Question VII: Whether, if the accused is interrogated again, he can give only a relative answer, saying: as I answered

They SUPPOSE that the Judge is given the right to compel the accused to answer clearly, so that he be tortured if he will not answer: Chart., in praxi interr. reorum, l. 3. cap. 2. num. 11. et 25.; Iason, in Leg. Praescriptione, Cod. si contra ius vel util. publ.; Baldus, leg. Barb.; and Boss., tit. de responsis reo faciendis, num. 4. And the aforesaid torture is given to the accused, not for eliciting the truth about the crime; for to that effect preceding indications sufficient for torture are required, as Clarus says with the common view, §. fin. quaest. 64., and Chart. above num. 4. But torture in this case is given for extorting a precise assertive or negative answer, Carrer. Paris. de Pat., Bald., Bossius, Brunus, Clarus, Cason, cited by Chart. above. Indeed Follerus and Millcius add with him that an Accused refusing to answer is to be punished as a criminal; but this is admitted in a civil matter, not in criminal causes, as Socinus, Bettandus, and Chart. note, where above num. 9.; for in criminal causes silence is an indication for torture.

THEREFORE, for our matter: in the case where the Judge again wishes to examine, whether he may answer relatively so dryly: I say, as I answered before; whether the Judge is bound to accept such an answer.

MANY, whom Chart. follows, loc. cit. l. 3. cap. 2. num. 83. et 84., say the Judge can again require that he answer integrally.

I SUPPOSE that the accused can ask that his first answers be read out, Boss., tit. de respons. a reo facienda, num. 3., and others cited by Chart., num. 86.

He can also answer with a protestation, as he now recollects; but refer himself to the first answers, about which he recollected better.

But beware that at times the judge, whether covetous of money or urged on by others, presses the accused too severely; and then indeed, if the accused proceeds candidly, he is not bound to answer, as Menochius and others cited by Chartar. note, num. 87.

AND if the Accused doubts whether the Judge interrogate him first and second, he is not bound to answer. So Bannes, Henriquez, Less., Salas, Sanchez, Sotus, and others cited by them. And Diana asserts this as more probable, p. 3. tract. 5. resol. 106., bringing forward Lessius, l. 2. cap. 31. dub. 3.; Sanchez, T. 2. l. 6. cap. 3. num. 24.; Salas, p. 2. quaest. 21. tract. 8. d. un. sect. 17. num. 155.; Henriquez, l. 14. cap. 3. num. 3. in Gloss. littera X.; Bannes, Soto, Medina, and others, against Sancius, Select. disp. 43. num. 28. The reason is that it is a greater evil that a man be killed on my confession, than that I not obey the Judge, uncertain in possession of the right of questioning him. Moreover, everyone is presumed good until he be proved bad; and the laws favor the accused as one in possession.

But the Accused thus presumptively in possession can require that the depositions of the witnesses be given to him; and as long as they are not given, he can reasonably doubt whether he is being questioned lawfully. So Aldiete. of the Society of Jesus, de Religiosa disciplina tuenda, l. 2. cap. 4. num. 7.; Caietanus, and Aragon., 2. 2. quaest. 69. art. 2.; Ioan. de Cruz, in direct. p. 1. tract. 8. art. 8. dub. 9. concl. 1.; Sanchez, in Summa t. 1. disp. 3. cap. 7. num. 15.; Salon., 2. 2. quaest. 69. art. 2. controv. 2.; Lessius, l. 2. cap. 31. dub. 3. num. 10.; Segura de Auolos., in direct. iud. p. 2. cap. 24. num. 3.; Miranda, in ord. iudic. T. 2. quaest. 19. art. 13.; Diana, p. 3. Tract. 5. resol. 91., where, with Salzedo, in pract. cap. 126., he praises the rite of certain Judges who, before the confession of the Accused, order the Tabellion or Notary that the depositions of the witnesses be read in the presence of the Accused without their names, whence he may have proven what stands against him.

ADVERTISE, however, that the Doctors alleged assert the same even concerning regular Judges, as Diana notes. Wherefore Ioseph a S. Maria is deceived, in Tribun. Relig. tract. 4. cap. 17. §. 3., saying these rules do not obtain in the judgment of Regulars. To them add Navar., in Summa, cap. 25. num. 35.; Rodriquez, in ord. iud. cap. 10. n. 3.; Bonacina, in Decalogum disp. 10. q. 3. p. 2.; Dictus, q. 81. num. 37.

NEITHER does it avail in this case to say that the Prelate is in possession of superiority, as Lorca objects, 2. 2. sect. 3. disp. 53. num. 8. et 9. For Dictus answers that this is true in simple extrajudicial obedience, of which the objection is verified; but otherwise in judicial obedience, in which a superior, even a Regular, is not in possession unless the order of law is observed.

Diana, 4. p. Tract. 8. resol. 130., treats of this question again, p. 4. tract. 8. resol. 130., treating of the judgment of the Holy Inquisition, where greater severity is required; and he says that in that forum it is not required that the witnesses and other indications be made manifest. Lodovicus Peguera notes the same, in praxi crim. cap. 12. §. 5. num. 13. For the rest he refers himself to those things which he had said, tract. 5. resol. 91., in 3. p.; and he brings forward also Suarez de Paz., in praxi, tom. 3. p. 5. cap. 3. num. 14., constantly confirming that it is certain the Judge is bound to notify the Accused of the depositions of all the witnesses; otherwise he is most wretchedly deceived.

Whence you have that it was badly said, quaest. 81. num. 39., that it would drive us to straits to say that Diana moderates that opinion which he had handed down in that resol. 91., and to think it enough if the Accused be told by the Judge that he is held, so that proceedings be taken against him; and he brings forward also Bouentius, in direct. p. 2. cap. 55., verbo Reus.