Question XXIV: Whether faith is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit

The first opinion is Durandus's, who denies it entirely in 3. dist. 23. question 4. Others are with him.

The second opinion asserts it absolutely. So Scotus 3. dist. 23. and 24., whom the Scotists commonly follow, and some moderns at Mastrius disp. 6. num. 144., and likewise Bassaeus verb. Fides, 1. num. 2.

The third opinion distinguishes: Faith in itself is more certain than any intellectual habit; but on our part, by reason of its inevidence, because of which we can deny the articles of faith, whereas we cannot deny demonstrations and first principles, other habits are more known to us. So D. Thomas here, Albertus in 3. dist. 23. art. 17., Richard art. 7. question 1., Valent. question 4. p. 8., Suarez disp. 6. sect. 5., Molina p. 1. question 1. art. 5., Maetac. disp. 12. sect. 1., Pasqualig. disp. 35. sect. 2., De Lugo disp. 6. sect. 3., where he uses the very same terms as the Seraphic Doctor.

S. Bonaventure proceeds in nearly the same manner, as Valencia notes.

He supposes, however, that he is not comparing faith with the beatific vision, since that is more certain in every respect. As regards the sciences, in one way. This is understood either of those things about which there is also faith: and of these, speaking simply, Faith is more certain than science. Hence if some philosopher has known scientifically that God is one creator, etc., he nevertheless never recognizes it so certainly through science as the faithful man knows it through faith. Or science is understood of other knowables. In this way, faith is in a certain respect more certain, in a certain respect not. If we speak of the certainty of affective adherence, then the certainty in faith itself is greater than that in the habit of science, because true faith brings it about that we adhere more firmly to the truth believed than any science adheres to some thing known: for we see that true believers can be inclined to deny the faith they believe neither by arguments nor by torments: But surely you will find no Mathematician who would prudently offer his throat for the demonstrations of Euclid. But if it is understood of speculative cognition, then by reason of evidence a demonstration adheres more firmly in us.

I assert first, that faith simply, and in itself, is more certain, and of firmer adherence, than science is.

It is proved by D. Bonaventure in the Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 3. from 1 John 5. This is the victory which overcometh the world, our faith.

He shows it profusely in the sermons of S. Doctor On the Hexaëmeron 8. 9. and 10.

First from the definition of faith Hebr. 11. where it is called Substance, or conviction.

Then from the obligation which the articles of faith impose on us, he argues it with the Apostle, Hebr. 2. Therefore we ought to observe the more abundantly the things we have heard, lest perhaps we let them slip. For if the word, spoken by Angels, was made firm, etc. He proves the same with the Apostle Hebr. 1. from the dignity of Christ revealing, who is the Wisdom of the Father, and since we have the most firm testimony from the prophets, divining future things, he brings every certainty to bear. Therefore 2 Peter 1. We have the more firm prophetic word, to which you do well to attend, as to a lamp shining in a dark place.

See the Seraphic Doctor in the sermons cited, proving it wondrously.

It is PROVED indeed by S. Bonaventure in those passages especially. That habit is in itself more certain than all others which rests upon a more infallible cause or reason: Such is faith: Therefore. The major is proved; for the perfection of the cause redounds to the effect. The minor is proved, because faith rests upon divine revelation; but other cognitions upon natural reason. He repeats the same argument here. The whole argument, however, and especially the firmness of divine revelation, he confirms with very many testimonies of Scripture in the sermons cited.

It is PROVED secondly here by another argument, which Valencia uses. The certainty of a habit, or of the assent of the intellect, as it is an accident distinct from evidence and other things, properly consists in this: that as long as the certain habit or assent is retained in the intellect, one cannot deliberately fear that what is persuaded to him by such a habit or assent may not be true; But he who is truly faithful can doubt the truths of faith far less than any other evident truths, and would more easily deny any truths whatsoever than the truths of faith: Therefore etc. Albertus used the same argument.

It is CONFIRMED from the Fathers: S. Augustine 7. confessions cap. 10. I would more easily doubt that I live, than that those things are true which I have heard.

The same Saints affirm: Dionysius cap. 7. on the divine names. Basil. epist. 43. and on Psal. 115. Chrysost. homil. 12. on the epistle to the Hebrews. Ambrose on Psal. 40. Finally, most fittingly for the argument of the Seraphic Doctor, Jerome, epist. 61. cap. 3. Do you wish to know how great is the ardor of those who believe well? Hear the Apostle: And if we, or an Angel from heaven, should preach otherwise to you; let him be anathema. And in cap. 1. to the Galatians the Apostle shows the firmness of his faith, saying: I know that neither death, etc. Aptly S. Bonaventure serm. 2. on several martyrs runs through the firmness of faith from 1. cap. ad Hebr., considering the miracles wrought by the power of faith, the torments overcome, etc. Which he likewise sets forth in the sermons on the Hexaemeron cited, which one ought to transcribe word for word; for they are more precious than gold of Peru: read them through with him.

MASTRIUS answers that even the act of faith is subjectively more certain, because the act ought to be informed according to the whole perfection of its certainty. But he is mistaken, first, because otherwise all would believe in the highest degree. Secondly, I say it does not inform according to evidence, which makes the assent firmer; for the certainty of an act or habit is not taken from the certainty of the object in itself, but from the light also by which it is applied to us.

I assert secondly; On our part indeed, by one and the same reason other habits are more certain than faith, insofar as by reason of its inevidence we can deny the articles of faith.

In this sense Hugh of St. Victor lib. 1. de Sacram. p. 10. cap. 1. says: Faith is the certainty of the soul concerning absent things, constituted above opinion and below science, as S. Bonaventure relates.

It is proved by D. Bonaventure's other arguments. That is known more certainly of which one cannot doubt, because it is known by clear vision, than what is in an enigma; and that is known more certainly which can be evidently proved, than what cannot be so proved: Such is the object of science, which is evidently demonstrated, in contrast to faith: therefore. For indeed we experience first principles as such, so that they appear more certain, especially universals, such as: Whatever is, is. Every whole is greater than its part, as the Arretine notes.

But what S. Doctor said, that those sciences which pertain to faith are more certain, is proved; for the motive of reason and of authority is present, which assist one another in strengthening the truth, as Amicus observes.

YOU WILL SAY, this question seems useless, because, just as one truth is not greater than another, since it consists in an indivisible, so neither is one certainty more perfect than another.

It is ANSWERED with Lugo disp. 6. sect. 2. that the reason of truth and of certainty is different; for truth is considered in itself as the conformity of the object, and it stands in an indivisible; But certainty is relative by reason of the knowledge, which can be greater or less; according as it is more strongly represented to our intellective powers. In another way Arriaga answers disp. 3. sect. 4. num. 77.