Question XIII: On the obligation of a promissory oath in itself

I SUPPOSE from quaest. 10. when such an oath is promised.

An OATH is, as it were, a private law, which man imposes on himself by promise, as Sanchez notes lib. 3. cap. 9. num. 1., and in this it is likened to a vow. Yet so, that the assertory oath is a greater and stricter law, because the obligation of the truth to be sworn pertains to the negative precept: Thou shalt not take the name of God in vain, obliging to not inflicting the gravest injury, by denying Him to be the first truth; but the law of a vow is affirmative: Pay thy vows to the Lord, and it obliges to serving the promised God; to violate this is less. Thus Suarez Tom. 2. de relig. Tract. de iuramento, lib. 2. cap. 3., Less. de Iustitia, lib. 2. cap. 42. dub. 11. num. 53.

Again, if it contain a promise made to God; it is higher, because it contains the obligation of a vow and of an oath. But if the promissory oath be considered as such, solitary, without Divine attestation, and be compared with a vow; the obligation of the vow is greater, both because the greater force of obliging is to be taken from the one to whom the promise is made: now in a vow we promise to God, from the intrinsic nature of the vow; but in a promissory oath to men, which is less. But if it include also God adduced in witness, this is greater, as I said, and I shall say again quaest. 16.

These one may gather in part from D. Bonavent. in 4. d. 38. quaest. 1. in fine, D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 8., Suarez in the cited cap. 3 from num. 7., Sanchez num. 4. cap. 9.

The QUESTION, however, is what matter of a vow is necessary, that the oath oblige. This question the holy Doctor treats, asking: whether an uncautious promissory oath obliges.

It is CERTAIN, however, that a promissory oath ought to include something in the service of God, or the utility of men. And indeed, while something is promised to God, it takes on the reason of a vow, and its matter ought to be the matter of a vow, which was treated in disp. de Voto quaest. 6. et seqq. Say the same of matter against the counsels, as of not entering Religion.

It is PROVED by D. Bonav.: that oath has not the justice owed which directly impugns perfection; such is that against the counsels. Thus D. Thom. quaest. 89. art. 7. ad septimum, and the others commonly, cited by Sanchez lib. 3. cap. 9. num. 11., who adds that it is a sin to observe it, not indeed if it be observed materially, that is, not by force of the oath, for as S. Bonavent. says in corpore, and S. Thom. ad 1., he sins here by swearing, yet not by fulfilling. In the second mode, to observe by force of the oath, by not entering Religion, is a sin, because it operates by the force of an illicit thing. Therefore an oath about evil matter is invalid, although it must be declared such, as is had in cap. finali, verb. Confirmavit 22. quaest. 4. and cap. Venerabilem, de elect., as Suarez expounds lib. 2. cap. 25. num. 8., Sanchez in the cited place, num. 13. It is proved by D. Bonavent. in the arguments in the second place, both from D. Isidore; and because an oath is not a bond of iniquity.

From what has been said it will be permitted to elicit, that oaths of parents, heirs, and the like, by which they swear to punish sons, servants, etc., commonly do not oblige, which ordinarily come from anger, not from any virtue. Say the same of the oaths of boys to accuse other boys before the master, etc.

But the MATTER of the oath, which is for the utility of men, ought to be free of every fault, that it may oblige. Therefore if any fault, even venial, bubble up, it does not oblige, as is had in cap. Quamvis pactum, de pactis in 6. and cap. cum contingat de iureiurando, where the general rule is handed down: an oath given to man, which can be kept without loss of eternal salvation, is necessarily to be kept. By the name of loss, however, is understood even a venial sin, since it disposes to losing eternal life. Therefore this general rule the Abbas hands down in that cap. Cum contingat, num. 7., Sanchez lib. 1. de matrimonio, d. 12. et lib. 3. sum. cap. 9., Tañer num. 25. cum Covarru. de pact. 3. part., Molin. Tom. 1. d. 149. et tom. 2. d. 271., Lessius lib. 2. cap. 17. d. 7., with D. Bonavent. in resol. et ad argumenta.

BUT although in promises made to God it is required that the thing be of the better sort; nevertheless in matter sworn to a man it suffices if it be indifferent, as Suarez teaches lib. 3. cap. 16. et 22., Sayrus lib. 5. cap. 5. num. 5., Lessius lib. 2. de Iustitia, cap. 42. d. 4. num. 20. The reason of the diversity is, because God wills better things; but man also exacts indifferent things, provided they be useful to himself, which, although in itself the matter be indifferent, nevertheless as rendered by oath, it is reduced to virtue, as I said quaest. 4., and Sanchez notes lib. 3. cap. 11. num. 2., with Lessius lib. 2. de Iustitia, cap. 42. dub. 6. num. 26., Suarez Tomo 2. de relig. Tract. de iuram. lib. 2. cap. 16. num. 4.; and indeed Vasquez says prima. 2. d. 174. num. 35. that it is necessary that it be an act of some virtue, which is the sense of all. Yet something can be in the promise illicit matter; but licit in the rendering, as is clear of the hire of a harlot, as Valentia notes d. 5. quaest. 6. puncto 5., Sanchez loc. cit. num. 27.

From these you have the rule: Non est obligatorium; de regulis iuris in 6., where it is said: An oath against good morals does not oblige. Where Sanchez glosses: if it be against good morals, by the natural laws, the divine, or canonical precepts; because these laws tend to composing souls; but he does not speak of morals ordered by the civil law, because the civil law is ordered to political composition; nor does it always contain matter ordained under sin.

I ASSERT therefore first, that an oath, once promissory, emitted, ought to oblige.

It is PROVED by D. Bonavent. in 3. d. 39. art. 2. quaest. 1. in corpore, et in fundamentis, from Matth. 5: Thou shalt pay thy oaths to the Lord. He confirms it from D. Augustinus serm. 28. de verbis Apostoli.

It is PROVED secondly by D. Bonavent. there, and in sermone 3. Decal.: because the transgression of an oath is forbidden by the second precept: Thou shalt not take the name of God in vain, as all the Fathers assert, and the Theologians. And it is a great injury to God, by which, marked with falsity, or wickedness, or ignorance, as far as lies in the one swearing, it is sealed, as I said quaest. 4. and the three following, where I set out the three necessary companions of the oath.

I ASSERT secondly. An incautious oath, which verges into evil, or loss of salvation, is not valid.

It is CLEAR from what has been said, and it will be expounded quaest. 18.

OTHER conditions, however, are added by positive law. The first is, that the one swearing be fasting, as the holy Doctor notes d. 39. in litt. num. 8., and it is had in cap. Honestum 21. quaest. 5. and cap. 1. de testibus, et attest.; and this condition is one of counsel at least, as is had in that cap. Honestum; the Council of Orleans decreed that it be so done, except in treaties of peace, which, since they are prolonged at length, and are not to be interrupted, can be validly confirmed even by the non-fasting, as S. Bonavent. relates loc. cit. As to the time, it is required that it not be made from Advent to Epiphany, and in the Litanies of May and of the Rogations, and in the Ember Days; and from Septuagesima to the Octave of Easter, as is had in cap. Decrevit, 22. quaest. 5. But this condition has fallen into desuetude, as the Gloss teaches there, with Valentia d. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 3., Sanchez lib. 3. Decal. cap. 5. num. 4.

FURTHERMORE, an oath is forbidden to certain persons. First, Perjurers are excluded from a judicial oath cap. Parvuli 22. quaest. 1., because from the moment they have once committed perjury, they are presumed always about to commit perjury; for they are infamous, as D. Bonavent. notes d. 39. quaest. 3. in corpore, and D. Thom. quaest. 98. art. 3. ad 2. Yet that they be excluded only after they have been judicially convicted and condemned of this crime, Archid. teaches, whom Sylvest. relates and follows V. Periur. quaest. 5., Sotus lib. 8. de Iust. quaest. 1. art. 10., Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 10., Sanchez loc. cit. num. 5.

FURTHERMORE, boys before puberty are forbidden to swear in judgment cap. Parvuli, et cap. Pueri, 22. quaest. 1.

THIRDLY, Priests are forbidden to swear from a slight cause in judgment cap. si quis Presbyter 2. quaest. 5. D. Thomas gives the reason quaest. 89. art. 10.

IN three cases, however, clerics cannot swear in the hand of a layman without the license of their Bishop. The first is, when they swear before a layman, as compelled by him as superior. The second, when they swear upon calumny. The third, in the act of testifying. See Sanchez lib. 3. num. 8.