Question VI: Whether an oath made without justice is a sin, and what sin

I ASSERT first, that if the thing promised is gravely evil and deadly, the oath will be mortal against religion from a defect of justice, against the second precept of the Decalogue, besides the mortal sin of the purpose of fornicating, killing, and the like. So teach D. Bonavent. in 3. dist. 39. quaest. 1. argumento secundo fundamenti, whom they commonly follow, as Sanchez cap. 4. num. 26. Valencia puncto 3. citato, Sanchez lib. 3. cap. 19. a num. 9.; for it is a grave injury to God to invoke Him as a witness to the perpetration of a crime against His law; for it is a great contempt of the Divine majesty, and perjury from a defect of justice, as S. Bonavent. says loco citato, and after him the rest.

It will be mortal, however, EVEN IF the intention of fulfilling is not present, because God is brought in as a witness to a falsehood; yet it will be a single sin: but when the mind of fulfilling is present, it will be twofold, namely, perjury from injustice, and the purpose of sinning. So Navar. summa, cap. 12. num. 13.

I ASSERT second, that one who swears to commit a venial fault, with the intention of fulfilling, sins mortally from a defect of justice, and thus it will be a twofold sin; so Suarez lib. 3. cap. 4. Sanchez num. 33. against Bassaeus 5. num. 3. and others there.

It is PROVED, because therefore one who swears to sin mortally sins deadly, because he makes, as far as in him lies, God a cooperator of that deadly thing; but to make God guilty even of a venial fault is a grave offense contending with the Deity: Therefore.

Sanchez num. 28. OBJECTS, because it is not a grave irreverence to God.

It is ANSWERED from our argument, that it is a grave offense to make God cooperate in a venial fault, for this implies a contradiction with the Deity; nor could God sin venially except by losing the Deity, which is said to be the perfection of infinite goodness. So Valencia judges it probable.

HENCE also, it will be mortal to fulfill, by reason of the oath, a thing venially culpable. The reason is the same, because God is asserted to hold the oath as ratified and just. So Hugo holds, as reported by Angelus V. Iuram. 5. who laughs with Soto lib. 8. de Iustitia, quaest. 1. articulo 7.

I ASSERT third. If anyone swears not to observe some counsel, e.g. to enter religion, it is probably only venial. So Sanchez cap. 4. num. 30. Valencia loco cit. and others. Although others say it is mortal, among whom is Sylvester loco cit. q. 7. whom I wonder asserted that to observe a sworn venial thing is only venial: and to commit a venial sin upon oath is only venial. So V. Iuram. 4. q. 1. For it is worse to swear a venial sin, and to observe it by oath, since these render God, as far as in them lies, a cooperator of evil.

I ASSERT fourth, that to swear an indifferent thing is venial, from a defect of justice, because it is not apt matter for an oath. So commonly, with Sanchez num. 31.

I ASSERT fifth, that a defect of justice exists also in an assertory oath, as if anyone uncovers, and confirms by oath, the sin of someone undeservedly, or boasts of himself concerning some mortal sin. So Sotus lib. 8. de Iustitia, quaest. 1. art. 3. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 3. Peter Ledesma Tomo 1. summae, Tract. 11. cap. 2. dub. 4. Toletus lib. 4. summae, cap. 20. num. 10. and it seems so to D. Bonavent. in 3. dist. 39. dub. 1. where: He gravely requires justice in every oath, that it be done for a just cause, which D. Thom. also confesses 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 3. ad 2. and there Cajetan, Valencia puncto 3. col. 5. Suarez lib. 1. de Iurament. cap. 3. num. 6. and lib. 3. cap. 2. num. 5. and cap. 12. num. 7. Sanchez loco citato, num. 33. Yet these two last hold that a defect of justice in an assertory oath is only venial, because it is not opposed to the end of the oath, nor does it make God the witness of a lie, but of a wicked thing, which of itself is not a grave injury. Likewise, because it is accidental to the testification of truth, in which the reason of the oath is situated, to narrate the truth with sinning or without sinning. Therefore they conclude that an oath is mortal only then, when it is assumed as an instrument of that sin, for instance, that the infamy of one's neighbor become more probable, asserted by that assertory oath; because it is a grave injury done to God.

But who does not see that all these things are confirmed by oath, that they may be rendered more certain? For why would anyone swear that he perpetrated that deed, for instance with that woman, that he committed that crime, unless to persuade it? Therefore, since this is the ordinary end of such swearing, they are to be condemned.

But let us grant that it is sworn only so that those crimes are asserted simply by oath, since God is invoked as a witness of a gravely evil thing, will it not be a grave injury to God? For if to bring God in as a witness to a thing to be done against His law is mortal, as Sanchez confesses num. 26. why will it not be mortal to bring God in as a witness to a mortal thing already perpetrated, since a grave offense to God intervenes here also? Nor does Sanchez answer sufficiently, that that oath is accidental to the deed; for against him is, first, that in the promissory oath also it is accidental, for one can swear without the intention of not doing, and yet whether the mind of fulfilling be present or not, the oath will be mortal, as Sanchez teaches num. 34.

Moreover, the assertory oath falls upon a past crime just as the promissory upon the future.