Question I: What restitution is

RESTITUTION, as is gathered from D. Bonaventure in 4. dist. 15. quaest. ultima, is an act of Commutative Justice, by which, according to the equality of thing to thing, what has been taken from another, whether willingly or unwillingly, is given back to him. So also D. Thomas here, and others in Valencia disp. 5. quaest. 6. puncto 1; Caspensis disp. 1. sectione 1. de Restit. More properly, however, it is when what has been unjustly taken away is given back, as Tanner notes disp. 4. quaest. 6. dub. 1, with Bannes quaest. 62. art. 1 and others.

CASPENSIS, however, OBSERVES, from D. Bonaventure loc. cit. and Lib. 6. Compend. Theol. cap. 29, that Restitution differs from Satisfaction, as the inferior from the superior, because every restitution is a satisfaction, yet not every satisfaction is a restitution; for he who satisfies for himself is not said to restore. And so Restitution is the giving back of what was received, and pertains to Commutative justice: but Satisfaction is the taking on of some burden because of an offense inflicted on another, and pertains to Vindictive justice.

MOREOVER, Satisfaction for sins, if it is made ex opere operantis, must be by a man existing in grace: but Restitution can be fulfilled by a man existing in mortal sin. Satisfaction, too, can be a part of the Sacrament of Penance: but Restitution by no means. Finally, Satisfaction is at the discretion of a good man: but Restitution of itself must be made according to equality. Moreover, all say that Restitution is an act of Commutative Justice.