Question XII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to exact an oath from an idolater

It must be ASSERTED first, that it is lawful to exact such an oath from an ethnic, whom you know will swear by Idols, if necessity presses. Thus S. Bonavent., after D. Augustinus epist. 154. ad Publicolam.

It is proved first by D. Bonavent. from scripture Genes. 31: Jacob exacted an oath from Laban, who was an Idolater, and who for that reason complained that his idols had been taken from him by Jacob.

Secondly it is proved by D. Bonavent. primo Machab. 8: Judas exacts from the Romans an oath of alliance, who worshipped idols. Yet they are not reproved.

Thirdly from D. Augustinus in the place adduced above.

Fourthly, because it is lawful to enter into contracts, covenants, and pacts with infidels; and these are confirmed by oaths.

Fifthly, lastly, it is proved by D. Bonavent., because this is not to cooperate in that one's sin, but to use it for one's own utility from a just cause; for the oath is sought which he could licitly render by the true God; wherefore there is offered to him a licit matter, which he abuses of his own will, whence it is not to be imputed to the one asking. This reasoning D. Thom. loc. cit., Sanchez lib. 3. cap. 8. num. 11. et alii use. S. Bonavent. brings forward an example: a poor man can seek alms from a rich man whom he knows will give with murmuring, even grave; because the poor man seeks in necessity what is good; but the rich man abuses it of his own will by murmuring: but that he gives with an evil will does not stand in the way of the other's rightly receiving it.

The DIFFICULTY, however, is what necessity is required, lest a fault be ascribed to the one exacting the oath.

First, indeed, some will that the public good be required. Thus Alens. 3. part. quaest. 31. m. 2. art. 6., Maior in 3. d. 39. quaest. 3. D. Bonavent. is also cited by Sanchez num. 21. in corpore, where although he said first that it is lawful for the good, especially the common one, he indicates there that it is lawful also for a private good; but a little below he concludes: Whence although it be illicit to swear by an idol, because that form is prohibited, nevertheless where necessity, or common utility requires it, it is lawful to receive the formal oath, where he does not say that it is lawful when necessity, or common utility requires it, as Sanchez reports, but when necessity, that is, particular, or common utility requires it; because for a private good to make a sufficient cause it is required that there be necessity; but the common good, even if it brings only utility, suffices. Now that the Seraphic Doctor thinks this way is proved. For in the response to the first he says in express words: He who receives an oath by an idol does not thereby consent to the veneration of the Idol, but to the confirmation of the truth, that the word may be firm and the pact remain solid: and as to this, there is no sin there, because he receives what is his own: what is evil there, he detests: just as a poor man receives alms given with murmuring, and does not sin, because the giving of alms so pleases him that the attached murmuring displeases him. He indicates the same in response to the other arguments, in which he wills a private good to be sufficient. And thus hold Gabriel 3. d. 39. art. 3. dub. 1., Sayrus lib. 5. cap. 3. num. 19., Suarez tomo 3. in tertiam partem, quaest. 65. art. 4. disp. 18. sect. 1. corol. 2. et Tom. 2. de Religione, tract. de Iuramento, lib. 3. cap. 13. num. 8., Less. lib. 2. de Iustitia, cap. 42. dub. 10., Graff. 2. part. decis. lib. 2. cap. 4. num. 13., Driedo lib. 1. de libertate Christiana, cap. 9.; Sanchez num. 21. citing these, because they say it is lawful for confirming a peace, or covenants, which can pertain to the common good and to the private; the same he ought to have asserted of S. Bonavent., who has the same on foundations 4. and 5. Therefore S. Bonavent. requires some necessity, which he asserts is not extreme, nor proper necessity, but moral, ordered to mercantile dealings, truces, and other grave contracts to be entered into, which cannot be confirmed without these oaths, and in this the necessity stands.

The solution of this question, however, is gathered from another, which S. Bonavent. treats in 3. d. 37. dub. lit. num. 15., D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 78. art. 4., where the Thomists and others, to be cited presently, ask: Whether one seeking a loan from one whom he knows lends usuriously, sins.

The holy Doctors answer that one thus exacting in necessity does not sin; but they say necessity is not extreme, but the convenience of the state of some right, or the like, to which that money is necessary, nor can it easily be had elsewhere: because the precept of charity of avoiding the occasion of the neighbor's ruin does not bind so tightly that anyone is bound for that reason to neglect his own state. Thus follow Durandus 3. d. 37. quaest. 4.; there Paludanus quaest. 2. art. 1.; D. Antonin. 2. part. tit. 1. cap. 9. §. ultimo; Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 78. art. 4.; Sylvest. V. usura 7. quaest. 1.; Sotus lib. 6. de Iustitia, quaest. 1. art. 5. dub. 1.; Molina de Iustitia, Tom. 2. disp. 335.; Valentia 2. 2. disp. 5. quaest. 21. puncto 4.; Bannes 2. 2. quaest. 78. art. 4. dub. 3.; Aragon. dub. 1. concl. 1. et ibi Salon. coutron. 3.; Pett. Ledelma 2. Tomo, tract. 8. cap. 33. post concl. 29. Hence it follows that it happens very rarely that such a one sins, because the decency of his state is preserved.

The same, however, must be said of the payment of usury as of seeking a loan, as Valentia notes disp. 5. quaest. 21. puncto 4. §. Iam de secundo.

I assert first: To seek an oath without cause from an idolater, about to swear by Idols, is a mortal sin.

This difficulty, Sanchez says num. 23., is not unraveled by the Doctors, but in the similar case of usury: but the holy Doctor unraveled it ex professo and proved it gravely.

It is proved first by D. Bonavent. from that Rom. 1: Not only those who do such things are worthy of death, but also those who consent to those doing them (namely those seeking, or swearing by idols, of whom he was just now speaking); but he who exacts an oath from an idolater with no necessity and no cause can will nothing else than that the deadly oath be emitted by him: Therefore.

Secondly, because from D. Augustinus, Serm. 11. de Sanctis: He kills his own soul, and the soul of the one swearing.

THIRDLY, because the general precept of charity toward one's neighbor obliges everyone under mortal sin to avoid the other's lethal sin, when he can conveniently, and without his own, or at least common detriment; the reason is, because the spiritual good of the soul ought to be preferred to the temporal, as far as lies in us.

Sanchez says num. 23. that this argument is pressed strongly, where he adds that it is probable that even a venial fault alone is committed, unless some circumstance of a mortal end assists, as if one were to seek a loan from a usurer to be squandered with harlots, or exact an oath from a Pagan for plotting ambushes.

But many, cited by Sanchez num. 25., assert it to be venial of itself.

NOTE, indeed, that the Seraphic Doctor answers the argument, insofar as they were striving to prove that it is never lawful, on account of temporal necessity, to exact an oath from a Pagan, who sins mortally by swearing by idols; because the spiritual good of salvation is to be preferred to every temporal good; I say, to answer that at least for the common good the salvation of particulars can be omitted. He does not will to say that it is precisely necessary to press directly the necessity of the common good, but that it suffices for that cause to be reduced indirectly to the common good. Now in this way even contracts, pacts, and particular peaces are reduced to the common good, for the observance of which oaths are necessary, often with ethnics of this kind; for if oaths of this kind were taken away, the contracts of necessary mercantile dealings, of which the Pagans possess themselves, would perish; there would perish the security necessary for promises, and for a particular peace, or covenant, and thus to the great detriment of Christians they could not enter into contracts with them.

The holy Doctor adds ANOTHER response, that the salvation of the Pagan swearing is not postponed to temporal convenience, because that Pagan is otherwise an internal worshipper of idols; therefore his salvation is not gravely harmed against charity. But if he were not prepared to swear by idols, because he wished to receive the holy Christian Religion, then such an oath would by no means be to be exacted from him. This is S. Bonavent. ad tertium.

By these he clearly demonstrates that it is not lawful to exact such an oath for a temporal convenience from one not exposed, that is, who would not otherwise swear by the gods, against Sanchez num. 7. et 19. and others cited by him. This, however, I would understand thus: that it is not lawful while he is on the point of receiving Baptism and the faith; but one must wait until he is baptized, and afterwards the oath be sought, for then he will swear by the true God; but otherwise, if he were hardened in infidelity, even if he were not prepared to swear by idols, the oath could be exacted as such, and thus he could swear by the true God (of whom it is necessary that he have some knowledge), and if we knew that he would swear by the gods, because that petition is not of itself inductive to sin, but exacts what is of one's own right; it is to be ascribed to the malice alone of the one swearing, if he should swear by the gods, as I said above. And thus the response accords with the whole doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor adduced above.

At least that a greater cause is necessary in one not prepared to swear than in one prepared, all confess.