Question — Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V · from Schola Thomistica
Question V: On epikeia
This is the virtue which, from natural reason, dictates something besides, or against, the law in a certain case, according to the mind of the legislator; from Aristotle 5 Eth. cap. 10. and in Cod. de legibus, et Constit. Principium, leg. 5. we have: There is no doubt that he transgresses the law who, embracing the words of the law, strives against the will of the law. Hence Epikeia is praiseworthy, which, looking to the mind of the law, does not observe the words. Laws, moreover, decree what happens for the most part, and in some case they leave room for Epikeia.
De EPIKEIA.
Haec est virtus ex naturali ratione dictans aliquid praeter, vel contra legem in aliquo casu ad mentem legislatoris, ex Aristotele 5. Eth. cap. 10. et in Cod. de legibus, et Constit. Principium, leg. 5. habetur: Non dubium est in legem committere, qui verba legis amplexus, contra legis nititur voluntatem. Ideo laudabilis est Epikeia, quae legis mentem aspiciens, verba non servat. Decernunt autem leges id, quod ut plurimum fit, et in aliquo casu Epikeiae locum relinquunt.
With D. Thom. this is a subjective part of Justice, not a potential one, and it ranges through all positive law and through all the acts of the virtues, insofar as they obey the laws.
Apud D. Thom. haec est pars subiectiva Iustitiae, non potentialis, et vagatur per omnia legis positivae, et per omnes actus virtutum, quatenus legibus obtemperant.
Others, however, say that Epikeia is an accidental species of legal justice, and is not so much a special virtue, distinct extensively from legal justice. Thus Tanner. num. 56.
Alii vero dicunt, Epikeiam esse speciem accidentalem iustitiae legalis, nec esse adeo virtutem specialem, a iustitia legali extensive distinctam. Ita Tanner. num. 56.
The interpretation of Epikeia in a case of doubt pertains to the Prince, as we have in Cod. leg. 1. tit. 14. de legibus, et Constit. Principum, whose first law is: Between equity and right, the interpretation interposed must and may be inspected by us alone. But where the matter is manifest, interpretation is not needed, but execution.
Interpretatio quidem Epikeiae in dubio ad Principem spectat, ut habetur in Cod. leg. 1. tit. 14. de legibus, et Constit. Principum, cuius lex prima est: Inter aequitatem, iusque interpositam interpretationem nobis solis, et oportet, et licet inspicere. Ubi vero res est manifesta, non est opus interpretatione, sed executione.