Doubt I: Whether entrance into religion excuses from restitution

IT IS CERTAIN that one burdened with debt sins by not restoring before entrance into Religion, if he has no impediment, as Fagundez Lib. 7. cap. 28. admonishes.

IT IS ALSO CERTAIN that, if the debts are uncertain, whose owners are unknown and cannot be known even after due diligence, and which would therefore have to be restored to the poor, such debtors can licitly enter Religion, even though, remaining in the world, they might be able to acquire wherewithal to pay. So Sanchez Lib. 4. Decal. cap. 10. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 68. art. 12. fol. 1044. Manuel Rodriguez quaest. Regul. tom. 3. quaest. 10. art. 9. not. 1. This however understand, as Sanchez, et Fagundez note, when the debtor himself has been constituted debtor in his own name of uncertain goods.

THE QUESTION therefore is: whether, if someone is burdened with a certain debt and has not wherewithal to pay, yet can hope to earn by his industry in the world wherewith he might pay, he can licitly enter Religion.

GERSON denies it 2. part. Tractatu de hac re, Alphabeto 39. littera X. where he reports many Parisian Doctors, et suppl. Gabriel. in 4. dist. 38. art. 2. diffic. 12. Carbo de restit. quaest. 85. dub. 3. and others as appears in Dianam part. 2. Tract. 2. resol. 41.

ON the other hand very many affirm that he can enter Religion, and therefore is not liable to restitution. So D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. ult. art. 6. ad 3. as Caiet. Palud. in 4. dist. 38. quaest 3. art. 2. D. Anton. 2. part tit. 11. cap. 2. §. 1. Sanchez Lib. 4. Decal. cap. 19. num. 7. Rosella V. Religio 2. num. 5. et V. Restitutio 16. Angel. V. Religiosus. Sylvester. V. Religio 2. quaest. 4. Tabiena V. Religio, quaest. 11. num. 12. et ibi Armilla num. 5. Viguer. lib. instit. moral. cap. 17. §. 1. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 12. ad 1. fol. 1044. Sà V. Religio, and others as appears in Dianam.

THE third opinion is the middle one, inclining toward the second, with two conditions added. The first, when the debtor, remaining in the world, would hope that he can satisfy shortly. So Sanchez Lib. 4. Decal. cap. 19. num. 8. Maior in 4. quaest. 8. dist. 17. Nauarrus, Commentar. primo, de regular. num. 8. Azor lib. 13. cap. 1. quaestio 5. Petrus Nauarr. lib. 4. de restit. cap. 4. diffic. ult. num. 28. Sylvester verbo Religio 2. and many Canonists as appears in him, Tanner. 4. quaest. 6. disput. 15. num. 444. citing Carbonem loco citato, Valentiam quaest. 6. puncto 7. Lessium Lib. 2. cap. 16. num. 22. Lopez p. p. cap. 129. But if these are asked how much time would have to be awaited, in which he might be able to earn in order to pay; Ioan. Maior answers, two years. Nauar. one year or another. Sanchez, et Fagundez stand with Maiore.

THE other condition is, when the expectation of two years is a moral hope, so that he can pay without notable difficulty, as Nauar. Sanchez, et Fagundez say. But Sanctes in cap. 2. Regulae Minorum says another year must be awaited: It is the more common opinion.¹ What D. Bonavent. thought is not hard to find. ¹ N. Editor's note: the print/OCR reads 'Est communior cum QUID senserit D. Bonavent. non est arduum invenire'; 'cum' appears to be a stray misprint, and the sentence is rendered as two statements: 'It is the more common opinion. What D. Bonavent. thought is not hard to find.'

FOR FIRST, expounding our rule cap. 2. in those words: The Ministers shall speak to them the words of the holy Gospel, that they go and sell all their things, and strive to distribute them to the poor. But if they cannot do this (he says) on account of involvement in lawsuits, let their good will suffice, whereby what is licitly ceded and all things are despised, according to that saying of Hieronymi: If you have goods of your own, sell them: if you have not, cast them away. No one about to renounce the world can well sell what he has despised so as to sell it.

THERE the holy Doctor seems to favor those who say that if some goods are entangled, in which others have rights in some way to lawsuits, or even most just claims, and he has not wherewithal to pay, nor hope of opportunity, he may cast all behind his back.

THE SAME he recalls in speculo disciplinae ad novitios, cap. 1. et in Tractatibus de paupertate, which I have read through, in which he only admonishes that they bid the world a perfect farewell and, free of any impediment of domestic goods, whether they lack them or abound in them, fly to Christ, leaving the disposition of their possessions to expert men.

THE REASON by which D. Thom. and others support themselves is that the person of a free man is not bound to creditors; but only his goods: Therefore, by ceding them he satisfies them.

AGAINST this Fagundez argues, because it would follow that, these things perishing, the right of the creditor would perish; and thus, if new resources were acquired, they would not be subject to it, nor could the debtor be thrust into prison after the sentence of the Judge had been given.

THE REASON therefore devised by Fagundez is asserted to be this, that the person is not subjected as a slave, but only the goods are subjected. And so he is only bound to pay when he can morally; But in the said state he is accounted morally unable.

YET these reasons are not valid, and the former plainly wavers, as Fagundez says, yet it is not well overthrown by him; for if new resources arise, they are still bound by the same reason, because the debtor's goods are subjected to servitude. And so the person is not yet subjected to servitude. But if the person were imprisoned, this would be either as a punishment for past squandering, by which he precipitated himself into a state of inability to pay, dissipating goods not his own; or because fraud is presupposed, and it is still not established that he is unable to pay.

NOR does the reason of Fagundez add strength; for since the goods are subjected, and these are virtually in the person able to pay, they subject by their virtue the person, who by reason of the debt can be subjected in the natural law, as D. Bonavent. rightly argues in 2. dist. 44. quaest. penult. for Christian liberty does not exempt persons from all subjection; otherwise they would not be subject to Princes, nor to Prelates, which is most false, as I showed Tract. de Legibus, disp. 5. quaest. 1. et 2.

THE TRUE REASON therefore to be adduced is that the creditor, whose action is void because of his adversary's poverty, seems to have no action, as is said L. Nam in his, ff. de dolo malo.

Since therefore morally he is not actually able to pay, as is presupposed, nor morally by virtue, because too long a delay of time would be required for payment; it follows that he is not bound; and thus the natural law does not press upon impossibilities, and so the objections are resolved.

THEY STILL OBJECT that those wishing to enter Religion must be asked: Whether they are burdened with debt; which would be done in vain if they could licitly enter while so burdened; but this interrogation was introduced by the decree of Sixtus V. issued motu proprio in the year 1558, who declares such men as burdened with enormous debt and bound to accountings, or accounts to be rendered, incapable.

THIS decree Clemens VIII. tempered, as to the invalidity of the profession of those burdened with debt; yet not as to the illicit act of profession and the punishments of those receiving it.

YET those are not included in that Motu proprio of Sixtus V. who fell into inability to pay without their own fault, as Sanchez notes in Decal. Lib. 4. cap. 19. num. 24. Nor those to whom creditors renounce their claim. Nor those who are debtors from a merely liberal promise; but those who contracted resources for money, and after the contract squandered them, as Sanchez loco cit. et Fagundez num. 7. note.

FINALLY Sanchez judges that those who squandered through their own fault, if they make a cession of goods and leave them to the creditors, and there is no probable hope that, if they remain in the world, they could satisfy, are not included in that Motu proprio, ex his satisfit obiectioni.