Question XXVII: Whether faith is a substantial gift of God

Now we must treat of the efficient cause of Faith.

Catholics are unanimous that for the assent of Faith, besides the external object proposed, an internal help of grace is required, by which man is helped to believe as he ought. It is defined against Pelagius in the Council of Orange 2. can. 5. and in the Tridentine sess. 6. can. 3. On which see S. Augustine de praedest. Sanctorum, cap. 3. de bono perseverantiae, cap. 20. and 21. and lib. 1. retract. cap. 23. The reason is, because to believe as is required for salvation is a disposition to sanctifying grace: therefore it is not made without grace moving within, as the Council of Trent infers; otherwise justification would take its beginning from us; and thus it would not be gratuitous but owed. So also D. Bonaventure in the body of the text.

S. Doctor observes secondly that faith is had from hearing, as to its material element, and this is acquired; for by the ordinary law the articles of faith are not imprinted in the intellect, but only the habit is infused which raises the intellect to an assent above nature. Therefore a baptized infant, even if he has the habit; if nevertheless he is not instructed, will easily fall into errors, in the same way as if he did not have the habit, as S. Doctor observes at the very end.

There were indeed some Scholastics who seemed to assert the acquired habit of faith, as sufficient for believing the articles of faith simply; nevertheless the supernatural habit as necessary for believing more firmly. So Durandus dist. 28. question 1. Gabriel dist. 23. question 2. and others. The Nominalists, for which opinion Amicus disp. 15. sect. 1. and others, adduce Scotus 3. dist. 23. question unica. But Mastrius reports some passages of Scotus in which he asserts the supernatural habit to be necessary simply, on account of the supernaturalness of the act, as quodl. 14. art. 1. and quodl. 17. §. contra the conclusion, and in 1. dist. 17. question 2. and more clearly in 1. dist. 1. question 4. ad 4. for the 4. article, and in 4. dist. 49. question 5. ad 2.

The PRINCIPAL question is, how the act of faith is supernatural; for it can be supernatural in two ways. First according to substance, in that according to its entity it transcends every order of the beings of nature, not only by reason of the agent, since there is no agent in the course of nature able to produce that being; but also subjectively, insofar as that entity, say of faith, grace, or the Light of glory, is of a higher order: as I said p. 1. tract. 1. disp. 11. from num. 113. Secondly a being is said to be supernatural according to mode, and is called supernatural, because, although according to its entity it can be produced by a natural cause; yet the mode is above nature; thus vision, given to a blind man, is supernatural; just as health given in an instant, which would require a very long duration, is above nature.

The FIRST opinion is, that the assent of infused faith is not supernatural as to substance, but only as to mode; and consequently the help of grace, which is required for the act of faith, is not required for the entity of the act, but only as to some mode added to such an entity. So Scotus 1. dist. 17. question 2. and quodl. 17. art. 3. and in 3. dist. 23. question unica; Although Suarez lib. 2. de gratia, cap. 4. tries to recall him to a better fruit. All the Scotists follow him, and the Nominalists at Mastrius disp. 6. question 6. So Ocham quodl. 13: question 7. Gabriel 3. dist. 23. question 2. Durandus 1. dist. 17. question 2. Bassolis 3. dist. 23. question un. Vulpes p. 2. tom. 2. disp. 52. art. 7. Caietanus p. 2. question 109. art. 4. and 2. 2. question 171. art. 2. ad 3. where he contends that this is the opinion of D. Thomas. Capreolus 1. dist. 17. question 1. art. 3. Palud. 3. dist. 23. question 3. §. 3. tertio dicendum.

The SECOND opinion asserts that it is substantially supernatural. So D. Bonaventure here, whom D. Thomas follows 1. 2. question 6. art. 2., and the Thomists, and all the Doctors of the Society of Jesus suppose it, Suarez loc. cit. cap. 4. and lib. de auxil. cap. 1. Vasquez prima 2. disp. 187. cap. 2. Coninck de actibus supernaturalibus disp. 4. dub. 3. Molina in concordia, question 14. art. 13. disp. 7. and disputation 14. member 1. although Lorca disp. 9. de gratia, adduces him to the contrary, because in in concordia, question 14. art. 13. disp. 14. and 15. he says that to believe, to love, and to hope are natural acts as to substance; but Lorca does not notice that he wills only what other Scholastics, with D. Thomas question 171. art. 2., have signified in the same manner of speaking: that those acts, according to the generic reason, or as far as the part of the object is concerned, can be natural. The same think Medina p. 2. question 62. art. 2. Bannes 2. 2. question 6. art. 1. Turrianus 2. 2. disp. 46. dub. 3. Lugo disp. 9. sect. 2. Amicus disp. 10. de fide, sect. 2. and other Recentiores everywhere, as Morandus in his single tractate, question 12. Peter a S. Joseph lib. 3. de fide, etc. cap. 3. resol. 5.

I ASSERT first, that the assent of faith is substantially supernatural.

It is PROVED first from D. Bonaventure on 6. John. This is the work of God, that you believe, where he was speaking of faith: And below: No man can come to me, unless the Father, who sent me, draw him. Then S. Doctor proves it in 1. dist. 21. question last ad 1. from Matth. 11. No one knoweth the Son, but the Father: neither doth anyone know the Father, but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal him. He urges this passage also in de 7. Itineribus Aeternitatis, dist. 5. of the third Itinerary, and Itinerary 5. dist. 4. where he brings together many passages of Scripture: Matth. 16. Flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but my Father. Psalm 84. I shall hear what the Lord God shall speak in me. Psalm 118. Reveal thou my eyes, and I shall consider the wondrous things of thy law. John 16. When the Paraclete shall come, he will teach you all things. 1 John 2. His unction will teach you of all things. 1 Cor. 2. But God hath revealed to us by his Spirit. And in 1. dist. 46. dub. 8. litt. he proves it by that 1 Corinthians 12. No man can say the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost.

He proves the same here from 1 Cor. 12. To another is given faith in the same Spirit: but he is speaking of graces freely given: Therefore also of the act of formless faith. Then from the Gloss on that 1 Cor. 13. And if I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, where he notes that it must be a gift of God, since it works miracles above nature.

He also brings forward that Rom. 8. You have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear. Now fear arises from formless faith, as the Council of Trent teaches.

FINALLY the Councils define that faith is supernatural and a gift of God. So the Second Council of Orange cap. 6. 8. 16. 25. and 27. Milevis cap. 4. Trident. sess. 6. can. 3. and cap. 5. 6. and 12. Celestine epist. 1. to the Bishops of Gaul. Innocent I. epist. 25. and 26. which are 92. and 93. among the epistles of D. Augustine. The same is taught everywhere by S. Augustine de praedest. Sanctorum; de bono perseverantiae. S. Prosper con. Collatorem, from cap. 36. and dub. 8. ad capit. Gallorum, and S. Fulgentius de Incar. cap. 8.

MASTRIUS ANSWERS that the Scriptures, the Councils, and the Fathers indeed require a special help of God for the act of faith, not on account of its substantial supernaturalness, but on account of its mode. Therefore he says the Tridentine Council declares the help of God necessary that the act of faith be elicited as it ought, namely for justification. Therefore the help of God is necessary that we assent to the articles as we ought, that is, on account of the testimony of God. And therefore the Council of Trent sess. 6. cap. 6., describing that faith which disposes to justification, says that it is that by which we are freely moved toward God, believing that the things which have been divinely revealed and promised are true. Therefore they require the infused habit for the infallibility of the assent, not for the substance.

But the formality of the Divine revelation is the essence of faith, not an accidental mode, nor is the infallibility of the assent the formality of the supernatural act; for the heretic also firmly assents to the articles in which he agrees with us; and yet that is not supernatural faith. Nor let Mastrius say that those articles are believed by the heretic with human faith; for he believes them as revealed in the divine Scriptures, to which he gives credence.

It is PROVED from D. Bonaventure secondly, by a reason deduced from this. By no natural or acquired habit is the intellect raised above itself, so as to assent to the First Truth for its own sake, and above all things: But by the habit of faith the intellect is raised in the manner said: Therefore.

It is PROVED thirdly from D. Bonaventure. That which produces substantially supernatural effects is of the same order, because there is no effect above the cause; but faith is the cause of miracles, not only according to the subject or mode, but also according to substance: Therefore. The minor is proved Matth. 7. and at the end Act. 19. and elsewhere.

It is PROVED fourthly in the body of the text. That which takes away from faith the reason of virtue takes away the substantial reason; but to believe from a human motive takes away the reason of virtue from faith: Therefore. The major is evident. The minor is proved; for to believe a man speaking is not praiseworthy in itself, but indeed often blameworthy.

It is PROVED fifthly from S. Doctor in the body of the text, because if, as to mode only, of greater certainty, help were given for the act of faith; it would follow that nature could, of itself, without elevation above nature, attain that greater intensity, if an intense cogitation were given in the order of nature: But this is false: Therefore. The minor is proved from 1 Timothy 1. I have obtained the mercy of God, that I may be faithful, where, as S. Augustine rightly weighs, he did not say that I may be more faithful, but that I may be faithful. See Cardinal de Lugo num. 33. Suarez tom. 4. in 3. p. disp. 3. sect. 6. and Vasq. 1. 2. disp. 187. cap. 2.

From what has been said I conclude that the faithful have a permanent habitual gift for believing; otherwise they would not permanently have the help, so that whenever they will, they may elicit the act of faith. That this habit is given is so certain that it cannot be denied without temerity and error, as Lugo observes disp. 9. sect. 3., Salas tom. 2. in primam 2. tract. 10. disp. 3. sect. 4 and others at him, who indeed say that it is of faith. It was defined in the Council of Trent sess. 6. cap. 7. and in the Council of Mainz, celebrated in the year 1549.; and Peter John, in the time of Innocent III. was for this reason condemned and exhumed. See Lugo.

You will OBJECT first with Mastrius, that the Councils speak of the acts of the way and of the acts of the fatherland with such diversity; for toward the latter they require supernatural help; but for the acts of the way they do not require absolutely the help of grace, but that they be made as they ought: Therefore they signify that these are not absolutely supernatural, but by reason of mode, so that there are given other acts of these virtues which are not as they ought, namely proportionate to justification, but natural: Thus Aversa urges p. 2. question 55. sect. 4.

It is ANSWERED, that that clause is added to define what pertains only to faith; because the Fathers of the Council knew that the opinions of the Nominalists and others existed, saying that natural acts of these virtues are given; and of others denying that the habits of Faith, Hope, and Charity are infused for supernatural acts, because the Council of Vienna had accepted the assertive part only as the more probable. Therefore the Council of Trent, willing to eradicate every contrary opinion, defines that the virtues are infused for these acts, although it does not call them habits, as Vega observes lib. 7. in Trident. cap. 24., who was himself present at it. The same says Soto, an eyewitness lib. 2. de natura, et gratia, cap. 19. Therefore the Council does not suppose that there are given other natural acts of these virtues and others as they ought, but whatever is opinionatively circulated, it decrees that these acts are supernatural, and that for eliciting them habits are infused for eliciting their substance simply.

But suppose it grants that there are given some natural acts similar to them, imitating those which are perfect as they ought; it is not inferred that true acts of faith, resting on human authority, are given, as Coninck notes from D. Bonaventure in the body of the text.

Mastrius INSISTS. If the mind of the Council was that we can elicit acts indeed similar, but not of the same substantial reason; there was no reason for adding as it ought, but it would have said absolutely that the acts of faith cannot be elicited; just as the Council of Vienna speaks absolutely, that a special help is necessary for seeing God.

I shall say, that the Council of Trent adds that clause to exclude all acts whatsoever that were circulated as sufficient, even as to mode supernatural, introduced by Scotus and his followers, and on that account to define the necessity of the infused habits; and although it does not define as to this, it nevertheless defines as to excluding other opinions, asserting that natural acts of the virtues of Faith, Hope, etc. are given; and that these suffice — which nevertheless are not acts of true virtue of faith, as S. Bonaventure teaches in the body of the text. The Council of Vienna, however, speaks absolutely, because the Beguines and Beghards, against whom it acts, ascribed to natural intellectual virtue the efficacious power of seeing God; nor was anything else circulated. And if you say that then the writings of Scotus existed, saying that God can by absolute power raise someone with natural powers to seeing God, or at least that the light of glory is not necessary. I say, that first thing is not asserted by Scotus, nor is he rightly involved among the Beghards; rather it is related in his life that he died of the pains that assailed him, bathed in sweat, after the disputation against the Beghards; nor did the Council wish to condemn the opinion of Scotus, who judges that yet an actual help is required, substantially necessary, as is evident I. dist. 6. question 2. art. 1. but on this p. 1. tract. 1. disp. 11. from num. 145.

You will OBJECT secondly with Scotus 1. dist. 17. question 2. and quodl. 17. art. 2. If the act of faith were substantially of a higher order, such that man cannot attain such acts with his own powers, as to physical entity; man could know that he is in grace from the promptitude and facility with which he would experience in himself the crediting and loving of God, and everyone would know by experience when he exercises supernatural acts.

It is ANSWERED first from D. Bonaventure dist. 25. that knowing faith implies nothing; but it does not follow that one knows that he is in grace, because many unknown things are required for this, as, that that act of charity be above all, while I can have, from vincible ignorance, aversion from God, and conversion to some created object. Further, Cardinal Lugo proceeds disp. 5. sect. 7., and exceeding, receding disp. 5. sect. 7. num. 115. Then Scotus's inference does not follow (let them say secondly) because from infused faith alone one cannot elicit an act of believing, from Scotus quodl. 14 art. 1. H. and Mastr. 191. Therefore he does not argue well here, that I, eliciting a supernatural act of faith, already clearly recognize it, because a natural act is mixed with it, which does not allow him to distinguish it from the supernatural act. Add, that the habit does not at once give that facility, for we experience that such acts are arduous. Hence neither do we perceive the habit immediately by touch; and the facility, if any comes, you ascribe to the acquired habit.

You will OBJECT thirdly. That which can be actualized by another is not of a different order from it: the natural act is perfectible by the supernatural: Therefore.

It is ANSWERED easily, that the natural act has its ultimate specific gradual being, nor is it potential as to the supernatural act except by moral potency, and that they are twins specifically distinct. So also natural and supernatural potency differ in genus.