Question XXX: Whether a cause is required for a dispensation, and which

The first opinion is that it is lawful for Superiors to dispense in vows without a cause; D. Thomas refers them to 2.

Yet it is most true that a human dispensation in divine natural law, as in vows and oaths without a cause, has been condemned and made void. So D. Bonaventure in 4 dist. 19 dub. 8 litt. and dist. 38 quaest. 3, and I showed it in 1. 2. tract. de leg. disp. 5 quaest. 14; D. Thomas loc. cit., whom all Theologians and Interpreters of Pontifical Law follow, with the Gloss cap. non est, v. adimplere, de voto. So warns Tanner disput. 5 quaest. 4 dub. 6 cap. 10; Balsaeus V. Votum 7 num. 8 and V. Dispensatio num. 9, where he lists others.

I assert, with this opinion, that a cause is required for dispensing.

It is proved by D. Bonaventure loc. cit. dist. 19, from D. Bernard lib. 3 de consider. cap. 23, where he thus addresses Eugene III: Dispensation without cause is not dispensation, but dissipation. Others use this saying, adding with the same Bernard, 2 Corin. 13: Power is given for edification, not for destruction.

As to the causes, what sort they ought to be, so that these dispensations may be rightly made.

I suppose first that it is not necessary for a just dispensation that the cause be directly for the common good, but it suffices that it redound upon it indirectly, as the good of a part redounds to the good of the whole. This is clear from cap. Requisitis, §. nisi rigor, cap. quaest. 7. For although one may not act against the common good, and for that reason dispensation should not frequently be made in laws, because such frequency would enervate the force of the laws, by which the common good is preserved, and open the way to violation of the laws, as the Council of Trent says, sess. 25 cap. 18 De reform.; still, dispensation need not always tend directly to the common good.

It is proved secondly by D. Bonaventure's second argument, from those things which I set out in the second place from the usage of the Church, which dispenses even for the bodily salvation of someone, redounding nevertheless to the public good; and he brings the example of King Louis. On this argument Sanchez leans, cap. 45 num. 13.

I suppose secondly, that the same cause is required and suffices for dispensing in a vow and in an oath, when it is not made to a man but in honor of God alone, because such an oath is in the state of a vow as to its dispensation, as Aragon notes, 2. 2. quaest. 89 art. 9, and Sanchez lib. 8 de matrim. disp. 20 and lib. 4 summae cap. 45 num. 14. The reason is, because the obligation of a vow made to God arises from the fidelity owed, or truth, as St. Bonaventure notes in 4 dist. 38 art. 2 quaest. 3 in corpore, and this is also in an oath, as the Saintly Doctor pursues at length in 3 dist. 39.

Truly, however, since the promise of an oath has man for its object (which is for the most part, as D. Bonaventure notes in 4 dist. 38 quaest. 1 ad ultimum), the obligation presses more in an oath, because we are treated more mildly by God than by men, as we have in the law Celsus in the Pandects.

Therefore a cause obstructing the execution of the vow is required, as D. Bonaventure teaches dist. 38 art. 2 quaest. 3 and 4, and D. Thomas 2. 2. quaest. 88 art. 12; for, since it is a promise made to God, it must redound to the honor of God; but, the cause failing, it would redound to contempt, in not keeping to him what was promised. In this many potentates of our time rage so madly that they usually command many questions to be put in this case, whereby, as they say: Manghino di parola. See very many on this in Sanchez lib. 8 de matrimonio disp. 20 num. 3.

Say the same proportionally, when a vow is commuted to a lesser one, and so a partial dispensation intervenes, as Sotus notes lib. 7 de Iust. quaest. 4 art. 3; Aragon 2. 2. quaest. 88 art. 12 col. 4 vers. circa secundam conclusionem, dictae 2; and Sanchez loc. citato n. 4.

Where note that no certain rule can be given about the sufficiency of the cause, but it must be left to be weighed by the judgment of a prudent man. For three things ought to be looked at in such a cause, according to cap. Magnae de voto, namely, what is lawful according to equity; what is fitting according to honesty; and what is expedient according to utility.

Now from a threefold source can arise a cause obstructing the execution of a vow, and therefore a just one for dispensing in it, as Sanchez notes lib. 4 summae cap. 45 num. 26. The first is on the side of the one vowing: the second on the side of the matter promised: the last from an extrinsic cause, which regards the public good, or the private good of the one vowing.

From the first source: the first cause is when the vow did not proceed from a perfectly prudent deliberation, as when it was made from the impulse of some passion not taking away deliberation. Thus we have in cap. 2 de voto: But we absolve from the vow him who in tender age promised it through easiness rather than from the judgment of discretion, and Abbas holds there num. 3 and very many others related by Sanchez lib. 8 de matrimonio disp. 20 n. 12 and lib. 4 summae cap. 45 num. 27. See also Suarez Tract. de voto lib. 6 cap. 17.

The cause will also be fear arising from shipwreck, or another blow not induced to extort the vow, furnishing a just cause for dispensing. Or if the fear were induced fear, yet not sufficient for annulling, it will be a cause for dispensing; as Clau. reg. teaches lib. 6 cap. 12 num. 30. Similarly error concerning the impelling cause of the vow. See Lezana Tom. 3 qq. Reg. V. Dispensare.

The second kind of cause arises from the matter, when it is made useless, or evil, or impeding a greater good; and the Doctors speak of it. So D. Bonaventure in 4. dist. 38. art. 2. quaest. 3.; D. Thomas 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 10. in corpore, et ad 3., where Cajetan and others, in Sanchez lib. 8. de matrimonio, disp. 20. num. 8. et loco cit. summa, num. 36. This, however, is understood not when it is clear that the matter has been made such, but when it is doubtful. So explain Azor Tom. 1. lib. 11. c. 19. q. 17.; Suarez loco cit. lib. 6. cap. 17. num. 10.; and Sanchez loco cit. It is also a just cause if a greater spiritual utility of the one vowing is hoped for from the dispensation; for this is chiefly intended by a vow, as D. Bonaventure teaches loco cit. dist. 38., where Richard art. 9. quaest. 1.; Sanchez loco cit. num. 8.; and Suarez loco cit. num. 10.

Similarly on the side of the matter of the vow, when it can be the cause of ruin, either in general or with respect to the one who vowed: or when a great difficulty supervenes in fulfilling it, not sufficient to take away the obligation altogether.

The third kind is a good resulting in the dispensation, as if marriage were necessary for a King, either for succession or for the peace of the kingdom; this cause is taken ex cap. magna, et cap. ex multa, de voto. So D. Bonaventure loco cit. in argumentis, provided the matter be not morally doubtful, that peace or succession is to be had, or health necessary for a most preeminent person. So also Cajetan 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 12.; Sotus lib. 7. de Iust. quaest. 4. art. 3.; Suarez loco cit. cap. 17. n. 13.; Clavis Regia eodem cap. 12. num. 29.; Sanchez lib. 8. de matrimonio, disp. 20. num. 24. et loco cit. summa, n. 49. But probable hope, or moral certainty, suffices with D. Bonaventure.

But whether grave disease, for which expert physicians indicate that venereal acts must supply relief, is a sufficient cause — many deny it, asserting this to be the opinion of D. Thomas 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 11. ad 3.; they bring forward there Cajetan, Durandus in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 2. in fine, who although they speak of a solemn vow, yet the argument holds also for the private vow of chastity; for these establish a difference between abstinence and continence, because, since food is ordered directly to the sustentation of the individual, yet abstinence verges into notable harm to the individual if it be indiscreet, it is not an act of virtue, depriving oneself of food from necessity; but coitus is for the preservation of the species alone, and continence verges into danger to the individual only very much per accidens. And therefore continence even with danger to the individual is an act of virtue; nor on that account is marriage to be entered, especially since the disease can be met with other medicines, as Medina learnedly proves lib. 4. de foederum hominum continentia, controv. 4. c. 25.; and that this is not a just cause for dispensing is handed down by D. Antoninus 2. part. tit. 11. cap. 2. §. 9., speaking of every vow. But Sotus lib. 7. de Iustitia, q. 4. art. 2. ad tertium asserts it of the solemn vow of chastity; and so he seems to think the contrary of the private one. Sanchez judges this part the truer lib. 8. de matrimonio, disp. 20. num. 26. He adds, however, that he thinks it should be partly commuted, partly relaxed into some good; nor does God intend that the danger of death be undergone for chastity's sake, although that be an act of virtue; but he wills the Church to use benignity, partly relaxing, partly commuting, because the matter is most arduous. Nor does it avail to say that relief can come from other remedies, because it suffices that this is doubtful and most difficult, and in the judgment of physicians the remedy of coitus is better; just as also, when someone is driven by the most violent stimuli of lust, although one might provide by other remedies, nevertheless because these are not so well adapted to human frailty, hence it is held a just cause for dispensing in the vow of chastity. Nor does the testimony of D. Thomas and others stand in the way, who speak of a solemn vow; since its keeping is most grave and its dispensation redounds to notable detriment of the religious state, it will require a much more urgent cause for dispensing.

But whether that cause ought to be of the common good, or whether the good of a religious suffices: Richard in 4. dist. 38. art. 9. quaest. 1. in corpore, et ad 5. ait that the good of the one vowing suffices. Cajetan favors him in opusc. tom. 1. tract. 27. de dispensatione matrimonii in occidentali Ecclesia, quaest. unica, et Tom. 3. Tract. ultimo ad art. 12.

But a hundred and ten Doctors assert that a cause of universal good is necessary, with Sanchez lib. 8. de matrimonio, disp. 8. num. 7.; and they expressly attack the doctrine of Cajetan: Medina lib. 5. de sacrarum hominum continentia, cap. 37., Valentia 2. 2. disp. 6. q. 6. puncto 7., and Sanchez disp. citata, but especially Catherinus lib. 6. in Caietanum.

As to D. Bonaventure, Sanchez himself loco cit. num 5. brings him in among those denying that the Pope can dispense in the solemn vow of chastity, and therefore neither is there any reason why any cause should be admitted. Of this we shall treat disput. sequenti de Castitate religiosa, quaest. ult.

The blessed Bonaventure therefore in 4. dist. 38. art. 2. quaest. 1. corpore, ait, it is commonly said that the Church cannot dispense in vows of religion.

But he treats quaest. 3. of the proposal, and sets down first the opinion of those asserting that the Church can dispense in all vows, even solemn ones, because the universal good is preferred to the solemn vow of continence, as if peace in the kingdom or the Church were obtained from marriage; and he says this can be done, and has at some time been done by the Church. Therefore he supposes it cannot be done except for the common good, against Cajetan.

He then reports another opinion, saying that dispensation can be granted in all things except in the vow of Continence, because it is not a worthy weighing of the continent soul; and he seems to speak still of the solemn one, although the argument holds for the private one too; for these concede dispensation even in other solemn vows; and the Saintly Doctor himself in his reply to the arguments indicates the same, while he answers three arguments for the individual solemn vows, and none for the private one of Chastity. Although someone might say that in the argument, etc., he concludes for both continence.

The third opinion, which he reports quaest. 3. eiusdem art. 2., denies of solemn vows only, and he subjoins: Which of these three opinions is the truer, I confess I do not know, and each can sufficiently be sustained; therefore I assert none. O the humility of the wisest Doctor!

But soon, lest he leave the first affirming opinion altogether infallible, he answers its arguments, and especially the dispensation in the vow of chastity, because profession is a solemn vow; for in the two following arguments he answers the objections as to the other two vows, namely obedience and poverty; but now he says: certainty is not present (he speaks for the most part), because as to the necessity of preserving the species, men will never fail. There the greater utility of the one vowing does not fall in, because it commutes the merit of the hundredfold fruit into the merit of the thirtieth (he alludes, moreover, to the parable of the sower, in which it is said that some earth gave a hundredfold fruit for each grain of seed, and this earth is called virgin, or chaste; the other part is of the married). Moreover it would be uncertain, because it is not known whether the sick man would be healed through coitus; it is not known whether from coitus someone would be begotten; it is not known whether peace would be restored from the marriage; and the certain is not to be given up for the uncertain; therefore it does not avail. Such are the words of D. Bonaventure.

Which things being so, he concedes that if health were certain (he understands of some King, bringing the example of King Louis of France in the argument) still continence would not be sufficiently compensated, because it would commute the hundredfold fruit into the thirtieth: but if public peace, or another good, were certainly to be had (which can happen), he concedes the commutation is rightly made. Such a good would also be the health of a Prince as to succession.

Finally, that the good also of the family is a cause for dispensing the father of a family from a long pilgrimage; many say, with Sanchez lib. 4. summae, cap. 45. num. 50. et Suarez loco cit. num. 13.

But he notes num. 4. that the individual causes from what has been said do not always suffice for such a dispensation of the vow, but some merciful commutation on the part of it. Indeed he adds num. 19. that a cause rarely concurs for a total dispensation.