Question V: Whether all the statutes of religious orders bind under sin

NOTE that there are various Rules: for some, besides vows, add other precepts; and indeed some otherwise of divine and natural law, and these I do not think are enjoined by a distinct law unless the Holy Founder declares himself: but only confirmed them; therefore then there will not be a twofold sin, as Cajetan teaches quaest. 186. art 9. although Valencia disp. 10. quaest. 4. puncto 3. Sanchez lib. 6. cap. 4. num. 7. say there are two malices, insofar as the transgression would be against the vow of obedience.

SOME add new precepts, as the Rule of the Minors. Of these many are imposed on others not by precept, as the Fasts of Advent, abstinence from meats, assistance at Choir, and the like. But the formula of the Rule must be observed. Each indeed has observances of supererogation.

THEREFORE now not all the statutes of Regulars compel under guilt of fault, even if we promise to observe the Rule, as we Minors especially; for the promise must be understood according to the sense of the Rule, and the mind of the Patriarch. So they declare concerning us Nicholas III. Clem. Exiit de verb. signific. in 6. §. in primis, and Clement Exivi §. Cum igitur in primis, de verb. signific. and D. Bonaventure admonished ad cap. 1. Regulae, D. Thomas 2. 2. quaest. 186. art. 9. Sylvester V. Relig. 1. quaest. 8. dict. 1. et quaest. 13. dict. 5. Vasquez prima 2. disp. 162. cap. 4. Faustus in theol. lib. 6. quaest. 121. Angel. V. relig. n. 28. Sylvius ad locum cit. D. Thom. Basaeus V. Obed. num. 14. Sanchez lib. 6. in praec. cap. 4. The Holy Doctor declares this ad ea verba Reg. cap. 1. Regula fratrum minorum haec est, sanguis Domini Nostri Iesu Christi Evangelium observare, saying, The Rule is promised as it is; but it is certain (he says) that some things are enjoined preceptively, others only admonitorily.

So also in the Rule of the Fathers the Preachers it is said: We do not will to bind under fault. The same in the Rule of the Minims Passarelli reports cap. 25. The same in the Constitutions of the Society, 6. part. cap. 5.

CONTEMPT indeed would be a grave offense, as D. Bonaventure notes in speculo animae, and in the Rule, and D. Thomas art. 9. and others.

Sanchez infers num. 10. that it is mortal not to will to observe the rules, except those which compel under mortal sin; Basaeus subscribes num. 16. because it is to the grave prejudice of Religion, and he himself would be a scandal to others, and would in himself undergo the peril of a grave fall.

It is however arduous to find when, and whence the rules bind under mortal sin. This I discussed in Tract. de Legibus, disp. 5. quaest. 2.

All note that by usage it has already come in, that obedience does not compel under mortal sin, unless it be commanded in virtue of holy obedience, or of the Holy Spirit, as Suarez warns Tom. 3. de Relig. lib. 10. cap. 4.

Truly if the matter be grave, and it be commanded under penalty of divine indignation, or of excommunication, then the Prelate expresses that it is commanded under the lethal, as they commonly concede.

But if the matter be light, it does not compel under mortal sin, even if the precept be added. So Sanchez lib. 1. cap. 4. Suarez lib. 5 1. de leg. cap. 25. Azor tract. 1. lib. 5. cap. 6. quaestio 5. and others among these.

Yet some things light of themselves can be made grave by the consequent harm, or another circumstance, and be commanded under anathema, etc. so Valencia disp. 7. quaest. 5. puncto 6. saying, silence can for this reason be commanded.

Cajetan judges it arduous, V. Praeceptum, to judge of these from mere apparent gravity or lightness, since often some things are grave in the judgment of Prelates which seem light to subjects, as Suarez saw in Tom. 3. de Relig. lib. 10. cap. 4. num. 9. Therefore in part. 9. constit. societ. I. suae, cap. 3. §. 10. it is declared that all things can be commanded which make for the proposed end of the Society, perfection.

Conversely it can happen that the Prelate commands grave things under venial, as Sanchez saw lib. 6. cap. 4. and lib. 1. de matrim. disp. 9. num. 6. Castro de lege poen. cap. 5. docum. 4. Valencia loco cit. Navarrus cap. 23. n. 49. Diana part. 3. tract. 6. resol. 91. and others among these. Pelizarius pursues these at length.

From what has been said you have, that formal disobedience is a most grave sin, as D. Bernard says serm. 46. in Cant.

NOTE however that formal disobedience, which is not to will to obey because of the precept, includes contempt to be expressed in confession. So Suarez de Relig. lib. 3. cap. 28. num. 25. Sanchez lib. 6. cap. 4. num. 8. et 11. Valencia t. 2. disp. 7. quaest. 5. puncto 6. Layman lib. 1. tract. 5. cap. 7. Crousier ad cap. 10. Regul. min. lect. 3. Caspensis tract. 12. disp. 3. sect. 5. Eligius Basaeus V. Obedientia, and V. Contemptus, at the end.

INDEED Suarez adds that such disobedience imports a twofold malice. The first is against religion, and is sacrilege; the second is against Justice, acquired by the prelate in the person of the subject; and this is acquired by a twofold title; for spiritual and dominative jurisdiction is derived upon all the prelates of a Religion from the supreme Pontiff, in virtue of which they can command and found statutes, since they are the ordained pastors of their subjects; besides, the subjection must be considered in which disobedience is committed; for if it be opposed to a special virtue, it will be a special sin; thus he who does not obey a prelate enjoining a fast for a just end will also sin against temperance. Yet it is not the custom to set forth these various species in confessing, and it suffices to express that one did not obey the commanding Prelate, even though the vow enjoined it. It is however necessary, if the penitent be not known to the Confessor, that he set forth his state of solemn or simple vow. This I say on account of those who in the world make a simple vow of obeying their directors, or even sometimes Lords; which vow has a special obligation, which Suarez weighs throughout Chapter 3. For although he to whom this vow binds can obtain its use from the one vowing; properly however he is not his superior; and therefore he who in a doubtful case should wonder whether he was to be obeyed, could not obey; because for him then stands that possession which otherwise would stand for the prelate, if the one vowing were a Religious, who is bound not only in virtue of the vow but also of ecclesiastical subjection: And if indeed a case were given in which the prelate lacked this ecclesiastical jurisdiction, yet his condition would not forthwith be equated to that of one who could obtain it in virtue of a simple vow; because in this vow there is only a promise without the actual handing over of oneself and one's goods under the dominion of anyone; which always intervenes in the making of a solemn vow.