Question I: What virtue temperance is, and of what kind

IT IS DEFINED by St. Bonaventure in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 8: Temperance is to desire nothing whence repentance must follow, in no way or measure; to exceed no law; to subdue cupidity under the yoke of reason. This is rather a description, which he repeats de septem itineribus, itinere 7. dist. 5, and in compend. Theol. verit. lib. 5. cap. 35, and p. p. Centil. loco citando.

IN the Declaratorio of Theological terms he says: Temperance is the taming of lusts and of all evil motions, preserving man uncorrupted for God.

AT OTHER TIMES he brings more proper definitions, varying only in words: 3. part. Centil. sect. 42: Temperance is the firm and moderate dominion of reason over lust and over the other disorderly impulses of the soul; from Aristotle, lib. 2. de invent.: Temperance is the dominion of reason over lust and over inopportune motions; from the same Cicero, de off. lib. 1. cap. 15.

From these you have that the object of this virtue is the moderation of the sensitive appetite with regard to those things which most allure man, namely the delectable things according to touch, and the concupiscences of food and drink, as Aristotle teaches 1. Eth. cap. 10, and Cicero lib. 2. de Invent., and St. Thomas art. 3. and 4.

THAT IT IS ASSERTED, I gather thence also that it is a virtue.

IT IS PROVED by the Holy Doctor in the places cited here, and in 3. dist. 33. quaest. 4: The office of the moral virtues is to moderate the passions, especially those which move more vehemently toward changeable goods; but Temperance labors in curbing the most vehement cupidity, which draws away from the eternal good to the created, which are the delectations of the material senses: Therefore. Just as therefore fortitude, because it turns away from the flight of sensible evils to the pursuit of reason, is a virtue; so also Temperance, which calls away from carnal goods to spiritual things, will be a virtue.

NOR indeed is a precise virtue required for curbing spiritual delectations; for these are of themselves according to reason, and only one of them is to be moderated per accidens, when it withdraws from another more due one, as St. Thomas says art. 4.

I ASSERT secondly, that Temperance is a Cardinal Virtue. So St. Bonaventure in 3. loc. cit. and St. Thomas art. 7. and 8.

IT IS PROVED: A Cardinal Virtue is one which exercises some principal office for rational direction. But such is temperance, which is concerned with moderating the most difficult passions of the concupiscible, and the most vehement delectations of touch, taste, and smell, and of sight. But this moderation is principal among the things necessary for leading a life consonant with reason.

OBSERVE, however, with St. Bonaventure lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 35, that Temperance is concerned not only with delectable things according to touch, but also according to the other senses; yet because the delectable things according to sight, hearing, and smell, since they are not so material, have not the moral goodness and malice that the delectable things according to touch have — which are therefore not forbidden in the Decalogue except sometimes per accidens, insofar as they can be referred to appetitions or actions concerning the delectable things of touch, or concerning the objects of other passions — as the Holy Doctor gathers from St. Augustine lib. 10. confess. cap. 32, and Aristotle teaches 3. Eth. cap. 10, where he says: For those who rejoice in things perceived by sight, such as colors and pictures, are called neither temperate nor intemperate. In like manner must we speak of those things that pertain to hearing: nor of those who rejoice in odors, except per accidens.

FURTHERMORE, the rule for judging whether the appetition and delectation concerning things of this kind, which are the matter of Temperance, is such as right reason prescribes, and accordingly has that moderation which Temperance prescribes, must be taken from the necessity and utility of these things for human life. So teaches Aristotle 3. Eth. cap. 11, St. Jerome on cap. 44. Ezech., and St. Augustine lib. de moribus Ecclesiae, cap. 21, St. Isidore de summo bono, lib. 2. cap. 44, and in synonim. cap. 26, and other Fathers cited by St. Bonaventure lib. 2. Pharetrae, from cap. 35 to 38.

THE REASON of this is, because delectable things are not goods per se and to be sought, but only insofar as they are ordered to relieving some necessity of this life for the end. Whence Aristotle says 3. Eth. cap. 11: The temperate man desires delectable things for the sake of health, or of good condition, as Valentia disp. 9. quaest. 1. puncto 1, and Tannerus disp. 3. quaest. 3. dub. 1. num. 6, also note, with St. Thomas quaest. 141. art. 6.

THAT TEMPERANCE is inferior to the other Cardinals I showed above; and it is confirmed: For Justice is ordered to the public good; likewise fortitude. Prudence indeed rules all, but Temperance regards only the particular good per se. Add that it is concerned with curbing concupiscence, the lowest of the powers that obey Reason.