Question IX: Whether besides infused charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts

Many questions are enclosed in this one. The first is: Whether besides the acts of supernatural charity there are given acts of natural charity. Next, whether, if such acts are given, a habit of natural charity is generated from them. The other question: Whether besides the infused habit a natural habit is acquired from supernatural acts, a new habit of charity.

As to the first question: whether there is given a natural love of God as the author of nature, distinct from the supernatural, there was a variety of opinions.

The negative opinion is defended by Vasquez in the prima secundae, 1. 2. disp. 195. adducing others from the school of D. Thomas, especially Bannez 2. 2. quaest. 23. art. 1. Likewise Alvarez 2. p. quaest. 30. memb. 1. art. 2. §. 2. ad 1. Albert 2. p. tract. 4. quaest. 14. memb. 4. art. 2. Scotus in 3. dist. 27. quaest. 1. but wrongly, as Tannerus notes, disp. 2. quaest. 2. dub. 2. num. 37. And indeed Vasquez himself recognized that this was a novelty.

The true opinion therefore is, that a twofold love of God is given, certainly of friendship; one, God being the natural end; the other, the end being supernatural. So D. Bonaventure in 2. dist. 3. p. 2. art. 3. quaest. 1. in corpore, and ad 3. which he referred to this. And in the prima secundae, tract. de Gratia, disp. 7. quaest. 11. §. Nota secundo. The same thought Alvarez 2. p. quaest. 131. membr. 3. and quaest. 91. membr. 1. ad 7. Alexander of Hales lib. 2. summae, tract. 1. cap. 4. Richard 2. dist. 3. art. 7. and dist. 28. art. 1. quaest. 1. Astim. in 2. dist. 39. quaest. 1. art. 2. Abul. in cap. 19. Matth. quaest. 177. Soto lib. 1. de natura, et gratia, cap. 22. Cajetan, Conrad, Medina, and other more recent Thomists on the prima secundae quaest. 109. art. 3. Cano relect. de poenit. p. 5. Valencia tom. 2. disp. 1. quaest. 1. p. 4. Tannerus disp. 2. quaest. 2. dub. 2.

The same S. Thomas taught most clearly in p. 1. quaest. 60. art. 5. and in the prima secundae, quaest. 109. art. 3. ad 1.

And indeed that it is given is defined by Pius V. and Gregory XIII., condemning proposition 34. of Michael Baius, who denied this division.

It is proved also by the reason brought forward in the prima secundae, in the place cited, because God can be known under both aspects, and precisely as the author of nature, as the Philosophers acknowledged him: and as the author of grace and glory, as faith teaches: Therefore the will, under these distinct aspects, can pursue him with love, namely of friendship, since the end is twofold, and a good, and therefore to be loved, as S. Thomas argues ad 3.

Vasquez answers, cap. 4. that the goodness of God is indeed known by natural reason; but that it is not shown here that he is to be loved with the love of friendship, since not even among the gentiles is any trace of such love found; indeed Aristotle denied friendship between God and men.

But Aristotle in 8. and 9. Eth. conceded from this chapter true friendship between God and men, inasmuch as God is loved as an end; although from another chapter he may assert it is not entirely complete, since it is a total sharing in goods; and indeed you will find no philosopher denying that God is loved for himself as a natural end, as Tanner noted, num. 42.

You will object first, that this twofold love is not found in Scripture or the Fathers, as is seen in D. Augustine on Ps. 53. I will sacrifice to thee willingly, and epist. 113. and in Bernard in the book on loving God.

It is answered, that a twofold love is found in exercise; for the Scriptures and the Fathers preach that God is to be loved from diverse motives and from a twofold principle, whether from the benefits of nature or from the gifts of grace: For thus also they propose a twofold faith to the objection, as Tanner noted, num. 47.

You will object secondly. That love could be had without grace, and yet the love of God as friendship is repugnant to mortal sin.

It is answered, that this is not inconvenient; nor does every love of friendship conflict with sin, but only the supernatural one.

Whether, however, from this a natural habit of the love of God is produced; Cajetan denies it, prima secundae, quaest. 62. art. 3. and quaest. 109. art. 3. and Valencia here p. 1. §. 4.

But more correctly Aragon affirms it: 2. 2. quaest. 25. art. 1. ad ult. Tanner disp. 2 q. 2. dub. 2. n. 52. where he says it is the common opinion. Otherwise the foundation for finding acquired habits would vanish for us; and as to this, Meldula argues well, 3. disp. 6. quaest. 23. num. 589. since we find by clear experience that such habits are acquired. But those err, as I shall soon prove, who will that they are acquired by acts.

It can moreover be inquired, with Tanner, num. 64. Whether the habit and acts of charity, granted above, always differ in the formal object.

I assert that natural and supernatural acts can indeed have the same material object, but the adequate formal object must always be distinct. So D. Bonaventure and the others cited above, as Tannerus notes, to whom Curielem adds, p. 1. quaest. 109. art. 3. For acts are specified by the object, or are known as specified by it: But the acts of natural friendship have as object the goodness of God as it is the end of nature; but the acts of supernatural charity have as object the goodness of God inasmuch as it is a supernatural end. It is confirmed; for acts bear an intrinsic order to the formal object. What is objected on this will easily collapse.

As to the other question: Whether from supernatural acts a new habit of charity is acquired, distinct from the infused one; or whether that habit is perfected by those acts, with new degrees added: And indeed I shall inquire into the latter in quaest. 11.

As to the former part, some hold that from the acts of Faith, Hope, and Charity new habits are generated, which are not Theological virtues, since they are not infused by God; yet they are Theological, because they are concerned immediately with God. So the Nominalists, and Scotus in 3. dist. 23. and 26. whom his disciples follow, Arretinus disp. 27. art. 6. Poncius disp. 26. quaest. 2. Mastrius disp. 6. quaest. 23. and other Scotists.

The same think Aversa quaest. 55. sect. 7. Coninch. lib. 1. de virtutibus, disp. 7. dub. 3. Oviedo 1. 2. tract. 3. controv. 2. p. 4.

The second opinion denies that an acquired Charity is given. So D. Thomas 1. 2. quaest. 51. art. 4. ad 3. and the Thomists. This seems to be the opinion of D. Bonaventure 3. dist. 27. quaest. 3. in corpore, and in the de septem Itineribus AEternitatis, Itinere 4. cap. 3. at the end, where he always persists, that from the acts of the supernatural habit of charity one indeed advances in the perfection of the same habit, but no new one is produced; but that habits produced anew are from natural acts.

The same think Vasquez p. 2. disp. 79. cap. 10. Caspens. de charitate, dist. 2. sect. 2. and commonly, as Tanner relates, disp. 2. quaest. 2. dubio 4.

I assert with this opinion, that no acquired habit of Charity is given.

It is proved. Either that habit, acquired from the acts of the infused habit, would be of the same species as the infused habit, or of a diverse one. Not the first, because an infused habit is such that it cannot be made by nature: Nor the second, because a habit is made from acts of the same species.

I urge: Either this habit, acquired from the acts of the infused virtue, would be natural, or supernatural; not the first, because it would not be of the same species as the acts from which it is obtained; but a natural habit is of the same species as the acts from which it is generated. Nor the second, because otherwise it would not be made from our acts.

Mastrius answers, that it would be a natural habit, because the acts of these virtues are supernatural only as regards the manner, not the substance.

But this answer was refuted in disp. 1. quaest. 27.

You will object, because a Catholic, accustomed to elicit acts of faith and charity, acquires facility in believing; but this does not come from the infused habit, because it would produce the same effect in a Neophyte. Next it is proved, because a heretic, after the supernatural habit is lost, retains the same facility regarding those things which he still believes: Therefore from a habit acquired by supernatural acts. The same argument holds for Hope and Charity; for the same heretic experiences himself prompt to love and to hope.

S. Thomas answers, dist. 27. cit. from D. Augustine in the book de spiritu, et anima, near the beginning, that by the acts of the infused virtue the infused habit is perfected and increased by God, but no new one is acquired. So the other Thomists also answer. And indeed, as it has its origin from God, so it is increased by God, as D. Bonaventure teaches, 1. dist. 17. p. 2. quaest. 2. Therefore by supernatural acts the increase of charity is measured out to man, as D. Augustine teaches, epist. 106. cited by S. Bonaventure, fundamentum 1. and I shall show in quaest. 11. That something of facility remains in the heretic; it is answered that this is done through the acts of the natural order, which are usually elicited together with the supernatural ones.