Question VIII: Whether it is lawful to narrate a crime, notorious in one place, in another, where it is not known

We must suppose some cases, in which the difficulty about this matter is not so grave.

I SUPPOSE first, that manifesting the crime of anyone, even one already defamed, with the evil intention of gravely harming him, is mortal against charity. Thus the Doctors commonly, at Fagundez on the eighth precept of the Decalogue, cap. 4. n. 3., with St. Bonaventure, cap. 1. and 4. of the Speculum animae, where he often insists that the malice consists in the intention of harming.

I SAY second. If someone formerly defamed has now recovered his reputation, it will be mortal to defame him again by renewing the memory of the crime. Thus the Doctors commonly, at Fagundez num. 4.; Tanner, disp. 4. quaest. 8. n. 143., although Lessius, l. 2. cap. 11. dub. 13., says it is only against charity.

I SAY third. If someone is defamed in one place and has not repaired his reputation, it is not mortal to relate his crime in another place, where his reputation must soon be carried. Thus Tanner, disput. 4. quaestione 8. num. 142.; Fagundez, numer. 9., citing Malderus, de Iustitia tract. 7. cap. 1. dub. 6.; Toledo, l. 5. cap. 63; Peter de Navarra, lib. II. cap. IV. num. 295; Lessius, lib. II. cap. XI. de tract. dub. 18. num. 78; Aragon, Bauny, Valencia; and others, to be cited below, who hold that it is not mortal to relate it even in an alien place, where the reputation was not to be carried. The same say Tannerus, and many at his place: if anyone publishes the sentence of a Judge in even the most remote place, it is not a sin. But about this there is a great question.

The FIRST opinion is, that it is a mortal sin, at least against CHARITY, to relate some crime in a place where reputation would never arrive. In this sentiment are the Doctors commonly, at Diana, part. III. tract. V. resol. 17.; Lessius, lib. II. cap. XI. dub. 13. num. 28.; Sayrus, lib. V. quaest. X. art. II.; Villalobos, tom 1. tract. XI. diffic. 6. num. 13.; Faber, in IV. disp. 53. n. 130.; Salon, 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. II. controv. 18.; Navarrus, lib. II. cap. IV num. 288.; Sayrus, lib. XI. cap. IX. n. 25.; Malderus, 2. 2. tract. VII. cap. I. dub 6.; Adrian, quodl. XI., and very many others at the places cited, with Toledo, lib. V. c. 65.; Tanner, disp. IV. quaest. VIII num. 142.; Bassaeus, V. Detractio, 1. num. 10.

The SECOND opinion denies that it is mortal. Thus Fagundez, on the eighth precept of the decalogue, lib. VIII. cap. IV. from num. 11. (a passage Diana cites wrongly.) The same think Cajetan, tom. II. opusc. 31. respons. 9.; Navarrus, summa, cap. XVIII. num. 26.; Maior, in IV. dist. XXI. quaest. II.; Azor, part. III. lib. XIII. dub. 8.; Filliucius, tom. II. tract. 32. cap. IX. num. 255.; Diana, loc. cit.; and Nangus, 3. part. tract. I. quaest 80. art. VI. diffic. 3., judges it probable.

The REASON is, because when crimes are notorious, the authors of them have lost their right to reputation; and if they have lost it by the sentence of a judge, it is a punishment, as is supposed, just, inflicted by judges, who intend that it be known by all.

For truly, if a crime has been committed in some house, it will not be lawful to sound the trumpet through the streets and squares, and that will be mortal against justice. Soto, lib. V. de Iustitia quaest. X. art. II.; Malderus, de iustitia tract. VII. cap. I.; Fagundez, num. 10.

The REASON is, because he is not deprived of right by law, even if some rumor had broken out; and indeed a broad way would be opened to detractions.