Question VIII: How the accused ought to conduct himself in his examination, when pressed by the judge's unjust questions

Judges are accustomed to tender to the Accused an oath concerning the truth to be told, according to the opinion of Bartolus on the Leg. Inter omnes, §. recte, ff. de furtis, and the common opinion at August. ad Ang. de malef. on the verse, Comperuerunt. And in the Leg. 1. Cod. de iuram. calumn. where Baldus also, who also say that this is observed throughout all Italy. So too D. Thom. 2. 2. question 69. art. 1. and 2. More on this Chartar. l. 3. cap. 3. num. 11 has.

But whatever oath may have been taken, if he is interrogated iniquitously, he is not bound to confess the truth, as Henry admonishes quodl. 1. quaest. 14. Sylvester v. Confessio delicti, quaest. 1. Petrus Nauar. l. 2. cap. 4. num. 136. it is gathered from C. Qualiter, et quando, and C. Inquisitionis, de accusat. Lessius l. 2. cap. 3. dub. 3. Tolet. Sum. l. 5. cap. 58. yet neither ought he to lie, as the Saintly Doctor says in spec. animae, cap. 1.

Then indeed the Judge does not legitimately interrogate, when he does not observe the order prescribed by the Law; but he interrogates suggestively those things which he cannot, and by seeking to extort, and by suggesting, and by deceptive cavils drawing one into snares, so that at times the Accused, reduced to straits, can neither deny, nor assert, nor keep silent, nor use any of the usual amphibologies.

Sotus l. 5. quaest. 6. art. 1. thinks that the accused cannot employ words signifying an express negation of the truth, and is bound rather to meet death. Couar. l. 1. var. cap. 2. follows; the reason is, because this is openly to lie, which is never licit.

On the contrary, they commonly grant that it is licit for him even to use those modes of speaking. Adrian. in 4. quaest. de sigillo, confess. Caietanus opusc. 17. respons. 5. Maior in 4. dist. 15. quaest. 18. Nauar. Man. cap. 12. num. 9. and cap. 18. num. 61. Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 13. p. 1. Tanner. disp. 4. quaest. 4. dub. 5. Less. de iust. cap. 31. dub. 2. and others at these places. And this is the opinion of D. Bonau. in 3. dist. 38. quaest. 2. in resolut. where he teaches, the discord between understanding and speech remaining; that all fault can be removed, and there, and dub. 3. litt. ad mendacium he requires two things; the false signification of the voice, as the material, and the wicked intention of deceiving, as the formal, which dub. 2. he calls the desire to lie. And disp. 39. art. 3. quaest. 1. fundamento 1. he brings forward that saying of D. Gregory. Words serve the intention, and God judges such words as those from which they are uttered from the innermost heart; and therefore on the ultimate foundation he says, those words, confirmed by oath, are to be measured according to the intention of the one swearing. Therefore when he is interrogated iniquitously, he can employ whatever words he pleases from the intention of signifying whatever he wants; so that just as, if no one were interrogating, he could turn those words to any sense he pleased; so also now, where the Interrogator is illegitimate. Whence Valentia answers all the objections; for that is not formally a lie in which the intention is right, although the words sound the opposite outwardly: but this is forbidden, as the Doctors say at Valentia, that the speaker should not intend to deny that which is true, and which he is bound to say, but not to use extraordinary amphibologies. Wherefore, since words are pure matter, they can take on whatever form from the intention.