Question XXVIII: Whether the difference between faith and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object

This difficulty is common also to the other virtues: whether natural and supernatural acts always differ from their objects, formal objects certainly; for the material object can be attained by several virtues.

The first opinion is negative; for although very many differ thus, still other natural acts differ from supernatural ones only on the part of the principle, inasmuch as one requires to be made by a solely natural principle, while the other requires to arise from a supernatural principle. So Scotus 3. dist. 25. quaest. 2. and dist. 27. quaest. 1. whom the Scotists follow, as Mastrius disp. 6. quaest. 7. and Molina in concordia, disput. 7. and disp. 13. and 14. and disp. 52. Coninck de supernaturalitate actuum, disp. 5. dub. 1. 2. and 3. Granado in p. 1. in prooem. disp. 5. sect. 4 num 13. and quaest. 12. tract. 5. disp. 8. num. 6. and 1. 2. tract. 1. disp. 4. sect. 3. Salas in primam 2. tom. 2. tract. 11. disput. 6. THE SECOND opinion is that these acts differ from the formal object. So St. Bonaventure in 3. dist. 23. art. 2. quaest. 3. Cajetan, Conrad, and Medina as at Salas loc. cit. Vasquez tom. 1. in primam secundae, disp. 86. cap. 6. and tom. 2. disp. 195. cap. 3. Suarez lib. 2. de gratia, cap. 11. and tom. 4. in 3. p. disp. 3. sect. 6. num. 10. and the following section. The same Turrianus opusc. 2. de gratia, disp. 8. and opusc. 13. dub. 3. Curiel in the present quaest. 109. art. 1. dub. 3. §. 4. Tanner. Bannes, Amicus disp. 10. sect. 4. and others as at Mastrius disp. 6. quaest. 7. in 3. Cardinal de Lugo disp. 9. sect. 1. The Mediator comes forward saying that, possibly, an act of natural virtue and an infused one are not distinguished on the part of the formal object; in fact, however, natural acts are given around the same object as supernatural ones.

I ASSERT with the second opinion that supernatural acts differ from natural acts by the formal object.

It is PROVED first here by St. Bonaventure from the Scriptures, Councils, and Fathers alleged in the preceding question, which distinguish supernatural acts as substantially requiring the help of Divine grace in order to attain their object. Hence the Second Council of Orange, can. 5. and 25. condemns those who say that the faith by which we believe in God is natural, as he confirms by the testimony of the Apostle Philip. 1. To you it is given for Christ, not only to believe in him, etc. And the Council of Trent sess. 6. cap. 6. teaches that man is disposed to justification while he is freely moved to believe in God that those things which he has said are true. And this is that as is fitting, can. 3. From these the Holy Doctor draws the fourth fundamental argument, on which he relies in the body: By no natural or acquired habit is the intellect raised above itself, so as to assent to the first truth for its own sake, and above all things: Therefore the habit of Inform Faith has acts from the object not attainable by natural or acquired virtue, by reason of the object. On this argument Suarez relies, lib. 2. de gratia, cap. 11. It is confirmed, moreover, because the supernatural virtues would be superfluous, if their object could be attained by nature. And if the act is supernatural, it must be occupied about an object of a higher order, not attainable by natural virtue; and thus exceed the mode of acting of the natural potency.

Mastrius ANSWERS num. 223. that although the supernatural object, say God as beatifying supernaturally, cannot first be attained without revelation, nevertheless what is revealed can be naturally desired, or the Mystery believed with someone narrating it; and then the supernatural object does not exercise the reason of its supernaturalness; and thus with respect to such an act it is not a supernatural object in the act exercised; but only in the act signified. Therefore the supernaturalness of the act is not attended to on the part of the object; but on the part of the subject.

Yet this stinks badly, and savors of Pelagianism, that after revelation has been made man could believe by his own powers; for he always needs, by virtue of supernatural help, otherwise at the first elicited act, the help of God would be superfluous for subsequent ones, by reason of the excellence of the object, which always sufficiently exceeds natural powers.

Suarez URGES: If anyone could attain by a natural act the truth of God as revealing the Mystery of the Incarnation, that act will be as certain as the supernatural one: Therefore it will have every condition in order to salvation, and will be as is fitting. It is confirmed; for since Trent defines that the gift of the Holy Spirit is necessary that anyone may be able to believe, hope, love and repent, as is fitting; he speaks also of the believer, who otherwise also had similar acts, while he was otherwise converted; otherwise someone could be converted a tenth time by natural powers.

Arriaga ANSWERS sect. 2. that the Philosopher can assent by a natural act to this article: God is one, with as much certainty as is assented to from revelation, on the part of the object; wherefore he says, help is required not on account of certainty; but on account of proportion with grace, which is supernatural.

But Mastrius, conceding that it is required on account of greater certainty as well, denies that the assent of the philosopher would be equally certain as that of the believer.

Suarez INSISTS that each relies on the truth of God, which is one.

Mastrius ANSWERS that the philosopher relies on the truth of God, known by human faith, which is fallible, and therefore that act is not so certain.

YET the Holy Doctor ARGUES better, and urges, from the disproportion of the object, on account of which the help of God is still necessary; otherwise the help would be superfluous, if nature could attain it; for the Truth of God is regarded by a supernatural act for its own sake, as the Holy Doctor says, but the truth is regarded by the philosopher on account of natural reasons, which are of a lower order.

It is PROVED second by St. Bonaventure in 3. dist. 13. quaest. 3. ad 1. and dist. 26. quaest. 2. ad 1. Virtues and habits are specified by acts; and acts by formal objects: Therefore virtues of diverse species must have objects of diverse species; but infused and acquired faith are of diverse species: therefore they must have objects of diverse species. It is confirmed from St. Bonaventure loc. cit. in 3. whom Scotus follows 3. dist. 23. §. ad quaestionem; and quodl. 14. ac. 17. where he distinguishes infused faith from acquired on the part of the motive and the formal object; because infused faith relies on the immediate testimony of God, beneath which falsehood cannot subsist. But acquired faith relies on created testimony, beneath which falsehood can subsist.

Mastrius ANSWERS num. 228. from what was said num. 208. that virtues indeed of the same order have a diverse object, but not so virtues of diverse orders, because they are often subordinate; for to the supernatural habit is subordinated the habit of the natural order, as to its proper rule.

CONTRA; because subordination, or subalternation always adds something, accidental indeed to the subalternating, but essential to the subalternated. Thus Perspective adds to the Geometric object, which is figure, being visual; and Music to Arithmetic, of numbers, being of sounds; whence the subalternating is always distinct as to object. Next it is false that the natural habit is subalternated to the supernatural, first, because the latter contains more than the natural. Then, because for this reason supernatural things require the help of God, because they exceed the whole order of nature; otherwise if such an object can be attained by natural virtue, grace is certainly superfluous, which is Pelagian, as Suarez also infers. I suppose, moreover, that they are supernatural substantially, but grant it as to mode; still that mode cannot be attained, and is essential to that habit: and it adds a new formal reason, because by this it transcends the power of nature. That it constitutes the formal reason is proved; because the honesty of that virtue, as far as we are concerned, with divine revelation removed, holds itself as the object; for it moves to that virtue under this reason, as Lugo advertises num. 19.

But Mastrius ANSWERS 232. and Lugo num. 25. that the necessity of grace is not destroyed by that opinion; because this necessity is not proved from the motive or the object, but from the proportion which these acts have with supernatural beatitude, to which faith is ordered, and from the excellent mode of attaining such an object.

BUT on the contrary it was shown above that this supernaturalness is substantial to the acts, and accordingly arises from the objects from which the acts are specified, according to the doctrine of Aristotle.

You will object first. Natural and supernatural love of God regard the same object, namely the divine goodness. And if you say that natural love regards God as the author of nature, but supernatural love as the author of supernatural gifts: Scotus REPLIES 3. dist. 27. quaest. unica, art. 2. grant some diversity comes from this in the love of concupiscence; nevertheless none will come in the love of friendship, by which God is loved for his own sake, and by which he is good in himself.

But in truth I answer, that the love of friendship also regards God as a good by absolute goodness, which is supernaturally communicable, and indeed this known and objected through revelation; but that he is loved by natural love of friendship as a good by goodness communicable through nature, naturally objected. From which the opposition of Mastrius num. 215. and of Coninck disp. 5. dubio 3. also collapses.

You will object secondly. If acquired virtue cannot tend to the same object to which infused tends, we would easily discern when we elicit an act of Faith, and of supernatural Charity; and accordingly we would know ourselves constituted in the grace of God.

It is answered from what was said in the preceding quaest., that it is not certain to me that the supernatural object is loved above all things, because by invincible ignorance there can be some obstacle of sin.

You will object thirdly. When someone narrates to me that the Son of God was incarnate, or another similar article, I naturally hear those voices, and can naturally conceive that whole supernatural object; and then the will can be borne to such an object with love, loving Christ, emptied for me, so that this may be the motive reason. So Mastrius, and Auversa.

It is answered from St. Bonaventure. that hearing that is indeed the material [element] of faith, but formally it is not perceived by assent, or not thought by assent, as faith requires, unless the Divine light be present, or the habit of faith, without which he will not assent to any article, nor believe, nor apprehend it as possible; since it is against the course of nature, and consequently neither will he love.

You will insist. By acquired faith anyone can believe God to be Triune, even after becoming a heretic he loses faith, then he believes that by human faith, even if he believes by the motive of the first truth revealing in the same way as before he believed clothed with faith; otherwise he would acknowledge that he has lost faith.

They commonly answer from St. Bonaventure. that the heretic believes the Mystery of the Trinity in a diverse manner before the fall, and after he has lost faith, denying e. g. the Church, and still believing the Trinity: for before he believed immediately, as revealed by divine faith; now however by human faith; And indeed that revelation enters the formal object I showed quaest. 2. Therefore he no longer believes revelation, or the divine truth revealing, while he denies the Church, through which it is revealed; and moreover he has a perverse affection about the motives of faith, and about the formal object, which Arriaga disp. 14. num. 18. and Mastrius, n. 219. undeservedly deny. Nor does he sufficiently advert to the difference of assents, because in these internal acts natural and supernatural motives are found, as Suarez advertises lib. 2. de gratia, cap. 11. nor is it so easy as Arriaga and Mastrius feign to themselves.

You will object fourthly. Grant that the distinction of objects would infer the distinction of acts; nevertheless the specific unity of the object does not always conclude the unity of act and potency, because potencies diverse in species, by acts diverse in species, can be occupied about the same object, not only material; but even formal. It is proved. For the same object is the object of every intellect of the blessed, and also of every will of the blessed, and yet volition is not of the same species as intellection. Nor did Aristotle say that acts have unity from the unity of the object, but distinction. And although acts are specified on account of objects, they are not nevertheless specified as from an adequate principle; for they are specified also in order to the principles; indeed more from those on which they more depend.

It is answered according to the oft-repeated principle of Scotus, that the same principle is constitutive and distinctive, giving to being [to be] one and in itself undivided, and distinct from any other; and accordingly if acts specify, or the specified show objects, they give them both. But what he says about intellect and will is most false; for they are borne to the material object by entirely diverse formal reasons. The Intellect, taking into itself the object, as true, for knowledge; the Will, going forth outside with love to the good, just as among all [authors] these potencies are also diverse. I equally deny what he said about the principle; for the potencies, which are principles, are made so much the more diverse inasmuch as they are so instituted for such operations, and accordingly natural potencies in order to various acts have been made various. Whence it comes about that the whole reason of diversity is excellently taken from the acts.

You will object fifthly. Let certain virtues be compared as to their acts. Natural mercy is borne to the needy, that it may relieve him; so also infused [mercy] is borne to the needy by the same motive of piety. So natural and infused Justice are borne to the restitution of a stolen thing, on account of the turpitude of theft.

It is answered with Vasquez, that they have a diverse formal object; for natural Justice and Mercy regard the neighbor as a political fellow-citizen; but infused [Justice and Mercy regard the neighbor] as joined to him in Christ, as a member of one body of the Church, and thus the virtues are distinguished; for as Aristotle says 3. Polit. cap. 3. Virtues are distinguished according to the diverse polities to which they order the subject.

But what Lugo explains num. 9. is against experience, and against the reason of merit; for thus one acting from a natural motive merits nothing, and Preachers ought to advert to this, lest so many works perish.

The Holy Doctor resolves it in the Diaeta, at the end of title 1. that one must admonish him who makes alms, with what end he expends it, that he may obtain the merit of alms; for not every end is sufficient; but a supernatural end proportioned to the reward. Therefore at the end of the world the kingdom of heaven will be given with these words: For I was hungry, and you gave me to eat, etc. not because it is necessary to intend giving to Christ; but to give to the needy on account of the divine command.