Question IV: How, and when, children are bound to relieve their parents

I HAVE said in the first question, in expounding the definition of Piety, that children are bound to supply their parents with food and clothing in their necessities. But certain difficulties occur.

The FIRST is; whether children are bound to nourish heretical parents, and some assert it. So Azorius Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 3. quaestio 2. Glossa 12. cap. 1. verbo fidelis, d. 30. Castro lib. 2. de iusta haeret. punit. cap. 7. who says that a heretical father is to be preferred to a Catholic stranger.

The SECOND opinion asserts in extreme necessity, but not in grave. So Cara l. 6. quis a liberis, §. et si impubes, ff. de lib. agnosc. Sardus de alim. tit. 7. Sanchez lib. 2. decal. cap. 24. Fagundez lib. 4. cap. 2. num. 6.

NAY, Fagundez adds, nor are they bound in extreme necessity, if the parents try to lead them into error against the faith, and refuse to desist. So it seems D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 101. art. 4. ad 1. expounding Lucae 14. Si quis venit ad me, et non odit patrem suum, etc. non potest meus esse discipulus. The same S. Bonaventure indicates in his Commentary on that passage.

MOREOVER the holy Doctor asserts in 4. d. 18. part. 2. quaest. 5. in corpore, that aid must be brought not only to excommunicate parents of whatever kind, but even to strangers in necessity, when they have nothing by which to be sustained. This seems to require extreme necessity, yet not clearly; for it can also be understood of grave necessity.

I ASSERT first, that it is more probable that a son is bound to nourish heretical parents only in extreme necessity.

It is PROVED first. Fathers are bound to their sons by a stronger bond of natural law than sons to fathers; for nature descends from parents to children, not the reverse: But Catholic fathers are not bound to nourish heretical sons, unless they be in extreme need, as Surdus proves tit. 7. quaest. 2. Therefore.

It is PROVED second, because a Father can deprive a heretical son of the inheritance, as is clear from Authent. Ut cum, de appellat. cognosc. §. causas, et l. Regia Hispanae 7. tit. 7. part. 6. et l. Lusitana, l. 4. novae recopil. tit. 88. Now it is the common opinion, as at Molina de primog. lib. 2. cap. 16. Azor. tom. 2. lib. 2. quaestio 6. cap. 5. Sanchez, and Fagundez loc. cit. that in all cases in which parents can disinherit their children, they can also, apart from extreme necessity, deny them maintenance: Therefore.

From this understand what the l. Hispana 8. tit. 23. part. 1. infers, defining that a needy heretical father is to be preferred to a Catholic stranger, in the alms to be bestowed by the son; for it is understood in extreme necessity, as Surdus notes tract. de alim. tit. 1. quaest. 18. et 19. and as the holy Doctor indicates in corpore, loc. cit. when he places first the parents, then the excommunicate pilgrims, when they have nothing by which to be sustained.

A QUESTION arises: Whether the fisc is bound to maintain the alimony of Catholic children from goods devolved to it from a heretical Father. Of this great controversy Peregrinus treats de iure fisci, lib. 5. tit. 1. Farinacius tom. 1. part. 1. tit. de delictis, et poenis, quaest. 24.

The FIRST opinion is that, in the goods of the father being made public, the alimony cannot be computed, nay not even the children's legitima. Many among those cited follow it, to whom I add Guilielmus, Benedictus, citing Raynutius under the word, et uxorem, decis. 5. num. 286. de testam. It seems D. Bonaventure's in 4. loco citato.

The second opinion teaches that children can be denied alimony from their father's published goods by the Inquisitors and the fisc, on account of these two crimes only, namely heresy, and the crime of lèse-majesté. Fagundez says it is today the common one lib. 4. cap. 1. referring to many, with Sanchez lib. 2. Decal. cap. 16.

I assert that the first opinion is probable, namely that the children's alimony is not to be computed in the Father's goods.

It is proved first by the argument of S. Bonavent. 3. with the explanation of the body added. The fisc succeeds to the father's goods: But a father cannot deny his son alimony in extreme necessity. And certainly it seems barbarity, toward infant children, after the inheritance and legitima have been snatched away, finally to deny them even alimony, and to punish the sins of parents in children against Divine law.

Nor let Fagundez say that only the Father is punished. For let it be that the father too is punished as to the patrimony of the inheritance; yet as to the denying of alimony, it is rather the son who is punished. For if any penalties whatever could be imposed to terrify delinquents, it would be lawful also to burn children alive.

It is confirmed, for on account of the crime of heresy of the son himself, his castrensial or quasi-castrensial goods, which belong entirely to the same son himself, cannot be proscribed, as very many teach, whom Sanchez cites lib. 2. cap. 15. to whom I add Diana part. 4. Tract. 8. de Inquisit. resol. 61. Sanctarellus de haeresi, cap. 18. d. 1. and it is clear from l. si filius, C. de bonis damn. Therefore much less, on account of the father's offense, are the son's alimony and maintenance, which are owed to the son by natural law more than castrensial goods, to be proscribed.

You will object first. A parent can subject all his goods to a mortgage by contract: Therefore much more by offense.

It is answered first, by denying the Antecedent; for this would be impious, even if valid; for it is against the law of natural piety.

You will object second, cap. Vergentis, de haereticis, where the Pontiff takes away entirely all succession from the children as to the goods of heretical fathers, and commands, with them wholly disinherited, that all the goods be made public.

It is answered, that odious laws are not to be extended. Now the Pontiff commands that the inheritance be proscribed, but not that alimony be taken from the children, because that would be against natural law.

I confess however that the opposite opinion is also probable.

¶ Under what law then are children bound to minister alimony to their parents; I say they are bound by natural law, as the Theologians commonly teach, with D. Bonavent. serm. 5. in decem praecepta, and in other places adduced quaest. 1. It is proved by S. Bonaventure because nature there binds more strongly, where there is the greater debt; but children owe more to their parents, from whom they have being, than parents to children. And they say this is by natural law: Therefore. See on this matter Fagundez loc. cit. and Rebellius de oblig. iust. part. 2. lib. 5. quaest. 8.

And it is so true, that in extreme necessity children are bound more to their parents than to their own children, as the Theologians teach, with D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 26. art. 8. ad 3. and D. Bonavent. as I showed, Tract. de charitate, de ordine charitatis, where I also discussed what is to be done in grave necessity.

But in either necessity of parents it is not lawful for children to abandon them and enter religion. So D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 101. art. 4. ad 4. Toletus lib. 5. summae, cap. 1. Alens. 3. p. quaest. 33. m. 4. quaest. 2. Angelus verb. Religio, num. 32. Rosella 2. num. 7. Sylvest. quaesito 7. Azor. tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 3. quaesito 5. with D. Bonavent. serm. 5. in 4. praecept. et loco cit. in 4. This also is true, if such a necessity begins during the novitiate, as is clear. But in doubt whether the necessity be grave and otherwise not removable, it seems to be in the son's discretion to choose either. See the Doctors also in Bassaeus, V. filius, num. 7.

For one who has a vow of entering religion ought not to enter, while the necessity of his parents lasts: yet if he enters and makes profession, he will sin; nevertheless his profession will be valid; for no law annulling it is found, as Fagundez notes num. 10.

But the grave doubt is: whether, in the necessity of his parents, a son who has made profession in religion is bound to leave it, when he cannot come to their aid in Religion.

In extreme necessity certainly all confess they are bound, as is seen in Sanchez lib. 4. Decal. cap. 20. Bassaeus num. 8. Fagundez num. 21. nor does D. Thom. quaest. 101. art. 4. ad 4. contradict this, as Fagundez thinks.

The question then is in grave necessity, if, remaining in religion, he cannot come to their aid.

The FIRST opinion is that he is bound, the faculty asked, even if not obtained. So Ancona de potestate Papae, quaest. 5. art. 1. Henriq. quaest. 6. quaest. 6. Iansen. in concord. Euang. cap. 60. Viguer. lib. 6. Instit. moral. cap. 6. §. 7. Corduba in Reg. Minorum, cap. 2. quaest. 6. art. 2.

The SECOND opinion is, that he is bound, if the necessity existed before his profession, but not if it came afterward. So Nauar. in man. cap. 14. Tolet. lib. 5. cap. 1. Lopez p. p. Instruct. cap. 34. Rodrig. tom. 1. summae, cap. 6. Cucus lib. 3. Instit. maiorat. tit. 1. num. 126. Bassaeus num. 8. Sanch. summ. lib. 4. cap. 20. num. 14.

The THIRD opinion is, that he is not bound, whenever the necessity may have arisen; yet he can leave, the faculty asked, even if not obtained. So Sà verb. Religio, num. 2. Rosella ibi verb. Religio 2. num. 7. D. Antonin. 3. part. tit. 16. cap. 2. Armilla verb. Pietas. Tabiena ibi. Corduba in summa, quaest. 141. art. 2. Angles flor. 3. part. quaest. un. de voto, art. 2. diffic. 13. Passarellus de privil. minorum, cap. 42. Rodriguez tom. 2. qq. Regularium. Alens. 3. part. q. 33. m. 4. art. 1. Fagundez num. 27. and others.

To me the first opinion seems more probable, because when several laws concur, the higher law ought to prevail; but to succor one's parents is pure natural law, and the first law in the order of charity toward one's neighbor: Therefore the vows of Religion cannot be made absolutely to the prejudice of that law, but conditionally, unless the bond of natural law be repugnant.

Fagundez answers num. 25. that vows are conditional as to extreme necessity, but not as to grave.

But this author ought here to have recalled that he taught, num. 14. et cap. 5. that even in grave necessity the natural precept of coming to the aid of parents presses.

You will say. Sons are not bound to leave their wife, that they may come to the aid of their parents, nor are clerics bound to take up the name of soldiery, that they may succor them, even if no other way be available: Therefore neither are they bound to abandon Religion, when they have delivered themselves to the power of the Prelates.

It is answered, that these assumptions are beside the point. And first I say that the bond of marriage is indeed of absolute natural right, nor does dissolving the bond of marriage help toward aiding parents. For meanwhile he ought, if he can, to aid his parents, even in marriage.

To what is said of soldiery, I answer, that one can also follow the soldiery, if no other way of aiding his parents be available; and acquire castrensial goods; but what then? Can he not accomplish the same with quasi-castrensial goods in the clerical state? As to the power of the Prelates, it is clear that it is conditional, without prejudice to the precepts of nature.

I ADD also that the habit can be laid aside, if otherwise he cannot exercise the work of piety in this case, as Fagundez num. 28. notes.

It is ALSO ASKED: when parents are in extreme necessity, and the son's creditor, is the latter bound rather to the parents than to the creditor.

I SAY, he is bound rather to the parents, and to himself, for in such necessity the debt of justice ceases, because all things, as to their use, are common leg. 2. §. Cum in eadem, ff. ad legem Rhodiamam de iactu. So also think Azor tract. 2. lib. 12. cap. 8. quaest. 5. Paludan. 4. dist. 15. quaest. 2. art. 1. Sotus lib. 4. de Iustitia, quaest. 7. art. 1. Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 5 ad 4. Tabiena verb. restitut. quaest. 4. Fagundez lib. 4. cap. 2. num. 30. Nay, as to dominion all things are common, as I said.

By the argument cited is also solved the adverse reason of those teaching that a son is bound to his creditors, because he is bound to them by a double bond, namely of Charity, and of justice. For I say the bond of justice ceases.

NOR will he be bound to restore to the creditor, if he should be restored to prosperous fortune.

The reason is, because from the beginning all things were common, and they were divided by the law of nations with this condition, that they return in that part which is necessary in extremity; otherwise the law would have been imprudent and unjust. See Fagundez num. 32.

It is ALSO ASKED: whether elder sons, who have received nothing from their parents beyond the bare right of primogeniture, are bound to pay their parents' debts from the means of the maioratus.

The COMMON answer, as at Fagundez num. 33. is that if the debts were contracted before the institution of the maioratus, those goods could not be bound to them; since they were debts owed to creditors; but if he contracted them after the institution of the maioratus. The true opinion asserts he is bound. So many Jurists, whom he adduces and follows, Fagundez lib. 4. cap. 2. num. 34.

It is PROVED, because those debts of the parents were converted to the utility of the sons, to whom the bound goods and maioratus pertain. Therefore they are bound to pay them, if he is not solvent who received them, leg. ei qui, §. Alioquin, Cod. eum eo, et leg. His solis, ff. de condit. indebit. ut exponit Glossa.

YET I do not deny that the opposite opinion is also probable, as at Fagundez num. 35.