Question XXXI: Whether, and how, the commutation of vows is to be made

Now we must speak of the third mode by which vows are taken away, namely commutation, not absolving entirely from the obligation of the vow, but commuting it into another good work. That commutation can be made is clear from the most ancient practice of the Church. Commutation can be made, moreover, either into another better work, or into an equal, or into a lesser. The question, therefore, will be whether it can be made in all these ways.

The first opinion is that commutation can be made not only into a better and also into an equal good, but even into a somewhat lesser good. So Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 12. d. 1. Alcozer summa, cap. 19. concl. 3. Medina lib. 1. summae, cap. 14. §. 7. regula 3. Toletus summa, lib. 4. cap. 18. Sà verbo votum, num. 10. Henriquez lib. 7. de Indulg. cap. 30. Leonard. lib. 2. de Iustitia, cap. 40. disp. 1. num. 95. Manuel Bulla Cruc. §. 9. num. 107. et Tom. 2. summae, cap. 100. Clau. reg. lib. 6. cap. 12. Bassaeus V. Votum 6. num. 8., with Bonagratia cited.

The second opinion is that a true commutation can be made only into a better or an equal. So D. Bonau. hic, D. Thom. 4. dist. 38. q. 1. art. 4. quaestiuncula ult. in corpore, Abb. c. 1. n. 3. et 5. de voto, Palud. q. dist. 38. q. 4. art. 3. suppl. Gabr. q. 1. art. 5. Caiet. 2. 2. q. 88. art. 12. Rosella V. votum, 5. n. 6. Syluest. votum 4. Couar. de pactis, p. p. §. num. 4. Sutus septimo de Iustitia, quaest. 4. art. 3. Palac. 4. dist. 38. disp. 3. col. 28. Gregorius Lopez lib. 5. v. Contando, tit. 8. p. 1. Angl. flor. 2. part. quaest. unica de voto, art. 8. Ouandus 4. disp. 38. dist. unica, prop. 25. Alcozer summa, cap. 16. concl. 2. Beta in respons. casu 49. Azor. Tom. 1. lib 11. cap. 18. quaest. 6. Clau. reg. lib. 6. cap. 12. Suarez Tract. de voto, lib. 6. cap. 12. num. 6. et cap. 29. num. 7.; nor does Bassaeus refuse, and Bonagratia to be cited below.

I assert with this opinion that the commutation of vows can be made only into a better, or an equal.

It is proved by the argument of S. Bonau. in corpore, for the commutation of a vow is a kind of contract, which God enters into through a procurator without damage to himself, commuting with the one vowing. But for it to be a rightful contract without damage to God, it must be rendered equal. For so it is done in every good contract, as we have in 3. Eth. Therefore as a procurator among us would be unjust, contracting to the damage of him who entrusted the cause to him; so also now.

It is confirmed by D. Bonauent. from the very name of commutation, which properly indicates an equal return. Therefore, favors are to be accepted with all liberality, but they must not be drawn beyond the propriety of the words.

Yet these things are not to be bounded Mathematically; otherwise, since it is difficult to find such an equality, it would already become arduous to commute; and perhaps this is what the authors of the first opinion intend, as Sanchez lib. 4 summae, cap. 50. notes, where he supports our opinion. So also Bonagratia V. Votum, n. 478. Bassaeus V. Votum 6. num. 2.

Now the question is: Whether a commutation can be made without the authority of a prelate. But the question can also be: Whether a commutation into an equal and into a better ought to be made with such authority.

The first opinion is that the commutation of vows can be made even into an equal good without other authority. So Maior in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 3. Medina lib. 1. summae, cap. 14. §. 7. Manuel 2. Tom. summae, cap. 100. Henriquez lib. 5. de poenit. cap. 20. n. 5. et lib. 7. de Indulg. c. 30. Ioan. Benedictus in summa de peccatis, lib. 1. c. 9., and they teach that it is probable: Aragon. 1. 2. q. 88. art. 12. dub. 1. dicto 3. Suarez de Voto, lib. 6. cap. 20. Alcozer summa, c. 16. Less. 2. de Iust. c. 40. dub. 11. n. 91. et alii apud Sanchez lib. 4. cap. 49. n. 10. et Bonagr. n. 478.

The second opinion is that by the power of the vow-makers alone it can be commuted into an equal. So Angelus verbo votum 4. n. 2. Caiet 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 12. et summa, v. votum, c. ult. Sotus lib. 7. de Iustitia, q. 4. art. 2. Couar. de pactis 1. parte. §. 3. Alcozer n. 10. loco cit. Corduba sum. q. 149. Toletus lib. 4. summae, c. 18. Graff. p. p. decis. lib. 2. c. 10. Philiarc. de off. sacerd. Tom. 1. part. 2. lib. 1. c. 22. Petrus de Ledesma 3. Tomo summae, tract. 10. c. 8. Angles flor. 2. part. quaest. unica de voto, art. 8. difficultate 4 et 6. Azor Tom. 1. lib. 11. c. 18. q. 2. Clau. reg. lib. 6. c. 12. Manuel in Bull. Cruc. §. 9. n. 106. Sorbus in compend. mendic. v. votum, Suarez de voto, lib. 6. cap. 19. Sanchez lib. 4. cap. 49. num. 11.

Yet all these, even for the first opinion, add — although they hold — that the authority of the Prelate is not necessary in the commutation of a vow into a better. To these add Imolam cap. peruenit et 2. num. 2. de iureiur. Bacon in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 5. art. 6. Armillam voto n. 14. Abul. q. 110. in 30. Numer. Nauar. summa, cap. 12. num. 75. Pedrazam in summa, praecepto 1. §. 8. Ouandum 4. dist. 38. disp. unica, praepositione 27. Ludouicum Lopez p. p. Instruct. cap. 49. Coronam confess. part. 3. Tract. de voto, num. 18. Gomez in Bulla Cruciatae, clausula 10. num. 112. Valentiam 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 6. puncto 7. Viualdum Candel. 3. part. cap. 14. et Sanchez num. 4. This is the safer, Bassaeus loco cit. says.

But the opinion at loc. cit. D. Bonauent. is that a commutation cannot be made even into a better without the authority of a Prelate. With the Seraphic Doctor walk D. Thom. 4. dist. 38. quaest. 1. art. 4. quaestiuncula ultima. Innocentius cap. peruenit, et 2. num. unico de, Iureiur. ibi Ioannes Andreas, Hostiensis, Antonins, Baldus, Anchar, Abbas, Henricus, Bellamera, Felinus, Naeuo, et Richardus in 4. dist. 38. art. 8. quaest. 1. Supplem Gabr. quaest. 1. art. 5. Palacius col. 3. dist. 27. fol. 875. Syluest. votum 4. quaest. 7. dicto 2.

I assert with this opinion that a vow cannot be changed into a better without the authority of a prelate.

It is proved from D. Bonau. first from Leviticus ult.: But the animal that can be immolated to the Lord, if anyone shall have vowed it, shall be holy, and it could not be changed, that is, neither better into worse, nor worse into better. Where the Gloss says: without the authority of a superior.

Suarez cap. 8. num. 12. Sanchez cap. 49. num. 9. answer, with Oleastro, that this law is ceremonial, and therefore has ceased.

But who does not know that that oblation of animals was ceremonial? Yet the reasons are rather reduced to the moral, namely, not to change what was promised to God at one's pleasure is a bond of contract by natural law; for a vow is a contract between God and man; and the commutation between God and the one commuting in the name of God, whence the rules of contract are to be kept by the law of nature. As Sanchez himself confesses cap. 50. n. 4. But as he who sold a horse cannot commute it into an ox, even if of greater price, without the consent of the Buyer, as we have in leg. 2. ff. si certum petatur; so also in our case. Nor does Sanchez sufficiently answer at num. 4, that there is a disparity, because man wills according to his utility: but God always wills what is better. For neither is the offering made at pleasure better than that made by license; but this latter is more perfect.

It is proved secondly by D. Bonaventure from D. Bernard on dispensation, where he says: When monasteries are well ordered, no one, by my counsel, will go out, from desire of a higher life, without the license of his superior.

Where note gravely, that this is expounded by D. Bonaventure as mere counsel of D. Bernard, because cap. licet de regular. et cap. scripturae extra de voto, et voti redemptione, we have that passage to a stricter religion, and to a more perfect state, even without the license of the Prelate obtained; and these cases alone are excepted by the law, as D. Bonaventure notes in corpore; and this rule is not extended to all, as Abulensis thinks quaest. citata, and Sanchez num. 4.; nor are these followed because they are certainly better, whence it would be lawful to do the same whenever the matter into which the vow is transmuted will be better, as Sanchez thinks; but on account of the excellence of this commutation the laws grant license, as D. Bonaventure notes.

Now that this is the mind of the Pontiff is gathered from cap. Licet, for, bringing the reason, he says: Because where the Spirit of God is, there is liberty, and they who are driven by the Spirit of God, these are under the law: Because the law is not laid for the just. Such a one, therefore, is presupposed as he who transfers the whole manner of his life to a religion declared stricter by Holy Church, or to a more perfect state of the whole life; but not whoever shall have commuted a vow in any way whatsoever into anything better whatever; for it does not seem to be of the mind of God, that if you had promised him a good of four degrees, one little drachm of a different good being added, he wills it to be commuted.

And in cap. scripturae, thus we have: He who is known to commutate temporal service into the perpetual observance of religion is not held in any way guilty of a broken vow. Whence, from the nobility of the change of state, it is held that this is conceded to be done without the authority of a superior.

But as from like things there is no rightful argument for extending privileges, so in our case, so much the less, because the reason, and the honor of God resulting from it, is less than from that change described there, of him who commuted the visitation of the Holy Sepulchre into religion; but not if he had commuted it into any almsgiving whatever, or another thing.

It is confirmed from cap. 1. de votis, where we have: Of vows of pilgrimage, whether they can be redeemed by alms, or for necessity be commuted into another thing. We answer that it depends on the will of him who presides, that he may consider more diligently the quality of the person, and the cause of the commutation.

Sanchez num. 4. et 9. answers that this text rather favors him, because the Pontiff wills the authority of a superior to intervene only in doubtful cases, and his judgment to be required only in doubtful ones; but not when there is a clear mutation, made into a better.

But he errs, for since the account of every matter of a vow has been signed over by the Pontiff to the judgment of the prelate, and the judgment entrusted to him, it follows clearer than light that the one vowing cannot make this judgment, so much the less as it is entrusted, that the quality of the person, the motives of the vow, the infirmity, and the power of the one vowing be preserved; but this judgment is entrusted by law, and deservedly to another, because the one vowing in these matters is not a fit judge, being in his own cause. Nor does Sanchez answer well at loco cit. that this is not a Judgment of jurisdiction, but a more abundant payment of the vow; for whatever it be, whether of Jurisdiction, or of doctrine, and prudence, it is entrusted to a Superior, as Sanchez himself confesses num. 12. et 19. Moreover Sanchez num. 22. confesses that the faculty of commuting vows is of Jurisdiction conceded by Christ. As it is also of the power of dispensing, and therefore num. 28. he says that those alone have the ordinary power of commuting vows who have also that of dispensing in them.

Now truly, that I may return to the Seraphic Doctor; he answers that D. Bernard asserts nothing for us, but offers only counsel as to passage to a stricter life. Yet he concedes in corpore, conceded by the law in cap. Licet, et cap. scripturae, related above, that without the license of a superior the vows of a laxer religion are commuted into vows of a stricter one, and that this has been conceded to so illustrious a mutation, as I showed above. Wishing to infer that only for this reason do we not have the argument from D. Bernard, that we might draw it out; much less of other inferior commutations, because in the time of D. Bernard those laws did not yet exist, for Caput Licet de regular. is of Innocent III. and cap. scripturae, of Alexander III. who were after D. Bernard; for Alexander III. canonized D. Bernard, and indeed D. Bernard had died before the Pontificate of Alexander III.; for he died in the year 1153, in which Eugenius III. also died, to whom Anastasius IV. succeeded; to Anastasius, Adrian IV. ¹, and to him Alexander III. in the year 1159. Innocent III. however was much more recent, who died in the year 1216. ¹ N. Editor's note: the print reads 'Adrianus III.'; corrected to Adrian IV (Nicholas Breakspear, successor of Anastasius IV in 1154), as 'III' is a factual print error.

From the body of the question, however, the argument is thus gathered, because, if this privilege was conceded only for the most illustrious commutation of the state of the whole life into a more perfect state, or a stricter religion; it is a sign that it is not conceded for the rest.

Nor should you say that before that there was another privilege for the superiors of religious, lest that passage be made without their license, as we have in cap. Licet. Therefore by your reasoning it is held to be conceded for other vows without the license of superiors.

It is answered that from that chapter is had the cause of that prior concession, because some under the pretext of a stricter religion were passing over to other places, even of non-religious, and this some Hospitallers and Templars also did, as is said in the same place. Therefore he subjoins; for that reason this seems to have been conceded to them, lest anyone from temerity, or levity, to the loss, or injury of his own order, under the pretext of greater religion, fly over to another order, as it is established by many to have been frequently presumed; not indeed that license be denied to him who shall have asked truly, not feignedly, that he may be able to pass over to the fruit of a better life. Therefore the law was not enacted for a real passage, but for the feigned, and those acting from levity; which is to be guarded against in every commutation, as D. Bonaventure notes in corpore.

Others prove it, because not to keep promises is to break faith, even if another thing is given; but this reason is weak, to which Sanchez answers at loco cit. ex D. Bonav. ad 3., that it is not a lie while a greater thing is given, as we have in cap. pervenit, citing. St. Bonaventure adds, even while an equivalent is given.

You will object first with Sanchez loco cit. ex cap. pervenit, et c. 2. de Iureiur. Promissum non infringit, qui illud in melius commutat, et cap. Scripturae, de voto: Reus fracti voti aliquatenus non habetur, qui temporale obsequium in perpetuum noscitur religionis observantiam commutare. Where the Pontiff grants no privilege to religious profession, but renders the reason of this licit commutation, sought from the very nature of the thing.

It is answered with D. Bonaventure that this is true as to the truth of what was promised; nevertheless, because the promise ought to be equalled by what is given, and this judgment belongs to the procurator of God, it follows that it is to be done by his authority. To that about religion I answered already above, that it is a singular privilege, and the reason is rendered from the excellence of the mutation.

He objects secondly; with the consent of the creditor one thing can rightly be paid for another, Instit. Quibus modis tollitur obligatio, and God always wills the better: Therefore, if the better is always given, it is more grateful to him.

It is answered from what has been said, that whatever better thing is offered belongs to the creditor, and that God also wills this, as I said. It is confirmed, for therefore Sanchez num. 12. et 19. denies that a commutation of an equal good can be made, because it is impossible to attain this equality, and therefore it is not credible that it has been committed to any vow-maker whatever, especially in his own cause. But this also imports the same difficulty in knowing the excess, because to know the excess one must see whether it is above the equal: Therefore by this reasoning it is not to be believed that it has been remitted to the judgment of the one vowing.