Question VII: Whether a necessary thing can be the matter of a vow

Thus far I have treated of those things posited in the definition of a Vow that pertain to the free will; now many things must be asked about the matter of a Vow, which is said to be a certain good.

I suppose, however, that things absolutely necessary cannot be vowed, e.g. to die, nor likewise things impossible, such as to count the sand of the Sea.

The question is: whether you can vow those things that are elsewhere commanded, e.g. not to commit fornication.

Commonly the Theologians assert that this is not properly the matter of a Vow. So D. Bonaventure, at the place cited, whom others follow, as related by Azorius book 11. on morals, q. 9. cap. 14. For this is the sense of D. Thomas in 4., at the place cited, and in 2. 2., where he says that such a being, insofar as it is necessary, does not fall under a Vow; D. Antoninus part 2. title 11. cap. 2. Paludanus 4. dist. 38. question 2. article 1. Maior question 1. Durandus there question 1. Richardus question 2. article 5. Cajetan, however, on 2. 2. at the cited passage of D. Thomas, is cited badly by Navarrus in his manual, cap. 12. num. 25. Sotus lib. 7. on Justice, question 1. article 3. Tabiena V. vow 1. §. 2. note well, Lyranus on Deuteronomy 23. Gerson part 2. in the Alphabet, letter 25, letter I. and letter T. Angelus V. vow 1. question 4. Arboreus lib. 19. Theosophia, cap. 6.

On the contrary, others say that the vow is properly about these things. So Sanchez lib. 4. of the summa, cap. 5. num. 6. where he brings forward D. Thomas 2. 2. at the place cited (but badly, as I said) and Cajetan at the place cited, 2. 1. Navarrus, Sotus at the place cited, Castro lib. 1. on penal laws, cap. 10. Aragon. 2. 2. q. 88. art. 2. fol. 77. Valencia 2. 2. disp. 6. question 6. point 2. Azorius at the place cited. The same view is held by Diana part 1. Treat. 6. resolution 86. Bassaeus V. Vow 2. num. 11., bringing forward others. So also D. Bonaventure, as I shall say in question 8.

I assert that it is not properly a vow. It is proved first from D. Bonaventure, because a vow establishes a new law binding; but a law is not a law unless it binds anew; but concerning necessary matter it does not bind, since one is already bound: Therefore.

It is proved second from D. Bonaventure, from the Gloss on that Psalm, Vow, and pay unto the Lord, where he says: To vow is of the will; to pay is of necessity. Therefore it is only about those things to which one is not bound from elsewhere.

Sanchez replies that the will is bound in a new way to that thing, which, he says, suffices for the ratio of a vow.

But here St. Bonaventure more properly calls that mode a new complacency in a necessary good, which does not obtain the force of a vow.