Question IV: Whether it is usury to receive beyond the principal any other emolument whatever besides money

I SUPPOSE first, that usury is to receive from the force of a loan, beyond the principal, some profit even estimable in money; for, as the Philosopher says lib. 4. Eth. cap. 1. et D. Bonavent. ad cap. 4. Regulae nostrae, we call money all those things whose valuation the coin measures; but to receive from the force of a loan money beyond the principal is usury, as we saw quaest. 1.; therefore also to receive something estimable in money and price. So D. Bonavent. in speculo animae, cap. 2. D. Thom. art. 2. and it is the opinion of D. Augusti in Psalm. 36. Valencia proves it quaest. 21. puncto 2. with D. Bonavent. on those words, Ioan. 2. Eiecit nummularios, and 18. Ezech. Usuram, et superabundantiam non accipias.

I SUPPOSE second, that it is not usury if someone receives something estimable in money beyond the principal, not as exacting it by the force of the loan, but as a gratuitous gift. The reason is, because if such a man did not lend, he could receive that gift; but he is not made worse off by lending. So the Doctors commonly, and the Holy Doctor supposes everywhere, with the others, in Valencia puncto 2. see what I have said on this matter, tom. 4. disp. 17. quaest. 10. ad proposit. 42. according to the decree of Alexander VII.

The QUESTION is: Whether one who excites the borrower to a remuneration is usurious.

There WERE some, as Ioannes Maior 4. dist. 15. quaest. 29. et Couar. lib. 1. var. cap. 20. num. 4. bringing forward others, who said that an agreement could be entered into without danger of usury with the borrower concerning some gift to be given back, under the title of a grateful mind, yet not under the title of the loan. The same is taught by the authors cited quaest. 2. secundo loco.

COMMONLY, however, with D. Thom. all here deny that it is licit to introduce into the agreement any remuneration of a gratuitous thing, and therefore Valencia quaest. 21. puncto 2. gravely concludes that the opinion of Maior is not to be brought into practice. The same think Lessius cap. 20. num. 58. Tanner. disp. 4. quaest. 7. num. 90. unless perhaps under the aspect of friendship (they say), when the thing is of such a kind that it is usually bestowed from gratuitous motive. So also those cited for the 3rd opinion quaestione 2.

The greater CONTROVERSY is: Whether it be licit to excite at least the borrower to some remuneration.

They ASSERT Valencia loco cit. Caietanus hic Molina tract. 2. disp. 305. Rebell. part. 2. lib. 8. quaest. 4. n. 8. Bonacina de contract. disp. 3. quaest. 3. punct. 2. n. 10. Salon. hic ad art. D. Thom. controu. 2. Diana p. p. Tract. 8. resol. 62. where he adds that it is licit to lend who would not lend, until the borrower, excited by the lender, says that he will give some gift, yet not from justice, but from fidelity. The same holds Salas Tract. de usuris, disp. 7. num. 6. who also adds that it is not usury to receive an inducement from him whom I know will not give, except out of fear lest a loan be again denied him, or lest he seem or be called ungrateful. This, however, Caietanus ad 4. Petrus Nauar. lib. 3. cap. 2. num. 211. Nauar. cap. 17. num. 219. et alii. deny.

MOREOVER, that it is not licit to insinuate this, teach Richardus in 4. dist. 15. art. 5. quaest. 5. Scotus quaest. 2. Angles quaest. de contract. mutui, art. 2. defin. 5. concl. 1. et alii.

The Holy Doctor SETS FORTH his opinion ad 6. Lucae in these words: mutuum date, nihil inde sperantes, in these words: mutuum date, nihil inde sperantes, scilicet recompensationis, Deutet. 23. Fratri autem tuo absque usura id, quo indiget, commodabis, ut benedicat tibi Dominus Deus tuus in omni opere tuo, in terra, ad quam ingredieris possidendam: idest, non quaeras retributionem de hoc ab homine, sicut usutarii, qui propter spem usurae perdunt spem vitae aeternae. Against whom the Apostle says, prima Corinth. 15. Si in hac vita tantum in Christo sperantes sumus, miserabiliores sumus omnibus hominibus. Such are the rich, who hope in riches, etc. Note that hope in a loan can be, either for a like service, or for profit: in the first way it is licit: in the second way it can be twofold, either expressed by agreement, and this is simply prohibited; because it makes one usurious. Or it is tacit, and in the heart, and in this way twofold: either as principally moving to the loan, and this likewise is prohibited, because it makes one usurious. Or it is tacit, and in the heart; and in this way twofold; either as principally moving to the loan; and this likewise is prohibited, because it is against the divine commandment: Or it is not principally moving, but as it were annexed, because, although he does not act principally for profit, such as gain, he nevertheless believes the recipient will not be ungrateful to him, and for that reason lends the more willingly. Here, however, there is not such a hope of gain as is against the divine commandment. Such is the Holy Doctor, who openly denies every agreement and inducement in the manner in which Salas says; yet, since he grants that some gift can be hoped for and desired out of gratitude, he will consequently grant also some gentle insinuation, in charming words, which nevertheless impart neither fear nor any force, but only express his own frame of mind, for instance by saying: I give to you willingly, and I give without interest, and the more willingly as I hope that you will not be ungrateful, through your kindness. This manner surely is safe.

I ASSERT therefore first, that it is not licit to make any agreement in this matter.

It is PROVED, because thus it compels, and takes away liberty from a free loan; and although, metaphysically abstracted, it might have value; yet in its modality, and in practice, it is not good. Indeed it is against the divine precept Lucae 6. by which certainty of gain from a loan is forbidden, as the Holy Doctor argues, and with him Valencia.

From which it follows that it is not licit to make an agreement that the borrower be bound to come to your mill and your workshop, even to buy at a just price. So very many, in Tanner disput. 4. quaest. 7. dub. 3. num. 88. iuxta cap. Naviganti, de usuris. The reason is, because this too is an obligation estimable by price.

I assert second, that this can be insinuated charmingly, in the manner said, with D. Bonaventure.

It is proved from the Holy Doctor. The interior and exterior act are of the same account, goodness, and malice: but the interior act from the note of a grateful mind is licit: Therefore also the exterior insinuation. It is confirmed by D. Bonavenr. in speculo animae, cap. 2. loco cit. et hic ad 6. Lucae, for the formal object of usury is profit from the force of the loan, whether explicit or implicit, desired, or in hope; but that act of insinuation has not the formal object of Usury, nor anything like it impelling and exacting: Therefore. So also Diana, and others.

Therefore the Holy Doctor concludes that one who lends does not commit mental usury from the hope of gain, provided he does not hope for gain as the price of the loan, but from the gratitude, or friendship, of the borrower; wherefore it can stand that the lender would not have lent if the hope of gain ceased, and that he does not commit mental usury; provided he intends gain from a grateful and benevolent mind, as Caspensis says sectione 1. in fine.