Question III: Whether a merely internal promise, made to a man, binds

I SUPPOSE that a promise made merely internally to God, or to the Saints, binds, as all confess with St. Bonaventure in 4. dist. 38.

AS TO our question, which is indeed about the forum of conscience alone.

The FIRST opinion holds that it binds. So Sanchez lib. 1. de matrim. disp. 3. who calls it probable. Aragon 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 3. Angles in flor. part. 2. quaest. 1. de voto, art. 2. diff. 4. Leddesma 2. 4. quaest. 18. art. 1. where, however, he is problematic, indeed at length inclines to the contrary.

Hence Diana deduces that such a person is bound to reveal and fulfill his promise, and consequently that the one to whom the promise was made, if he knows it and owes something to the promiser, which he cannot obtain in judgment, can make himself a secret compensation. The same think Mendoza lib. 1. de pactis, cap. 1. Palacius de contract. lib. 5. cap. 12. Sanctarellus var. resol. p. p. quaest. 66. num. 49.

The SECOND opinion denies that a merely internal promise binds. So D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 1. et in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 1. art. 1. quaest. 2. Tanner. disp. 4. quaest. 1. dub. 5. num. 59. Basil. Poncias de matrim. lib. 2. cap. 6. num. 9. Panormit. in cap. litteraturam, de voto, num. 2. Turrecrem. in cap. 1. 17. quaest. 1. §. 12. Abul. ad cap. 5. Levit. quaest. 4. et ad cap. 30. Numer. quaest. 44. Rosella V. votum 1. Tabiena ibi §. 4. and Clarius V. dispensatio, Molina Tom. 2. de iustitia, disp. 266. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 18. dub. 5. num. 28. Rebeilius 2. part. lib. 18. quaest. 1. Fagundez lib. 3. de contract. cap. 1. num. 4. Bassaeus V Promissio, num. 5.

This is the opinion of D. Bonaventura 4. dist. 29. quaest. 2. ad 2.

It is Proved by the Saintly Doctor with the argument used by Fagundez. The obligation of one man to another must be proportioned to a human manner; for man communicates with man only through external expressions, whence it comes about that the obligation of one to another cannot be made without the concurrence of the will of both; but while the promise is internal, it is indeed unknown to the promisee, but is a mere volition of one party, not accepted by the other, and hence cannot be a binding donation. So also others argue.

You will say l. 3. §. manumittenda, ff. de acquir. possess. possession can be lost by mere intention.

Fagundez answers num. 8. more is required for acquiring a right than for losing it.

The other things which the adversaries heap up only prove that an internal promise is required as the foundation of a human obligation, but they do not show that it suffices.

Nor do they prove that the act of conscience compels one to manifest that internal act, because from the beginning it was imperfect, and therefore essentially invalid as to its being.

You will say that with an oath added, you are bound to stand to him in conscience, as also by a vow.

Fagundez answers num. 6. ex D. Bonav. 4. dist. 28. dub. 2. that this happens from another title, reverence toward God, to which even an internal promise, and attestation, if made in a competent manner, is fitting, and therefore valid.