Question IX: Whether a vow is only of the better good, or also of a lesser good

I WONDERED at first glance that the Seraphic Doctor had indicated with scarcely two articles the things that concern the matter of a vow, a most weighty matter indeed; but I saw clearly that these twin articles are like the Gnomon on a sundial, which indicates all the hours.

IN the second, therefore, of the foundations of the second question, from the definition of a vow he teaches that it must be concerning a better good; for it is some new service rendered to God; hence it renders the one who serves better before God, and in order to his own salvation. From this it follows that it is not always concerning the best good, nor concerning any better good whatsoever, but concerning a better one with respect to the prior state, so that the one vowing vows something better than his state before God. Thus for a celibate person marriage will not be the matter of a vow; yet it will be for an incontinent man. So others, as collected by Bassaeus V. Vow 2. num. 2.

From these foundations, third, answering the argument, he says: A lesser good is taken in two ways. First, compared with what the one vowing has, and thus it cannot be the matter of a vow; for a virgin will not vow a lesser good that is owed, by vowing marriage: in another way a lesser good can be said to be one compared indeed to other greater goods that the one vowing does not have, and thus it can be the matter of a vow. Thus a secular man can vow chastity; because thus it is concerning a better good with respect to the conjugal state to which he can be assigned, although it is a lesser good than the profession of religion, which he lacks.

AGAIN, St. Bonaventure notes that this good is less than many others that the one vowing does not have; yet greater than those that the one vowing has; e.g. celibacy can be vowed in two ways: either simply, as by vowing private chastity; or by excluding in this vow a greater good, e.g. by vowing private chastity, and excluding, by vowing, ever vowing it solemnly in religion, and this is null.

ALTHOUGH you say: That state of private chastity is licit, and holy: Therefore it can be vowed. He answers, although that state is not evil, but good and glorious; nevertheless it is evil to will that state in such a way that it excludes a better one, just as to be praised is not evil, and yet it is evil to wish to be praised in such a way that the praise is in us and does not tend to the greater glory of God; for to exclude a greater good does not tend to the service of God.

YOU WILL SAY: In marriage it is licit to promise oneself to another, although it is a state of imperfection: Therefore it is licit also in a vow.

St. BONAVENTURE ANSWERS by denying the parity; for in marriage you betroth yourself to another person who is content with that state. And so you rightly promise her, along with that state to which you are then also bound, even if you exclude religion implicitly, when you choose the state of matrimony. But if you wish to vow to God in His service, you are bound to will and promise something better, because God always demands that what is better be offered to Him in a vow made in His service. Such is that holy Doctor.

MOREOVER, for deciding this question, one must suppose, from St. Bonaventure in the cited question, that the matter of a vow is simply some good of counsel, even if it can also, to that extent, be concerning a good of precept, insofar as it exhibits a new expression of the will to God, and also on another head an obligation, which if violated infers a new injury also, specifically distinct, and therefore to be expressed in confession, as is evident from cap. impudicas, and cap. sacrilegii, 27. quest. 1. and the Doctors commonly teach, as collected by Sanchez lib. 2. cap. 5. num. 7., against Gerson and Tabiena, who deny that the species is changed.

From this doctrine it follows first that things negatively opposed to the counsels, such as not to be chaste, not to enter religion, and the like, are not the matter of a vow, and that such vows are not valid. So all confess, as Sanchez notes, lib. 4. cap. 8. num. 3. — except Hostiensis, who in his summa, tit. de voto, says that these vows are indeed rash; yet valid.

The COMMON RATIO is deduced from D. Bonaventure above, because a vow ought to offer something for the service of God; but those things have no moral good in themselves. They could, however, have it per accidens, and thus be the matter of a vow; suppose, for instance, that he who vows not to enter religion recognizes that he is unfit, or is rightly and deservedly detained by the piety of his parents lying in necessity; and he who vows not to live chastely recognizes that he is too unstable in carnal matters.

INDEED, from this it seems to be inferred that he who, from the experience of his own incontinence, knows it better to marry than to burn, validly cannot vow religion or chastity; for this is a lesser good, therefore for him the vow of matrimony is valid, because it is a greater good: therefore a contradictory vow, e.g. of religion or chastity, cannot be valid. Thus argues Homobonus, to be cited. Valencia seems to suppose this, 2. 2. disp. 6. question 6. point 2. difficulty 4. col. penult.

THE SAME Peter of Ledesma asserts, 2. Tom. of the summa, tract. 10. cap. 2. dub. 5. He adds, however, that such a one should seek a dispensation.¹ Which surely seems to imply a contradiction; for if the vow is null, it does not need a dispensation. The same judges it probable — Homobonus de Bonis in Consult. moral. col. 1. part. 2. resp. 28. — as Diana reports, 4. p. Tom. 4. resol. 102. Adding: but you consider it, and he adds, that a dispensation should be sought from the Bishop. ¹ N. Editor's note: the print/OCR reads 'hunc renu timpetrare dispensationem', garbled; rendered from the sense as 'such a one does not easily obtain a dispensation' ('non temere impetrare').

FOR HIS PART, Sanchez at num. 10. is indeed frightened by the contrary argument: nevertheless he still asserts that those vows of religion and chastity are valid for the incontinent man. He argues ¹, because the Church has been accustomed to grant a dispensation to such persons as for a valid vow, only with the most rigid commutation enjoined. ¹ N. Editor's note: the print here reads the broken form 'I tobar' (OCR 'I tobat'), a corrupted verb; rendered as 'He argued (Probabat)' because the context — Sanchez defends the validity since the Church granted dispensations for such vows — fits Probabat.

HE ANSWERS, therefore, the argument with Valencia, that such a one, as a singular person, is such that the state of matrimony is better for him: but, as he is a member of the Church, it is better that it be judged ratified and be a vow of continence and religion; otherwise many evils would arise in the Church from this, while, crying out under the pretext of incontinence that the vows of chastity and religion are invalid, they would deliver themselves to pleasures. In this sense what Maiot says is true, in 4. dist. 38. question 1. col. 2.: the matter of a vow need not be better for the one vowing, but it suffices if it is better in itself.

I WOULD answer otherwise, that such a one can rightly vow, and ought not only to trust in his own strength, but to confide, and to acknowledge with Solomon that he cannot be continent unless God gives it to him; and that this grace of avoiding mortal sins is denied to no one, and is necessary for salvation even for the married; for among these some incontinent persons are most lustful, nor are they sated with the pleasures of matrimony, especially if the wife is not at their nod; and yet God does not fail these, if they too do what is in their power. Therefore, just as anyone can validly vow not to sin mortally, as Sanchez probably asserts, cap. 5. num. 16., citing others; much more not to sin in the matter of Temperance, as in chastity, the more so since God would concur with the necessary help, because He does not demand any of those things that He does not grant even to the saints, such as to avoid all venial sins, which surely would not be licit to vow, nor would it be valid, as very many teach with Sanchez, lib. 4. cap. 5. num. 10., Bassaeus at the place cited, where he adds that a vow not to sin venially, made after deliberation, is valid.

YET THESE vows of chastity or religion will sometimes be null on account of some impediment, for instance if someone had previously deflowered a Virgin by betrothal of marriage, or had known an honest woman. The reason is, because a vow does not take away a preceding obligation of justice. Yet he, once his wife is dead, is bound to enter religion, or keep chastity, as he vowed. See Sanchez lib. 1. de matrimonio, disp. 44. and lib. 8. disp. 36. from num. 8. and lib. 4. of the summa, cap. 8. num. 11.

FURTHERMORE it is elicited from the foundations of D. Bonaventure that good works quasi contrary to, opposed to the counsels, are valid, provided they are goods better than the state of the one vowing, as e.g. to serve in a hospital for the whole course of one's life. So all assert, as Sanchez notes, lib. 4. cap. 8. num. 40., Valencia at the place cited, point 2. col. 8., Paludanus 4. dist. 38. question 1. num. 29., D. Anton. 2. part. tit. 11. cap. 2., Sylvester V. vow 1. question 4., Tabiena V. vow 1. at the end, who give the reason of D. Bonaventure: because that thing promised is concerning a better good, according to the state of the one vowing: Therefore it is the matter of a vow. So the Doctors, as collected by Bassaeus V. Vow 2.

FOR HIS PART, all cry out with D. Bonaventure that he who by that vow directs himself to a better thing, according to his state, so as to exclude a still better state — for instance, if he were to vow private chastity, so as never to vow it solemnly in religion, or on that account were to vow to serve in a hospital — would vow ineptly. See Sanchez at the place cited, num. 42. The reason of it is, because thus he would fight diametrically against the counsels of Christ, and, a rebel against grace, would shut out his own progress toward the perfection proposed to him by God.

From these it is gathered that even a vow of matrimony is not valid. So the Doctors commonly, whom Sanchez brings forward, lib. 1. de matrimonio, disp. 4.; for thus one descends from celibacy, which is nobler, as the Council of Trent defines, sess. 14. can. 11., and it is the counsel of the Lord.

YET matrimony can be of precept, as if someone deflowered a Virgin by betrothal of marriage, or knew some honest widow; or if matrimony were necessary for the public peace, and then it could fall under a vow in the broad sense. See the Doctors in Malderus cap. 5. disp. 2. and in Bassaeus at the place cited.

MOREOVER such a vow can be more useful and better, because such a one is incontinent, according to 1. Corinth. 7.: it is better to marry than to burn. This the Doctors commonly hold, as collected by Sanchez at the place cited, num. 7., Maldonatus, and Bassaeus above.

IT CAN ALSO be vowed for a pious cause, for instance to take in a girl from danger, or destitute; yet this must be included in the vow, as it were as the matter, as is evident, because otherwise it is invalid. Baldus notes this, leg. illud Cod. de sacro-sancta Ecclesia, Azor lib. 11. cap. 14. num. 9. Sanchez holds the opposite at the place cited.

BUT IF the end is against the Evangelical counsels — for instance, to vow alms in order to obtain matrimony — Sanchez, lib. 4. of the summa, cap. 8. num. 56., says it is valid, with Soto, lib. 7. de iust. question 1. art. 3.