Question I: Whether fear is a habit distinct from hope

To the virtue of Hope is attached the gift of Fear, which labors in the flight from evil, as will be clear from what is to be said.

NOTE that Fear is sometimes taken for a sensible affection, which consists in the flight from an evil apprehended [by the senses]. Second, for the flight from evil as apprehended by the intellect. Third, for the flight from some future evil, which bears some order toward God, and in this way it is considered by the Theologian; and among these Fears is also the gift of Fear.

I ASSERT that this Fear differs from Hope.

IT IS PROVED from Cardinal Bonaventure first, because according to the Saints and the Philosophers there are four distinct affections of the soul: Joy and Sorrow; Hope and Fear. Now thus they retain their essentials in respect of any evil whatsoever.

SECOND: Because just as the affections concerning the present are opposed, such as Joy and Sorrow, so too are the affections that look to the future, such as Hope and Fear.

THIRD. The habit of a virtue differs more from the habits of the gifts than the habits of the virtues differ from one another: but the habit of Fear is reckoned among the Gifts, and the habit of Hope among the virtues, as Cardinal Gregory says, book 11, Moralia, chapter 4.

FOURTH: When things are separable, they are distinguished really: but the fear of the Lord is holy, enduring unto ages of ages, Psalm 18; hope, however, is emptied in the fatherland, as I showed in disputation 4, question 11. Therefore.

FIFTH: The causes of things whose effects are opposed are themselves opposed. But Fear makes one timid; hope makes one secure: Therefore.

SIXTH. Whose formal acts are diverse, their habits also are diverse; but the act of hope is a kind of confidence and stretching forth toward arduous eternal good; while that of Fear is a flight from evil; Therefore. That these acts are diverse also comes from the variety of objects, for Potencies are distinguished by acts, and acts by objects, as Aristotle has it, book 2, de anima, 33, as Cardinal Bonaventure teaches 1 dist. 7 art. 1 q. 1 ad argumenta, and q. 3 ad argumenta, and in 2 dist. 7 p. 1 art. 2 q. 1 ad arg., and dist. 24 p. 1 art. 2 q. 1 ad arg., and in 3 dist. 23 art. 1 q. 3 ad arg., and dist. 26 art. 1 q. 2 ad arg. — they are distinguished, I say, at least a posteriori by their objects, insofar as they have the character of motive. But the object of hope is good, future, eternal, arduous: the object of Fear is a future evil, surmountable: Therefore.

YOU WILL OBJECT first: The same power abstracts from one extreme and is drawn toward the other; for indeed the same weight abstracts from the summit and is drawn to the center. The same is the power in spirits that weight is in bodies, as Cardinal Augustine says, book 11 de civitate Dei, chapter 18, and book 6 de Trinitate, chapter 10, and book 13 of the Confessions, chapter 9. Therefore there is one habit by which we flee from evil in fearing, and tend toward good in hoping.

The Holy Doctor ANSWERS by denying the parity; for in local motion, by the same motion we recede from the terminus a quo and approach the terminus ad quem, because local motion is between two extremes, one of which has the character of a principle, the other of a terminus. But in voluntary matters it happens otherwise; for when there are two opposites, the soul can be affected with regard to one while considering nothing with regard to the other; for it can be affected with regard to the good while considering nothing regarding the evil, and conversely; and therefore it is moved by diverse affections with regard to opposites.

YOU WILL OBJECT second: In the disciplines there is one discipline of opposites, as of the straight and the curved, of the healthy and the sick: But the habit of virtue is a kind of art: Therefore it directs toward opposites: Therefore the same moves both to pursuing the good and to fleeing evil.

The Holy Doctor ANSWERS by denying the likeness with the habits of the virtues, for two reasons. The first is, because the will separates things that are really conjoined; hence someone wills the antecedent, and yet does not will the consequent. But cognition does not separate things that are naturally conjoined; hence whoever knows and asserts the antecedent asserts also the consequent. And since, by reason of consequence, opposite properties follow opposites in the very thing by which they are to be known — as if white gathers, black gathers — hence it is that there can be one cognitive habit of opposites, although there is not one affective habit.

The second dissimilitude is, because the cognitive power can busily deal with either opposite by a like act; for it judges of the oblique by the rule of the straight itself; but the affective power not so; rather, if it appetites one of two opposites, it rejects the other; if it loves one, it hates the other, speaking per se. The reason is, because the affective power is more united to the appetible than the cognitive to the knowable; hence love transforms the lover into the beloved; and therefore it does not follow that, if there could be one science of opposites, there could also be one affection, or one directive virtue of affection.

YOU WILL OBJECT third. Of two extremes there is one mean: but between Despair and Presumption Hope and Fear intervene: Therefore they are one.

The Holy Doctor ANSWERS: between two extremes there is one mean dividing equally, and this is a point; but with the mean taken broadly, which is not indivisibly between the extremes, there can be several means: Thus between Brixia and Venice lies Verona, Vicenza, Padua. Therefore between the extremes of presumption and of Despair there are Hope and Fear, yet so that Fear inclines more toward despair, and Hope declines more toward presumption; yet neither reaches the defect of the other.

The Holy Doctor ALSO answers otherwise: that this is to be understood of a mean which is composed of both extremes, as Liberality intervenes between Prodigality and Avarice: but Hope and Fear do not intervene in this manner.

THIRD he answers, by denying that Fear and Hope are means of the same extremes: For Hope holds the middle between Despair and Presumption; but Fear between Rashness and Timidity, or pusillanimity; and thus it is not necessary that Fear and Hope agree in the unity of virtue, unity of affection, etc.

YOU WILL OBJECT fourth. What is begotten is like its begetter; but Hope is begotten from faith, which believes both good and evil: Therefore Hope also tends toward goods and flees evils.

The Holy Doctor ANSWERS by denying that there should be a likeness in this, all the more because Hope is produced by faith as an equivocal cause; for faith, because it regards goods and evils under the aspect of the truth revealed, can regard both: but Hope and Fear are affective habits, which do not regard good and evil [indifferently]. Furthermore, faith is a habit directed to cognition, which is not diversified on account of the contrariety of objects; but affective habits must be diverse, because they regard under diverse aspects: the good indeed under the aspect of the fitting, but evil under the aspect of the noxious.

YOU WILL OBJECT fifth. Of opposites the same is the reason; but vice, the opposite of virtue, turns away from good and turns toward evil: Therefore the same virtue performs the same.

The Holy Doctor ANSWERS that the acts of aversion from God and conversion to creatures are two, although they can be referred to one sin; because one and the same can be compared and referred to diverse things; and thus it is not the same with the affection of Fear and Hope, because one potency cannot at once and in one act be affected with regard to diverse contraries; therefore it does not follow that, if aversion and conversion can be about one action and form, likewise Fear and Hope have being about one and the same affection.