Question IV: Whether ignorance excuses from heresy, and what ignorance

THE DIFFICULTY is, because heresy means error with pertinacity, whether ignorance includes pertinacity, and what that may be.

THE FIRST opinion is, that no gravely culpable ignorance excuses from heresy. So Sotus 4. dist. 22. quaest. 2. art. 3. Lopez 2. part of the Instructorius, where he treats of excommunication, cap. 20. Palacius 3. dist. 25. disp. 2. and Lorca disp. 41. de fide, having abandoned the contrary opinion he had taught in the prima secundae, disp. 33. membr. 2. ad 3. The same seems to be the mind of D. Bonav. here, as Sanchez reports num. 19. in the place to be cited.

THE SECOND opinion asserts the same thing, when the ignorance is exceedingly gross and easily vincible. So Sayrus, and Valentia thinks it probable.

THE THIRD opinion admits it, when the ignorance is affected. So Cano, Navar, Corduba, and Torrensis, whom Suarez reports disp. 19. sect. 3. and Valentia disp. 1. quaest. 15. p. 1. diffic. 4.

THE FOURTH opinion distinguishes regarding affected ignorance; for if it is affected out of a false opinion against the Church, as if the proposition of the Church were of small moment, or with a view to erring more freely in faith, it does not excuse from heresy: But if it is affected only out of negligence and weariness of learning, or from any other cause, it does not make one a heretic. So Thomas Sanchez lib. 2. in decal. cap. 7. num. 33. citing Vasquinus prima secundae, disp. 126. cap. 2. Zumel prima 2. quaest. 76. art. 4. disp. 1. and nearly Tannerus disp. 1. quaest. 8. disp. 5. who adheres to this partly with Soto and Valentia.

THE FIFTH opinion is, that any ignorance at all, both gross and affected, excuses from heresy. So Sylvester v. haeresis, Azorius t. 1. lib. 8. cap. 9. quaestio. 8. Bannes, Aragon. quaest. 11. art. 2. Conchinchius, and others, whom Castro Palao cites and follows, tract. 4. disp. 3. p. 2. num. 5. Suarez in the said sect. 3. num. 9. Hurtad. disp. 81. §. 10. where others assert the same; and Card. Lugo disp. 16. de poenit. sect. 4. §. 6. and disp. 17. de fide, sect. 4. and disput. 20. sect. 6. Diana p. 1. tract. 5. Resol. 1. Fagund. lib. 1. cap. 4. saying this is the view of D. Bonav. and D. Thom.

I ASSERT therefore, first, that the first opinion is probable, which the holy Doctor indicates with a single word in the cited dubium.

IT IS PROVED first by the authors of the first opinion, with D. Bonav., from D. August. epist. 162. which is found in decret. 24. quaest. 3. cited there; the Apostle said, where he says: Those who defend their own opinion, however false and perverse it may be, with no pertinacious obstinacy, but seek the truth with careful diligence, ready to be corrected when they shall have found it, are not to be reckoned among heretics.

With these words of D. August. he excuses from the plague of heresy only those who diligently seek the truth; not those who neglect to find it, and much less those who deliberately flee lest they find it.

Card. Lugo RESPONDS num. 176. that Augustine excuses indeed those who seek the truth; but others he neither excuses nor declares heretics; what was certain he decided; what was less certain, about that he did not dispute.

But Lugo TWISTS the authority, because S. August. lib. contra Manichaeos, reported in cap. Qui in Ecclesia, 24. quaest. 3. declares as heretics only those who, admonished that the Church teaches the contrary, still resist pertinaciously: Who in the Church, he says, hold some diseased and perverse sentiment, if corrected so as to hold what is sound and right, resist contumaciously, and are unwilling to amend their pestilential and deadly dogmas, but persist in defending them, are heretics. The same he teaches in lib. 4. de Baptismo, contra Donatistas, cap. 16. saying: The one who through error believes the same as Photinus is first a heretic when, the doctrine having been made manifest to him, he prefers to resist the Catholic faith, and chooses to hold what he held. Fulensis urges this in lib. 3. cap. 6.

Yet these things avail Lugo nothing: For in the former passage I would have him find where S. August. has the particle only. He puts it well that pertinacious persons knowingly are heretics; but in the passage alleged by us he assigns all the conditions lest anyone be a heretic for any cause, and therefore there it is extended more broadly.

In the other passage he evidently speaks of one who is invincibly ignorant, for he says: Let us suppose two men, one of whom holds about Christ what Photinus held, and is baptized in his heresy outside the communion of the Catholic Church: but the other holds the same, yet is baptized in the Catholic Church, thinking it to be the Catholic faith. Him I do not yet call a heretic, unless, the doctrine having been made manifest to him, he should prefer to resist the Catholic faith.

MOREOVER Lugo concedes it to be certain that one who ignorantly, with inculpable ignorance, is ignorant of the articles is not a heretic, because he seeks the truth; and that it is an opinion, uncertain, which says that those ignorantly culpable are not heretics.

It is proved secondly by D. Bonavent. in 2. dist. 22. art. 2. quaest. 2. in corpore. In all other matters sin from ignorance and sin from knowledge share the same malice and belong to the same species (although one offending from knowledge may offend more gravely within the same species;) thus he who kills knowingly and he who kills from culpable ignorance is guilty of homicide, and so of the rest: Therefore also he who falls into heresy from such ignorance is a heretic. This argument is commonly used.

They heap up many responses of no weight, which are refuted by Hurtado disp. 82. §. 56. and Lugo in the place cited de Poenitentia, who also refutes the responses of Hurtado.

Lugo responds that they do not differ indeed in species, yet have different effects, just as casual homicide and voluntary homicide; for this latter has joined to it a graver irregularity; thus neither do they damn the heretic from ignorance and the heretic from mere malice with the same punishments.

Lugo is mistaken; for first he concedes that heresy is that of one who offends from ignorance; and consequently that before God he is guilty of this crime, and that is what I ask. But since the heretic is condemned by the Church with excommunication, it follows that this man is condemned, since he is a heretic. Hence, by saying that this man is not punished by the Church, even if it be conceded that he is a heretic, the principle is begged and a contradiction involved.

It is proved thirdly by D. Bonavent. from foundation 3. on which the others principally rely, as Lugo says n. 182. To know what is to be believed and done belongs to faith, as its acts: Therefore the opposite, namely to be culpably ignorant, belongs to infidelity: But it does not belong precisely to Paganism or Judaism, since the confession of the Christian Religion is still retained: Therefore it belongs to heresy; for there are no other species of infidelity. Nor let them say that it belongs incompletely to heresy; for since it is a most grave sin, it ought to be in some species as a complete individual, as Lorca num. 16. and Lugo num. 182. concede; nor does he solve it by saying that it is a sin against faith; yet not heresy, Paganism, or Judaism, since it is also a proper infidelity, which is divided into three heads. For the contrary is true, because one must find the species under which this sin stands.^{1 1} N. Editor's note: the print/OCR reads 'oportet inveniat speciem'; rendered as 'one must find the species' because the syntax is anomalous (expected 'oportet inveniri speciem') but the sense is clear.

It is confirmed by D. Bonavent. because for the other species of infidelity, namely Judaism and Paganism, culpable ignorance suffices.

It is proved fourthly most effectually by D. Bonavent. in corpore, for since it is necessary for salvation not to be ignorant of the things of faith, certainly all are bound to know them, and few are they who deliberately refuse to know, by affecting ignorance; but for the most part they are ignorant; and if heretics are only those who know and affect ignorance, very few will be heretics; for, as I have seen by experience, disputing with heretics, they labor under great gross ignorance, as the Most Eminent Lugo concedes num. 194.

Hence culpable ignorance rightly does not excuse in the external forum, as Castro Palao notes, Tract. 4. disp. 3. p. 2. and Menochius, Farinacius, Peña, Simancas, Albertinus, and others, cited by Diana 4. p. Tract. 7. resol. 36. Yet sometimes it helps to diminish the punishment; yet not entirely, as these assert. But all these things are true much more of affected ignorance.

You will object. One sinning from ignorance can have a universal will of eliciting acts of faith, and of believing all things that are sufficiently proposed: But heresy essentially is pertinacity.

D. Bonavent. responds in the places cited that such a man has lost faith. For truly in the cited dubium he admits this argument.

I assert therefore, secondly, that the fifth opinion is probable. It is evident from the argument adduced.