Doubt — Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V · from Schola Thomistica
Doubt II: Whether one who is attacked is bound in some case to kill the aggressor
We have seen that in some case it is lawful: it must now be seen whether at some time it is commanded.
An teneatur in aliquo casu invasus occidere aggressorem.
Vidimus in aliquo casu id licere: videndum iam est: an aliquando sit praeceptum.
The Doctors commonly assert that ordinarily the one assailed is bound to defend his life, and if he cannot otherwise protect it, he is bound to kill the assailant. So Farinac. T. 4. quaest. 125. de homicid. tit. 14. Paulus de Castro in l. utim. ff. de Iust. et iure, Salon. ibi, num. 15. Iacobus Ayrerius tract. de homicidii necessitate, p. 1. num. 395. Fagundez in quintum praeceptum Decald. 5. cap. 3.
Communiter asserunt DD. teneri ordinarie invasum suam vitam defendere, et nisi aliter eam tueri queat, teneri aggressorem occidere. Ita Farinac. T. 4. quaest. 125. de homicid. tit. 14. Paulus de Castro in l. utim. ff. de Iust. et iure, Salon. ibi, num. 15. Iacobus Ayrerius tract. de homicidii necessitate, p. 1. num. 395. Fagundez in quintum praeceptum Decald. 5. cap. 3.
It is proved by all from a reason taken from D. Bonav. in 3. dist. 29. quaest. 4. for the order of charity is, that we prefer our own life to the life of our neighbor: Therefore he gravely sins who allows his own life to perish by the sword, as he who, outside this comparison, would allow the life of his neighbor to perish.
Probatur ab omnibus ratione sumpta ex D. Bonav. in 3. dist. 29. quaest. 4. nam ordo charitatis est, ut vitam nostram vitae proximi praeferamus: Igitur graviter peccat, qui vitam suam perire gladio sinit, sicut qui perire sineret vitam proximi extra hanc comparationem.
Yet they allege some causes on account of which the one assailed could allow himself to be killed. First, if he is in his conscience without mortal sin; but the invader is in mortal sin. But this reason is almost always supposed in the assailant: for if he is an unjust invader, he is unjust, and in sin. Second, if the invader be a person necessary to the Republic.
Aliquas tamen causas allegant, ob quas posset invasus sinere se occidi. Prima, si is est in conscientia sua sine peccato mortali; at invasor in peccato mortali. Sed haec ratio semper fere in aggressore supponitur: Si enim est iniquus aggressor, est iniustus, et in peccato. Secunda, si invasor sit persona necessaria Reipublicae.
Diana, however, p. 5. Tract. 4. resol. 14. seems not to admit universally that the one assailed is bound by the law of the order of charity to kill the assailant, but only if the one assailed himself be a Prince, or necessary to the Republic, or to his family. The same is held by Soto de Iustitia, l. 5. quaest. 1. art. 8. Sylvius 1. 2. quaest. 64. art. 7. and there likewise Aragon, and others with Bassaeo, v. Homicid. 1. num. 14.
Diana vero p. 5. Tract. 4. resol. 14. videtur non admittere universaliter, teneri ex lege ordinis charitatis invasum occidere aggressorem, sed solum, si invasus ipse sit Princeps, vel Reipublicae necessarius, aut familiae suae. Idem tenent Soto de Iustitia, l. 5. quaest. 1. art. 8. Sylvius 1. 2. quaest. 64. art. 7. et ibidem Aragon, et alii cum Bassaeo, v. Homicid. 1. num. 14.