Question IV: In what subject justice consists

It is CERTAIN first, that Justice is not in the intellect; for no one is considered just because he knows what is just, but because he chooses what is just, as D. Thom. and D. Bonau. warn here.

It is CERTAIN secondly, that Justice is in some appetite of man; for since a virtue is in that potency from which the act of virtue is elicited proximately, and Justice is not in the intellect, it remains that it be in another potency, which is the proximate principle of a good and just act, as distinguished from the act of the intellect, and it includes the election of the just object, or is itself the election of such an object. Now such a principle is some appetite, as the SS. Doctors affirm, and with them Caietanus art. 4. and Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 2. punct. 4.

It is CERTAIN thirdly, that Justice is in the rational appetite, that is, the will, as Aristotle teaches with common consent 5. Eth. cap. 1. et 5. and from Ulpian l. Iustitia, ff. de Iustitia, et iure, defining Justice: It is the constant will to render to each his right, as D. Bonau. teaches in the places alleged, quaest. 2.

It is, however, CONTROVERTED: Whether a certain Justice concerning another's good is to be established in the sensitive appetite, which, although in reality distinct from the Justice which is in the will, yet agrees with it in name and in matter.

But the controversy about this is VERY SMALL; for commonly all place it in the rational appetite, namely in the Will, as D. Bonau. warns, while Buridanus alone places not only Fortitude and Temperance, but also Justice, in the sensitive appetite.

THEREFORE the common opinion is that of D: Bonau. here, D. Thom. art. 4. whom all the others follow, as Sotus says lib. 3. de Iustitia, quaest. 2. art. 4. Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 2. punct. 4. Tannerus disp. 4. quaest. 2. dub. 1. numero 7. who, however, protests entirely.

It is PROVED by D. Bonau. first from D. August. lib. 1. Solil. cap. 6. where he says: Virtue is right reason, leading to the end. Which predication is causal, or material.

SECONDLY: Virtue is the principle of meriting, and of a meritorious and laudable work: Therefore it has being in that potency about whose act praise and merit consist: But such is the rational appetite: Therefore.

THIRDLY. Virtue is in that subject in which the soul has the image of God, since the other virtues have their origin from grace, of which man is capable inasmuch as he is the image: But it is not the Image except through the rational potency: Therefore. The major is D. August. 14. de Trinitate, cap. 8. et 15.

The FOURTH argument proves it singularly of Justice: That habit which consists in the proper election of good and flight from evil is in the rational appetite. Such is Justice: Therefore. The major is proved, because election signifies the selection of something, or of some things, after a comparison made with others. Therefore it is said in Cant.: My beloved is white, etc. chosen out of thousands; but the comparison of many, and the election of one from among them, includes at least virtually a discourse. The minor is proved; for the object of Justice is equality with another, inasmuch as it shuns the extremes, that is, Too much, or exceeding; and Too little, deficient from the equal, which is to be kept in proportion with another, as another's gift is.

But sense does not perceive this formal notion. For this reason D. Thom. and the Thomists also use it, as well as Valentia in the place cited.

FIFTH argument. Virtue is in the genus of the honest good, as Tully says lib. 2. de Invent. and de off. not rarely. But the honest good is the object of the rational appetite alone; for sense regards only the useful good: Therefore.

The RESPONSES of those who oppose these arguments, inasmuch as they prove it of every virtue, I referred to, and rejected, in prima secundae Tract. 2. disput. 2. quaest. 9. ¶