. de Instituto Societatis Iesu, cap. 18. Azor, lib. 12. Instit. moral. cap. 7. quaestio 2. Vasquez prima secundae, disp. 165. cap. 9. num. 104.

The same argument is pressed also concerning the vow of obedience, for one who has married ought to be the ruling head.

Hence it follows much more that the Pope can dispense in the vow annexed to sacred orders; for it is not so solemn, nor of itself; but annexed to sacred orders, and so on this there is the least controversy, since this is annexed by ecclesiastical law.