Question X: What sin it is to swear deceitfully

He NOTES first, from D. Bonaventure in the body, and the end of the question, that one swears deceitfully in two ways. First, when the mind does not accord with the words of the oath. Secondly, when they do not accord with the will of him to whom the oath is given, in that we elude by amphibologies, or by windings of words, although the words and the mind of the swearer accord among themselves.

He NOTES secondly, that the mind is wanting in three ways. First, if you swear with the mind of swearing, and not of giving, and consequently also not of promising; for if you have the mind of promising, you have also the mind of giving, as is gathered from D. Bonaventure, who constituted a single defect from these two. And Valentia notes this disput. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 4. col. 1415. against Sotus lib. 8. de Iustitia, quaest. 1. art. 7. Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 7. Sanchez lib. 3. cap. 6. num. 3. et cap. 10. num. 2. who distinguish these two: to have the mind of promising, but not of fulfilling; and the mind of promising and of fulfilling. And indeed Sanchez cap. 10. num. 5. places this distinction also as the mind of D. Bonaventure art. 3. quaest. 2. because he says, the Church does not compel oaths extorted by fear, because it presumes that they were emitted with the mind of escaping danger, not of fulfilling the oath. But Sanchez does not show this for that reason, because the Holy Doctor presupposes it, absque animo even of obligating himself; nevertheless I judge this mode possible, which is the same according to what was handed down in the preceding question.

The SECOND mode is, if the mind of swearing is absent. The third, if the mind of obligating oneself is absent, even if you wish to swear; yet this mode, which Sanchez posits, suffers some difficulty; for he who wishes to undergo an oath, and knowingly wills it, knowing its bond, seems necessarily to will also the consequence of the bond of obligation. That such a one does not swear, Azor teaches p. p. lib. 11. cap. 4. quaestio 2. Sanchez lib. 5. cap. 11. num. 8. Sylvius quaest. 89. art. 7. quaestio 3. cap. 1. Sylvester V. Iuram. 4. quaestio 20. Bonacina de Iuram. puncto 7. nor does Bassaeus refuse it V. Iuram. 2. num. 2.

Valentia adds a FOURTH mode, when the swearer has neither the mind of swearing, nor of obligating himself by the oath. But this mode too is superfluous, for by the very fact that he does not swear, nor obligates himself by the oath; the will excluding swearing excludes also obligating oneself, which is the effect of the oath.

The FIRST mode indeed makes perjury mortal by the consent of all. So D. Bonaventure in the body, and others cited by Sanchez cap. 4. num. 16. for he truly deceitfully brings forward God as witness.

AS FOR the second mode, some judge it mortal. So Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 7. Armilla V. Periurium, num. 3. Couar. de pactis 1. part. §. 5.

The SECOND opinion is that to utter words sounding an oath, with the mind of not swearing, is then mortal, when that oath concerns false matter, whether of the present, or of the future: Next, if it concerns true matter, and the oath is legitimately required, whether by a Judge, or by a contracting party; but if it concerns true matter, yet is not legitimately required, it is not, he says, mortal, but a simple lie. So Sotus lib. 8. de Iustitia, quaest. 1. art. 7. ad 4. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 7. ad 4. concl. 6. Petrus Ledesma 2. Tom. tract. 11. cap. 3. dub. 6. Lessius lib. 2. de Iustitia, cap. 42. et 43. Suarez tom. 2. de religione Tract. de iuram. lib. 3. cap. 17. and although Sotus speaks of one compelled to swear, yet his reason proves it of everyone not obligated to swear.

The THIRD opinion is that of Valentia 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 4. toward the end; where, in the case in which one is not obligated to swear, but the oath is unreasonably extorted, he thus distinguishes: If the swearer speaks the truth, then he sins only venially, when he wills to signify that he has the mind of swearing; because it is a lie not pernicious, as the Authors of the second opinion also say; otherwise if he does not will to signify this, but something else disparate; then there is no fault. But if he swears falsely, and wills those external words of the oath to be referred to ratifying false matter, it is mortal. This the Authors of the first opinion teach: but if he does not refer those words to false matter, nor can anyone think this, and take scandal from it; but only uses his right, usurping those words to signify something true in his mind; or he usurps them only materially, willing to confirm nothing by them; it will be only venial. Indeed Sanchez num. 10., following Valentia, adds that it is not even venial, which Soto also holds, when one unjustly compelled usurps those words materially.

AS FOR D. Bonaventure, he seems in quaest. 1. art. 3. to speak only of one truly swearing, without the mind of obligating himself; yet concerning this too he seems to infer consequently, that it is not indeed a true oath, yet it is lethal; for by the very fact that there is the mind of not obligating oneself, there is also present the mind of swearing not truly, but with the mouth only, as Sanchez notes num. 7. cap. 4. Therefore the same seems to be said of both. And quaest. 2. he seems to infer it also of him who is compelled to swear: But in Distinction 38. quaest. 3. in corpore he teaches that even a simple lie, by reason of scandal, can become mortal; much more if it appear confirmed by an oath. Finally, in d. 39. quaest. 3. he excuses one who professes oaths from sole invincible incaution from falsity.

THUS therefore, if the swearer speaks the truth, it will be only venial, unless it is justly required; for then he is bound to swear, and to swear truly, as D. Bonaventure teaches loc. cit. in corpore, so that the sole external utterance of what is false before a judge renders one infamous, as is had in 6. quaest. 1. cap. infames, and D. Thomas also reports it quaest. 98. art. 3. argumento 3. The same is to be said in legitimate contracts. But if he swear falsely, it will be mortal. And thus D. Bonaventure seems to approach the second opinion, and in some degree the last opinion.

I ASSERT first, that words sounding an oath, uttered without the mind of swearing, if they are true (and are not justly required), are a venial fault.

IT IS PROVED from D. Bonaventure loc. cit. quaest. 3. in the last argument, because it is only a superfluous invocation of the Divine name, which is not of itself mortal. Nor is there contempt of the Divine testimony, since God does not then require that honor. For thus it would be mortal, if I were to feign saying a prayer of supererogation, as Sanchez notes num. 9. Nor is any loss brought to the end of the oath, as the authors of the first opinion cry out, because the obligation is observed for the due times of human contracts, of lawsuits, and of decrees, as I said.

I ASSERT secondly, that such words are mortal, when the oath is legitimately required.

IT IS PROVED from D. Bonaventure in the body, because then justice is gravely injured, and the offense of this oath is occasioned.

I ASSERT thirdly, that if the words of the oath fall upon false matter, and cannot be saved by equivocation, they are mortal, since they are ordered to confirming that falsity.

It is CONFIRMED by the Doctors of the first opinion: For that external worship of latria, which sounds an oath, is exhibited to undue matter, namely a false thing. And so it is mortal, just as to exhibit the external worship of latria to idols.

The SAME is proved also of one compelled to swear; for, as D. Bonaventure teaches art. 3. quaest. 2. ad 3. Those things that are evil of themselves cannot become good through fear. For concerning these the Holy Doctor says the Divine precept must be observed: Fear ye not them that kill the body. But rather fear him that can cast both body and soul into hell.

AS FOR the third mode indeed, in which one swears, but deceitfully, without the mind of obligating himself: First, the Abbot cap. si vero, num. 10. holds, when the oath is unjustly extorted, that perhaps in a perfect man it is a venial fault; but in the imperfect, none. But of one swearing of himself, he says nothing. But others then excuse the compelled one when he adds some condition by which the oath be true, as one swearing to a robber that he will give the money (understanding) if he ought.

The COMMON opinion is that in every event it is mortal. So Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 7. ad 4. D. Antonin. 2 part. tit. 10. cap. 6. casu 5. Armilla verb. Iuram. num. 14. et V. Periurium, num. 3. Tabiena V. Iurare, quaest. 11. num. 12. Scotus in 3. d. 39. quaest. unica, art. 3. Nauarr. summa, cap. 12. Couarr. de pactis, p. p. §. 5. num. 3. et 4. Decret. 2. part. cap. 3. §. 5. num. 3. Alcozia sum. cap. 15. fol. 51. Salzedo additione ad regulam, num. 584. Bernardus Diaz, Aragon. 2 2. quaest. 89. art. 7. Less. lib. 2. de Iustitia, cap. 42. dub. 8. num. 42. Suarez de relig. Tract. de Iuramento, lib. 3. cap. 17. num. 10.

OTHERS thus distinguish: If the oath is reasonably required, it is venial; but if unreasonably, and the swearer does not intend to signify to the other that he wills to obligate himself by that oath, there is no sin; but if he wills to signify it, it is venial. So Valentia 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 4.

Sanchez ADDS num. 6. that he must necessarily be understood, when in that oath there is present the mind of fulfilling the thing promised by the oath (although he himself does not explain it), since if that mind were wanting, he must necessarily say it is a mortal perjury, since he himself holds it to be a true oath, and as such to obligate.

BUT Sanchez did not see that Valentia d. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 4. col. 1415. and quaest. 6. puncto 1. col. 1330. asserts these to be so connected, that if the mind of doing is wanting, the mind of promising is also wanting; and conversely it follows, If he has the mind of not promising, and of obligating himself by the oath, he does not have the mind of fulfilling the thing by the force of that oath. But what someone might say: I swear, but although I do not will to be obligated by this oath, I will give this; such a restriction is per accidens to the oath.

Therefore we, with D. Bonaventure, are bound to assert the same that we asserted of him who swears without the mind of swearing, namely, that it is mortal in an oath justly exacted, with the things said in the preceding question preserved proportionally.

I ASSERT first, that one swearing without the mind of obligating himself sins mortally, if the oath is justly required. So those cited above, and others, with whom almost the whole of Bassaeus subscribes loc. cit.

IT IS PROVED from D. Bonaventure quaestione prima articuli tertii in corpore, because he unjustly deceives his neighbor in a grave matter, and to this end uses, as an instrument of the oath, an external act (for it is not truly an oath, as I shall say in question 13.); he invokes therefore externally the name of God after the manner of an oath, and so gravely abuses the means of naming God vainly under the formula of an oath, mocking God himself, and to the ruin of the human race, for the preservation of whose peace oaths were instituted; and he enervates the faith owed to an oath. Very many use this reason; among whom those are judged to be related in the preceding question for the first opinion.

I ASSERT secondly, that one swearing without the mind of obligating himself (if the oath is unreasonably extorted) sins only venially, if he does not apply the words to confirming a false promise.

IT IS PROVED on the foundation of D. Bonaventure, because this is not an oath, but only a simple lie, as I shall say in question 4. and the same was said in the preceding question, in the first assertion, and then he uses his right, using equivocations. So Sanchez in number 10.

Sanchez, moreover, ADVERTS that one can use amphibolic words from a just cause, not only when they admit several senses of themselves, but also from some circumstance, of place, of time, etc.; indeed, when they render the true sense from the mind of the utterer; as if one denies that he has done something that he did (understanding that it is to be concealed). The same hold Syluest. V. Iuram. 4. quaest. 7. Nauarr. cap. Humana aures 12. quaest. 5. in quaest. 2. num. 12. Valentia 2. 2. d. 5. quaest. 13. puncto ultimo. Salon. 1. 2. quaest. 69. art. 2. controu. 11. in quarta ratione, Tolet. lib. 4. summae, cap. 21. num. 9. Manuel de ordine iudicatio cap. 10. num. 4. et primo tomo summae, cap. 191. num. 7. Philiarch. Tom. 1. part. 2. lib. 3. cap. 14. Suarez de Iuram. lib. 3. cap. 11. num. 6. Lessius lib. 2. de Iustitia, cap. 42. dub. 9. num. 48. Sà verbo Iuram. num. 6. Sanchez lib. 3. cap. 6. num. 15. D. Bonauent. passim. Vide Dianam part. 2. t. 15. res. 25. et part. 3. tract. 6. miscell. resol. 30. Although Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 7. Sotus lib. 5. quaest. 6. art. 2. cap. 7. Malder. opusc. de restrict. ment. cap. 4. et 10. Syluius 2. 2 quaest. 89 art. 7. quaestio 3. Azor. tom. 1. lib. 11. cap. 4. quaestio 5. Henriq. lib. 6. cap. 19. Layman. lib. 4. tract. 3. cap. 13. Coninch. de act. quatern. lib. 1. d. 10. dub. 3. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. et quaest. 89. art. 7. say it is perjury, unless the amphibolic words obtain that amphibolic sense from themselves; with whom Bassaeus V. Iuramentum 3. num. 10. hesitates, so that he may proceed more safely, although he grants the opposite opinion probable, which I follow.

He is PROVED from the Holy Doctor on cap. 7. Ioan. where Christ says: Go you up to this festival day; but I go not up to this festival day, and yet he ascended. But that utterance was completely true in the mind of Jesus. I go not up manifestly, and for celebrating the solemnity, or for the passion, but that I may instruct some separately in need of it.

SO many note, from D. Chrysostom homil. 47. in Ioannem post medium Tom. 3.

It is PROVED secondly, from D. Bonaventure in 3. d. 38. dub. 1. where from D. Jerome the amphibology of the Hebrew midwives is praised, because of which God is said to have built houses; and the Holy Doctor calls those midwives most spiritual.

THIRDLY it is proved from D. Bonaventure from Genes. 27. ibidem num. 6. from the deed of Jacob, who feigned himself Esau, and said of himself that he was such and such, and had done what the Father had commanded; and yet he is excused by the Holy Fathers Ambrose, Augustine, and others, whom D. Bonaventure reports loc. cit. et post eum Peterius ibi disp. 5.

SIMILARLY Abraham Genes. 22. going up the mountain to immolate his son, said that he would return with the boy. And Genes. 26. concerning his wife he says she is his sister. And cap. 42. et 44. Joseph says that he is a diviner. And Iudic. 9. Ierunt ligna. And 4. Reg. 10. Jehu said that he wished to worship Baal, which examples the Holy Doctor reports in 3. d. 38. quaest. 2.

It is PROVED fourthly from D. Bonaventure in 3. d. 39. art. 1. quaest. 1. with whom D. Gregory also concurs there lib. 26. moral. cit. and it is reported cap. Humana aures 22. quaest 5. ibi: The ears of men judge our words to be such as they sound outwardly. But the Divine judgments hear them to be such as they are uttered from the depths: Therefore he wills that truth be measured by words in their intrinsic seat from the intention of the utterer, not from the external words alone. The same D. Hilary expressed lib. 4. de Trinitate cap. 5. and it is reported cap. Intelligentia, de verborum significatione there, The understanding of words must be taken from the causes of speaking: Because the thing is not subject to the word, but the word to the thing.

It is PROVED fifthly from D. Bonaventure in 3. d. 38. in dub. litt. num. 4. et 5. et quaest. 1. in corpore, et quaest. 2. ad argumenta. To lie is to go against the mind, and so the reason of the lie stands in the habitude of words to the mind. Therefore whether they are true or false in themselves, it is per accidens; but they are to be considered with respect to the mind of the utterer, and in the deformity of the words with respect to it stands the formal reason of the lie. So also Sanchez num. 15. who again confirms it from D. Bonaventure in the quaest. 2. cited, argumento 6. with Bassaeus num. 10.

In this stands a lie, that words are uttered against the institution of their end; but words were instituted for this, that man express what he bears in mind.

But OUTSIDE of necessity it is not permitted to use amphibologies, which is proved from D. Bonaventure in 3. d. 38. quaest. 2. ad tertium argumentum, because man was made that he might contract with others, and live together economically, and politically; but for this it was necessary that they mutually communicate their own intentions and wills in a human manner; but this is done by words. Wherefore in legitimate contracts and fellowship we ought to use words instituted for that end, to signify candidly to our neighbors our conceptions. On this reason many, cited by Sanchez lib. 3. cap. 6. num. 12. try to prove that it is always true, that never may amphibologies be used; otherwise an approach would lie open to deceits, the commerce of words would be taken away, its assurance, etc.

INDEED, since in the corrupt state we are compelled to live together, and are often assailed by the unjust with questions and malicious speeches, an approach would rather lie open to very many evils than that satisfaction be given to one asking sincerely, with open mind. Therefore cautious prudence is needed. For thus also Christ did not always render oracles at a nod to the Jewish plotters, but with parables rather obscure, by which in several ways he could multiply responses.

From these it is clear, and Sanchez rightly gathers num. 10. that a case can occur in which not only when solicited, but even spontaneously we can rightly use amphibolic sayings, anticipating some evil, or for appeasing a neighbor, for restoring a fame unjustly taken away, etc. The same says Philiarchus de off. Sacerd. tom. 1. part. 2. lib. 3. cap. 14.

The SAME will be in the case in which one guilty has unjustly disclosed his accomplices in the crime, or a witness has unjustly betrayed before the judge a crime of the Accused that was hidden, that he can offer himself to swear that they are not guilty, understanding that they ought not to be disclosed:

So hold Medina lib. 1. summae, cap. 14. §. 33. Navarr. lib. 2. de resti. cap. 4. part. 3. dub. 5. num. 142. Henriquez lib. 5. de Poenitentia, cap. 12. Manuel primo Tomo summae, cap. ultimo. Bannes 22. quaest. 62. art. 2. dub. 8. and there Salonius in controv. 15. saying that Melchior Canus, Mantius, and other most learned men hold the same in their relections. Leonardus lib. 2. de Iustitia, cap. 11. dub. 10. num. 110. Sayrus lib. 11. cap. 4. num. 27. Petrus Ledaesma 1. Tomo, tract. 2. cap. 7. concl. 3. with Sanchez lib. 3. cap. 6. num. 28.

WHENCE I do not see how from the Doctors alleged, Navarr. in summae, cap. 12. num. 8. Sayrus lib. 5. cap. 4. num. 21. Leonardus lib. 2. de iustitia, cap. 42. d. 9. num. 46. it can be brought that it is not permitted to offer oneself to swear, using these amphibologies; but that only with the requisites is it permitted to use them.

From these many things are resolved, namely that it is permitted to use equivocations if we are asked, even in judgment, about a hidden matter, or by a judge not competent, and to deny, understanding that he is not bound; or if one asked whether he comes from such a place, when the plague has been falsely announced, could deny to the guards of the city that he comes from that place, understanding as if it had not happened. See Sanchez, who num. 4. also brings forward that case which they ascribe to the Holy Father Francis, that, being asked on the way by satellites whether a certain guilty one had passed that way, he answered that he had not passed through here, understanding through the sleeves of his garment, in which he held his hands. Likewise this is permitted for saving life, fame, goods, for repelling adversities, for eluding the enemy in a just war, for avoiding ambushes, for a useful work, etc.

I ASSERT finally, that if he refer those words to confirming a falsehood, he sins. See the third assertion of the preceding question, of which the reason is the same.

Now Perjury is a sin graver than homicide, because it is against the honor of God, as I shall say in the last question.