Question V: Whether hope is a virtue

The holy Doctor prefaces that Hope is sometimes taken for the affection: and thus the Philosophers and the holy Fathers say there are four affections of the soul: Joy, and Sorrow, Hope, and Fear. Sometimes it is taken for the thing expected, or hoped for, Tit. 2.: Waiting for the blessed hope. But it is taken thirdly for the habit directing the motion and affection of the soul toward that which is to be expected.

I assert first, that Hope is a Virtue.

It is proved from D. Bonaventure foundation 3. A habit repugnant to fault is a virtue; Hope is repugnant to Presumption and Despair: Therefore.

It is proved secondly from the holy Doctor foundation 4., by the argument which D. Thomas uses: A habit rectifying the soul is a Virtue: for Virtue is a habit regulative and confirmative of a power, which makes the soul rejoice in those things which are right, as the Philosopher says, 2. Eth. cap. 3. 4. and 6. and 2. Rhet. and 7. Eth. cap. 14. Hope is of this kind. But there is a twofold rule, or measure, of human acts: One proximate and homogeneous, that is, reason: Another supreme and exceeding, that is, God; and on this account every act reaching to reason and to God is good; but the act of hope reaches to God: for the object of hope is the arduous good, possible to be had: Now something is possible to us in a twofold way: First, by ourselves. Secondly, by others, as is evident 3. Eth. cap. 3. Therefore insofar as we hope for something possible by the aid of God, our Hope reaches to God himself, on whose aid it rests. Therefore Hope is a Virtue, and indeed a supernatural and gratuitous one.

I assert therefore secondly, that Hope is a gratuitous virtue.

It is proved from St. Bonaventure first. That which makes one attain to salvation is from grace. Such is Hope, as is said Rom. 8.: For we are saved by hope: Therefore.

It is proved secondly. That which renders acceptable to God is gratuitous: Such is Hope, Psal. 32.: The Lord is well pleased in them that fear him; and in them that hope in his mercy: Therefore.

It is proved thirdly. A habit directly repugnant to a fault which immediately attains God is a supernatural virtue. Such is Hope, repugnant to presumption of beatitude without merits, and to despair of the Divine mercy: Therefore.

It is proved fourthly. To expect that which is above every grasp of the natural appetite is as believing everything that is above every grasp of the intellect: But from this head Faith is a supernatural virtue: Therefore also Hope, which expects the things that transcend our heart, as is said 1 Corinth. 2.

Finally it is proved on the last foundation, and in the body of the text, by the argument made for the first assertion.

YOU OBJECT first. No passion is a virtue, ex 2. Eth. cap. 5. and lib. 3. where he says: In the soul there are three things, Powers, Passions, and Habits; but virtue is concerned among the habits. But hope is a passion ex Boët. de consol. Therefore.

The holy Doctor answers that Hope is taken here as it is regulative of the passions, and it is a Virtue.

YOU OBJECT secondly. As it happens to expect future things, so to remember past things: But this is not a virtue: Therefore neither that; for Hope is either the expectation of future things, or arises from it.

He answers by denying the parity; for virtue stands more in regulating actions to be done than in acts. Moreover remembering stands in Cognition; but expectation in the Affective; and virtue regards more the regulating of the affect. Hence also the act of virtue is linked to remuneration, as it is joined to affection: for instance, that of prudence, or penance, or charity, insofar as it recalls past deeds done, that it may act better in the future; or past evils, that it may sorrow; or benefits, that it may give thanks.

YOU OBJECT thirdly. As it happens to hope rightly, so also to fear rightly: but the habit which directs the soul in fearing is not a virtue: Therefore.

The holy Doctor answers by denying the parity, because Fear stands in recoiling; Hope in pursuing: and therefore Fear has more of passion; Hope indeed of action; and because the habits of the virtues direct the soul in those acts in which the rectitude of life consists, according to that which is said: Virtue is a good quality of the mind, whereby one lives rightly; hence it is that Hope is more in the genus of virtue than Fear. Hence also it is clear why the habit of virtue stands more about the affection of Hope than about the other three affections related above; for Joy, and Sorrow, because they have a conjoined object, stand more in sustaining; but the affection of Hope, among the others, stands more in acting; and therefore although, as it is a passion, it is not a virtue, yet as it is the stretching forth of the soul toward the thing hoped for, it is a virtue.

YOU OBJECT fourthly: Every moral virtue stands about the good and the difficult, ex Aristotle 2. Eth. cap. 3. But in the expectation of the goods promised by God there is no difficulty, since God cannot lie: Therefore.

He answers, that as to believe the things which are naturally proved to us is easy, so also to hope for what is naturally obvious: But to hope for supernatural things, which neither sense nor intellect perceives, and to despise our goods for these, is arduous and worthy of great praise.

YOU OBJECT fifthly. No gratuitous virtue in its act is repugnant to the perfection of merit; but Hope in its act is repugnant to the perfection of merit; for it proceeds from imperfection that anyone serve God on account of a future retribution; because, as St. Bernard says de diligendo Deo, cap. 4.: Charity does not look upon the reward. But Hope makes one expect a future retribution for merits: Therefore it is not a gratuitous virtue.

The holy Doctor answers first, that the act of Hope does not diminish merit; but, as the Apostle says, it rises up from the perfection of merit: For the greater merits anyone has, the more firmly and more certainly does he hope. Nor is detracted from Charity the expecting of God himself, whom it loves, as the reward wherewith it may be united; for the greatest charity most of all desires to be united to God. But this reward we hope for, as is had Genes. 15.: I am thy reward exceeding great. And the holy Doctor shows this a posteriori: for the true Saints, who expect beatitude, are little solicitous about themselves; much about God. Thus they despise all things, that they may be united to God in the fatherland.

MOREOVER, the mercenary Hope is evil in that it places the end in its own advantage, as Caspensis also says sect. 4.; but to serve God on account of a reward according to the Divine will, which declares that he wills to give it, Matth. 20.: Call the workmen, and pay them their reward; is not a defect, but an honest act, as the Council of Trent defines, sess. 6. cap. 11. and can. 31.: If anyone shall say that the justified sins, while he does good works in view of an eternal reward; let him be anathema. The Fathers of the Council prove this from Psal. 118.: I have inclined my heart to do thy justifications in eternity, on account of the retribution. And Hebr. 11. Paul reports that Moses, most holy, underwent most studious labors, because he looked upon the recompense. Therefore God often proposes the sweetness of the reward, Deuter. 11., Apoc. ult. For it is honest to seek one's own last end.

Hence against the Sectaries I hold that it is honest to expect eternal glory, as the crown of labors. For thus also Paul, 2. Timot. 4.: I have fought the good fight, etc. Therefore there is laid up for me a crown of justice. And Tobias 4.: Great will be the confidence before the most high God for alms to all those who do it. I add, that it is lawful to hope also from prayers, and studious works, for a temporal good, provided that in this the last end is not placed.