Question — Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V · from Schola Thomistica
Question VI: Whether an accused who has unjustly denied the truth when he was to be condemned is bound to retract before the end of the trial
They affirm: Sayrus, l. 12. cap. 17. num. 13.; Angles, in flor. 2. p. q. de correct. fraterna, art. 3. diffic. 7.; Malder., 2. 2. tract. 6. cap. 3. dub. 1. assert. 4.; and others cited by Sanchez. But Sanchez, cited above, steadily denies, citing Philiarcus, Bonac., Tract. de Legibus disp. 10. quaest. 3. punct. 1. num. 8.; Azor., p. 3. l. 13. cap. 25. dub. 5., who nevertheless adds that the confessor is bound to admonish the accused to be ready for the truth if he is questioned again. Yet this displeases Diana, tract. 15. resol. 26. p. 1., and deservedly, because it exposes the Accused to peril; but it is enough to admonish him to amendment. The same think all who deny that he is bound to confess the truth in a capital case: Panorm., in C. cum super de confess.; Angelus, v. Confessio delicti; Sylvest., ibidem; Petrus Navar., l. 2. de restit. cap. 4. a num. 142.; and Sà judges it probable, v. Iudex; Less., dub. 3. cap. 31.; Tanner., disp. 4. quaest. 5. Their reason is that in every other matter extreme necessity excuses from payment of a debt. Therefore Sà admonishes confessors not to compel an accused acting on this opinion. Bassaeus also admonishes this, v. Reus, num. 5.
An Reus, negans veritatem indebite, quandamnaretur, teneatur retractare ante finem Iudicii.
Affirmant Sayrus l. 12. cap. 17. num. 13. Angles in flor. 2. p. q. de correct. fraterna, art. 3. diffic. 7. Malder. 2. 2. tract. 6. cap. 3. dub. 1. assert. 4. et alii apud Sanchez NEGANT vero constanter Sanchez citatus, citans Philiarcum, Bonac. Tract. de Legibus disp. 10. quaest. 3. punct. 1. num. 8. Azor. p. 3. l. 13. cap. 25. dub. 5. qui tamen addit, teneri confessarium monere reum, ut sit paratus ad veritatem, si iterum interrogetur. Hoc tamen displicet Dianae tract. 15. resol. 26. p. 1. et merito, quia est exponere Reum periculo; sed satis est eum monere ad emendationem. Idem sentiunt quotquot negant, teneri in causa mortis fateri veritatem: Panorm. in C. cum super de confess. Angelus v. Confessio delicti, Sylvest. ibidem, Petrus Navar. l. 2. de restit. cap. 4. a num. 142. et probabilem censet Sà v. Iudex, Less. dub. 3. cap. 31. Tanner. disp. 4. quaest. 5. Eorum ratio est, quia in omni alia materia, extrema necessitas excusat a redditione debiti. Itaque Sà monet Confessarios, ne reum hac opinione operantem cogant. Id monet etiam Bassaeus v. Reus, num. 5.
THIS second opinion holds much more after the sentence has been given; for then the judgment is finished, and he has ceased in that cause to be Judge, as S. Antonin. weighs, 3. p. tit. 9. cap. 16. §. 8.; Sylvester, v. iudicium in fine; Diana with Sanchez above; and it is the text in Leg. Iudex, ff. de re iudiciaria; and consequently the accused is no longer bound to answer the judge, Navar., Man. cap. 25. numero 38.; Rodriquez, tomo 2. quaestione 18. art. 9.; Pingianus, in pract. crim. can. cap. 3. fol. 258.; Segura Davolos, in direct. iudicii, cap. 17. num. 36.; Villalobos, tomo 2. tract. 16. diff. 3. num. 4; Diana, p. 3. tract. 5. resol. 103.; Dictus, quaest. 81. num. 10., against Ledesma, tomo 2. tract. 8. cap. 24.; Salon, 2. 2. quaest. 69. art. 2. concl. 3.; Vega, Tom. 2. cap. 89. casu 2. et 3.; Bannes, 1. 2. quaest. 69. art. 2.; Medina, in Summa, l. 1. cap. 14. §. 35.; Corduba, Sum. quaest. 64 p. 2.; and others who relied on this reason: because in such a case he who denied his true crime, and yet is condemned to death, exposes himself as one unjustly condemned by the judge, and therefore defames him and stirs up the people against him.
HAEC secunda sententia multo magis valet post latam sententiam; tunc enim iudicium est finitum, et desiit in illa causa esse Iudex, ut ponderant S. Antonin. 3. p. tit. 9. cap. 16. §. 8. Sylvester v. iudicium in fine, Diana cum Sanchez supra; et est textus in Leg. Iudex, ff. de re iudiciaria, et consequenter reus non tenetur amplius iudici respondere, Navar. Man. cap. 25. numero 38. Rodriquez tomo 2. quaestione 18. art. 9. Pingianus in pract. crim. can. cap. 3. fol. 258. Segura Davolos in direct. iudicii, cap. 17. num. 36. Villalobos tomo 2. tract. 16. diff. 3. num. 4 Diana p. 3. tract. 5. resol. 103. Dictus quaest. 81. num. 10. contra Ledefmam tomo 2. tract. 8. cap. 24. Salonium 2. 2. quaest. 69. art. 2. concl. 3. Vegam Tom. 2. cap. 89. casu 2. et 3. Bannes 1. 2. quaest. 69. art. 2. Medinam in Summa, l. 1. cap. 14. §. 35. Corduba Sum. quaest. 64 p. 2. et alios, qui hac ratione nitebantur, quia in tali casu, iis, qui negavit suum crimen verum, et tamen morte damnatur, exponit se, tanquam iniuste a iudice damnatum, atque ideo eum infamat, et suscitat contra eum gentem.
BUT it is answered that no infamy is thence brought upon the Judge, or even upon the witnesses. For the Accused are wont to deny, and the presumption stands in place of the judge's sentence. Therefore judges should beware lest they lead accused of this kind to a recantation.
SED respondetur, nullam inde infamiam Iudici, vel etiam testibus afferri. Sunt enim soliti Rei negare, et praesumptio stat pro iudicis sententia. Itaque caveant iudices, ne reos huiusmodi ad palinodiam inducant.
Sanchez ADDS, num. 12., that if the Accused has by force of torture imposed upon himself a false crime, for which he is condemned, he is not bound to retract, unless the infamy would redound to others.
ADDIT Sanchez num. 12. si Reus vi torturae sibi falsum crimen imposuit, propter quod damnatur, non teneri retractare, nisi infamia in alios redundaret.